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SUMMARY:

Is

prayer

in

the

public

schools,

or a

-

minute of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer," a viola-

----------------'---·
tion of the Establishment
2.

-

,_,

Clause?

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

Jaffree,

the

resp and

applee here, is the father of three children in the Mobile County
public schools.

He brought suit against the school board seeking

a declaration and injunction barring the daily recitation of certain prayers in each of his three children's classes.

The three

prayers (one per class) were:
God is great, God is good, and we thank Him for our
food.
By His hands we all are fed, Give us Lord our
daily bread. Amen.
God is great,
food.

God

is good Let us thank Him for our

For health and strength and daily food we praise Thy
name, oh Lord.
Jaffree also sought damages.

Jaffree later amended his complaint

to include as defendants the Governor of Alabama and other state
authorities, and to add a constitutional challenge to two state
statutes.

~

The first, Ala. Code §16-1-20.1, provides:

At the commencement of the first class of each day
in all grades in all public schools, the teacher in
charge of the room in which each such class is held may ~
announce that a Eer ~d of silence not to exceed one _ . ,
r.
minute in duration shall be observed for meditation or ~
voluntary prayer, and during an y suc fi per i od no othe r
actl vl t1es- s hall be engaged in.
The second statute, Ala. Code §16-1-20.2, reads:
From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any
public educational institution within the State of Alabama, recognizing that the Lord God is one, at the beginning of any homeroom or any clas·s , may p ray, may
lead the willing st ~ nts in prayer, or may lead the
willing students in the following prayer to God:

Almighty God, You alone are our God.
We acknowledge
You as the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. May
Your justice, Your truth, and Your peace abound this
day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the counsels of
our government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the
classrooms of our schools in the name of our Lord.
Amen.
Petrs in No. 83-929 are 624 individuals--evidently local citizens
and parents--who intervened as defendants in the DC.
The DC
junction

first issued a preliminary in- L} C:.

(SD Ala, Hand, C.J.)

barring

the

implementation

of

the

statutes.

In

opinion on the merits, however, it dismissed the complaint.
DC

thoroughly

canvassed

the

historical

evidence

its ~-

~

and concluded

that (1) the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to incorporate
the Establishment Clause,

and

( 2)

the Establishment Clause was

not intended to bar prayer in the public schools.

JUSTICE POWELL

stayed the DC's judgment and reinstated the preliminary injunction,

noting

that

the case appeared

Court's precedents.

to be controlled by

this

103 S.Ct. 842, 843 (1983).

CAll reversed.

It said this Court had rejected the interpre-

tat ion of history advanced by the DC, and by appts and petrs,
citing,

e.g.,

Abington

School

(1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
Educ., 330
ers,

it

u.s.

1 (1946).

rejected

Dist.

u.s.

v.

Schempp,

374

u.s.

203

421 (1962); Everson v. Board of

As for the individual classroom pray-

the argument that since the teachers'

prayer

activities were not motivated by school board policy or state
statute--the teachers testified they were not aware of the challenged statutes--there was no state action.

The court held

that )~
~h..,_.

the school board was aware of the teachers' activities and took
no

efforts

to

stop

it,

thereby

ratifying

their

conduct.

The

court then found the activities to have a religious purpose and
effect.

---

As

for

------

the statute containing the sample prayer,

the

court held that the law amounted ..._
to the establishment of a state
religion,

quoting Engel,

supra,

at 425

("it is no part of the

-

business of government to compose official prayers for any group
to recite as part of a religious
ment").

Finally, with respect to th

the court noted the DC's finding in
tion that the statute was intended "to return prayer to the publie schools,"

(citing testimony of law's sponsor).

It held

the statute lacked a secular legislative purpose.

It also

c::' IJ !/

that the statute had the primary effect of advancing religion.
Four CAll judges dissented from denial of rehearing en bane
as to the moment-of-silence _:..t atute (Roney, Tjoflat, Hill,

Fay). ~

They said that 18 states have adopted similar statutes, that
Court has never

this ~

ruled on their constitutionality, that the DCs

are split on the question, and that the statute may be constitutional, citing Schempp, supra,
concurring)

at 281,

and n.

57

(BRENNAN, J.,

(suggesting such a statute might be constitutional);

Gaines v. Anderson,

421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976)

The dissenters

statute).

(upholding

also said that the testimony of

the

sponsor the Alabama law should not be used to invalidate "a neutral statute which is both facially and operationally constitutional."
3.

conducted

by

CONTENTIONS:
the

No.

individual

83-804 attacks only the prayers

teachers

in

Mobile.

It

says

the

Board did not advocate the prayer activities, but was neutral,

'

.

and that the teachers were merely exercising their free speech
and free exercise rights.
the DC that

They repeat the arguments made before

the First Amendment was not

intended

to prohibit

prayer in the schools, and that the Fourteenth Amendment was not
intended to incorporate the Establishment Clause.
No. 83-812 is addressed to the constitutionality of the two

~~atutes.
~ments

the ~en~f-silence s~a~

As to

of the CAll dissenters.

they repeat the

Appts urge a decreased empha-

sis on the purpose of a statute, and an increased emphasis on the
free exercise issues in prayer-statute challenges than they say
this Court or

the lower courts have shown.

As to the statute

containing the prayer, appts urge that the question of the basic
meaning of the religion clauses be reopened, especially on the
issue of school prayer.
Story's

commentaries--does

They also make
that

They say history--particularly Justice

the

the Court's

not

support

this

Court's

position.

Finally,

they say

the flames of

religious

incorporation argument.

rulings have "fanned

factionalism," and suggest that this case offers a rare opportunity to reconsider those rulings because of the record created in
the DC.
The SG has filed an amicus brief supporting appts in No. 83812.

Without intending to "minimize" the "broader issues raised

by the appellants here," he presents only the quest ion of the
constitutionality of the moment-of-silence statute.
the arguments of

the CAll dissenters.

~ ~lso

He repeats

says that this

case would be an appropriate vehicle for addressing the momentof-silence statute; he does not think whether a statute contains

s;-0:

the word "prayer," as this one does, is of constitutional significance, citing DC cases (p. 9, n. 9).

The SG also says this case

offers the opportunity to evaluate government efforts to accommodate

interests of

religious

individuals

in the public schools.

He says he thinks the lower courts have been applying the threepart test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
No.

83-929

repeats

the

u.s.

arguments

602 (1971), too rigidly.

contained

adding additional historical evidence.

in

No.

83-812,

In addition appts argue

that because incorporation was not intended, CAll's decision violates the Tenth Amendment.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The Court has shown no inclination to

overrule either its early prayer cases or its incorporation decisions.

Two Terms ago,

/(.

\.. {

the Court affirmed a CAS opinion invali-

dating a voluntary prayer statute less suspect than the statute
~~

'--

"'---

here that contains the suggested prayer.
--~,--

653 F.2d 897

(CAS 1981)

See Karen B. v. Treen,

'-"

(statute provided for voiced, voluntary

prayer by student or teacher for up to five minutes, with opportunity

for

excusing

objecting

(1982).

The

circulating

Lynch v.

Donnelly

(No.

82-12S6)

attacked

by petrs

and

appts

students),

majority

and

aff'd,

4SS

concurring

u.s.

opinions

913
in

reaffirm the basic propositions

here.

Thus,

unless

the Court has

changed its mind, ' those of the questions presented in No. 83-812
(question 2) and No. 83-929 (questions 2-S) that address the constitutionality of
summarily affirmed.
sentially

,.

factual

Ala.

Code

Also,
holding

§16-1-20.2

should

be

DFWSFQ'ed

or

there is no reason to review the esthat

there

was

state

action

in

the

prayers conducted

in the three classrooms that were originally

challenged, so cert. should be denied in No. 83-804.
As the SG recognizes, the challenge to the moment-of-silence (_~
statute

stands

on different

ground.

'-------· - - -

The constitutionality of

that does appear to be a question of first impression.

J 4J

It seems

to me that such statutes are religious both in purpose and prima-

-------

ry effect, but with four CAll judges, many commentators, and numerous states disagreeing, the question appears to be worthy of
plenary review.

The fact that so many state statutes would be )

affected further suggests the appropriateness of noting
jurisdiction.

probable /~

I am not sure that the SG is right that the inclu-

sion of the word "prayer" in the statute makes no difference, but

~

that is a question that can be left for the next case, if necessary.

Also, the finding of religious purpose below probably will

not make a good deal of difference, since it is based on ambigu-

No. 83-804--DENY.

50

No.

to Question 1 with an eye to NOTING

probable jurisdiction on that question.
FIRM as to Question 2

DFWSFQ or SUMMARILY AF-

0

No. 83-929--CFR as to Question 1 with an eye to NOTING
probable jurisdiction on that question.

DFWSFQ or SUMMARILY AF-

FIRM as to Questions 2-5.
Response

waived

response in 83-929.

in

83-804

&

83-812.

There

is

no

The SG has filed an amicus brief supporting

appts in No. 83-812.
January 20, 1984

Neuhaus

Opin in petn & 83-812 appx

.'

'·'

./

'-- .
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..JUSTICE: SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

March 26, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
There are at least two principle variations on an
appropriate order noting jurisdiction in these cases.
83-812 and 83-929 - In these cases probable
jurisdiction is noted limited to Question 1
in the jurisdictional statements. The cases
are consolidated and a total of one hour is
allotted for oral argument. The judgment
with respect to the other issues presented by ___ ~
the appeals is affirmed. (72c.. .....-~~ ~
83-804 - The petition for a writ of
certiorari is denied.

~f ~~~

-~~

~~~
83-812 and 83-929 - In these cases probable
JUrisdiction is noted limited to Question 1
in the jurisdictional statements. The cases
are consolidated and a total of one hour is
allotted for oral argument.
83-804 - The petition for a writ of
certiorari is denied.
If we adopt the second approach we would presumably
affirm as to the other questions when we announce our
decision on the moment of silence. I am inclined to prefer
the first option disposing of the remaining questions
immediately, but it is not clear what the Conference
prefers.
Sincerely,

.·
,•
...t:

..

i-

Justice
Just ice
J usti ce
,T n.~ tj c e
Just ice

Karenall
Blackmun
Po·Nell
Reh!:quist
O'Connor

;;'ro!:l : J ustice Stevens
'C ircul.a;t&tl:

- . . . :=------~--

~~~=~--------83-812 - Wallace v. Jaffree: 83-929 - Smith v. Jaffree

JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.

In his amended complaint in this case, appellee sought (1)
a judgment holding two statutory provisions, Ala. Code
20.1,

Ala. Code

§

16-1-

§

16-1-20.2, and certain allegedly State

sanctioned, though not statutorily sanctioned,

school prayer

practices invalid under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, applicable to the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and (2) an injunction against the enforcement of these
statutory provisions and non-statutory practices.
Court dismissed the amended complaint.

The District

The Court of Appeals

reversed the District Court's judgment in relevant part.

It held

the challenged statutory provisions and non-statutory practices
unconstitutional and ordered the District Court to enter an
injunction.

Appellants invoke this Court's appellate

jurisdiction under 28

u.s.c.

§

1254(2) regarding the Court of

Appeals' judgments on the statutory provisions.

As I understand it, the order this Court enters today is a
holding that Ala. Code

§

16-1-20.2 is invalid as repugnant to the

Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the

fh,-,

O; r'r'e.t- f- /J

inf-e/f r'eA-r

ti-t..

Ccu~t- 1f

-1-~ir 1!4/~'Yt~"'.l-rt..ll... o~ (A.Jq,.,.3 wirl..

fht'r

(1.,-cfe,.,:

7,-~<icn-r,~

{I. J.;J. ..u+
ha¥e.

r..eAt

if

irrvJ)~

v.,~,· /

-2-

States under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Moreover, the Court's

order also affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar
as it directed the District Court to enjoin the appellants from
enforcing Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2.

The judgment of the Court of

Appeals concerning the non-statutory school prayer practices is
not within the appellate jurisdiction of this Court and is
challenged in a petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 83-804.
The Court denies that petition.

The Court's order noting probable jurisdiction is thus
limited to the judgment of the Court of Appeals concerning the
constitutionality of Ala. Code §16-1-20.1 (1982).

Appellants

frame the constitutional questions presented by that provision as
follows:
"Whether a state statute which permits, but does
not require, teachers in public schools to observe up
to a minute of non-activity for meditation or silent
prayer has the predominant effect of advancing
students' liberty of religion and of mind rather than
any effect of establishing a religion." Juris.
Statement, No. 83-812 i.
"Does a moment of silence for individual silent
'prayer or meditation' at the beginning of each school
day in a public school classroom violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as
interpreted by its language, framers' intent, and
history?" Juris. Statement, No. 83-929 i.

On the understanding that the Court has limited argument to
the question whether Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 is invalid as
repugnant to the Establishment Clause, applicable to the States
under the Fourteenth Amendment, I join the Court's order.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

Tb:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

No.

November 30, 1984

Lee

83-812

and

83-929,

Wallace

v.

Jaffree,

Smith

v.

Constitute

an

Jaffree.

QUESTION PRESENTED

~~

Does

~

Establishment

the

Alabama Moment-of-Silence

~ .~~endment?

(;TV'- ~:=:n

w-<-·~~

w

..

BACKGROUND

;;;~~

elf 11 pA/ rrl/
~~~~'

~··~~

of

Religion

in

Statute

Violation

of

the

First

2.

Ishmael
three

children

Jaffree,
who

are

an

agnostic,

enrolled

Alabama public schools.

in

is

the

the

father

Mobile

of

County,

Jaffree filed a complaint in the

.OC for the SD of Ala. claiming that the two "Alabama school

prayer

statutes"

Mbbile

County

Clause

of

and

other

schoolteachers

the

First

non-statutory

practices

violate

Establishment

Amendment.

the

Ala.

Code

of

§16-1-20.1

provides:

At the commencement of the first class of
each day in all grades in all public schools, the
reacher in charge of the room in which each such
c~ass
is held max announce that a ~eriod of
Silence not to exceed
one minute in duration
Shall be observed for meditation or voluntary
praYer, ana dUring any such periOd no other
actfvities shall be engaged in.
The second

statute challenged

by Jaffree provides

teacher may lead "willing students in •..
r-

[a specified non- .

..;

denominational
Jaffree

that a

also

prayer]
alleged

to
that

God."
some

Ala.

Code

teachers

§16-1-20.2.

in

the

Mobile

County public schools lead their students in prayers other
than the one set forth in the Alabama Code.

as

defendants

Commissioners

in

this

action

of Mobile County,

the attorney general,

the

Jaffree named

Board

the Governor

of

School

of Alabama,

and other education authorities.

group of parents who favored

A

the Alabama prayer statutes

mtervened as defendants in the action.
The DC granted a prelimary injunction against the
enforcement

of

the

Alabama

school

prayer

statutes.

Following a trial on the merits, the DC dismissed Jaffree's

'•,

3.

action

and

considering

injunction.

After

"historical evidence" presented at

trial,

dissolved
the

the

prelimary

the DC found that the First Amendment did not apply to the
~ates

DC,

through the Fourteenth Amendment.

the

"United

States

Supreme

According to the
has

Court

erred

in

its

stay

of

the

-------------------~-'-------------~--------mading of history."
CAll

refused

to

grant

an

emergency

DC's judgment and to reinstate the preliminary injunction.
In your capacity as Circuit Justice, you granted the stay
and reinstated the injunction pending the CA's disposition
of

the

~fugel

case.

v.

In

Vitale,

a

memorandum

u.s.

370

421

opinion,

(1962)

you

stated

that

and the other school

prayer cases appeared to be controlling.
CAll subsequently reversed the judgment of the DC.
CAll

rejected

prohibits

the

only

the

argument

that

establishment of

the

First

Amendment

a

national

religion.

It also refused to credit the School Board's argument that
the First Amendment does not apply to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.
that

the

Clause

proscribes

which "aid one religion,
religion over anoth~r."

u.s.

1

earlier

(1946).

This Court has long recognized

The

decisions,

to

state

and

federal

laws

aid all religions, or prefer one
Everson v. Board of Education, 330

CA

stated

considered

advanced by the School Board.
powerless

both

reevaluate

that

the

this

Court,

"historical

in

its

arguments"

The CA concluded that it was

these

arguments,

already been rejected by this Court.

as

they

had

L JC tJ

4.

---- .According

to

the

CA,

challenged conduct.

~e-par t

the

Under that test, a state's action is

~ecular ~E._p~se; €)

unconstitutional unless :c:§) i t has a
its

principal

or

primary

effect

is

one

advances nor inhibits religion; and @
"an

excessive

~mon

governmental

v. Kurtzman,

the

Lemon test

for

teacher-led

Lemon

co~l!..!; ionali t

to determine the

should be used

----::::::=--..:--~

to

602,

neither

it does not foster

entanglement

u.s.

403

that

with

612-613.

religion."

The CA applied

invalidate the state statute providing

prayer.

It

also

relied

upon

the

three-

prong analysis in holding that the non-statutory actions of
the

Mobile

County

school teachers

violated

the

First

Amendment.
The CA dealt with the moment-of-silence statute in
The court stated that the ~
was to advance religion.
passing

the

statute

the

legislature

It
must

note~
have

intended to return prayer to the public schools, since the
statute had no secular purpose.
that

the

religion.
of the
that

statute

had

the

Moreover, the court held

~

primary

effect

of

advancing

Because the moment-of-silence statute failed two

three prongs of
Section

the

16-1-20.1

Lemon test,

constituted

an

the CA concluded
establishment

of

religion in violation of the First Amendment.
The Governor of Alabama and the intervenors filed
jurisdictional statements with this Court.
challenged both

the CA' s

The appellants

holding that the prayer statute

5.

was unconstitutional,
silence
was

statute violated

careful

~spect

and

its holding that the moment-ofthe

First Amendment.

The Court

§ii}

to

to the latter holding.

~

The Court's order summarily

affirmed the CA's judgment that the the statute permitting
~al

prayer was unconstitutional.

DISCUSSION
The appellants argue that the Framers intended the
Establishment Clause
national

church.

to prohibit only
Moreover,

Fourteenth Amendment does
~ink

they

not

the

creation of a

contend

incorporate

that

the Clause.

the
I

that the Court should simply ignore these arguments,
they have already b~ n cons ide red and

because
~erson

v.

Board

of

Education,

u.s.

330

1

rejected.

(1946).

The

"new" historical evidence in the appellants' briefs did not
convince
prior

me

that / his

decisions

Moreover,

Court

1 ealing

with

should
the

overturn

all of

Establishment

the Court • s order noting probable

its

Clause.

jur isidiction

indicates that it did not want to consider these arguments •

...

The Court summarily affirmed that part of the CA's decision
that

held

the

vocal prayer

statute unconstitutional.

If

the Court had found any merit to the position advanced by
appellants,

it would

have

noted probable

jurisdiction on

this issue as well.
The

appellants

do

point

to

historical

evidence

that the Framers approved of prayer in the public schools.

6.

~~
The Northwest Ordinance, passed by the First Congress just
58 days prior to the Establishment Clause, provided federal
land for schools, which were encouraged to teach "religion
and morality."

Moreover,

the

public

continued

uninterrupted

schools

practice

of

prayer

in

this

the

country

u.s.

until the Court's decision in Engel v. Vitale, 370
(1962).

in

421

(In fact, there was teacher-led vocal prayer in the

Birmingham

public

long

schools

after

Engel.)

The

appellants argue that the Court cannot ignore all of this
history
Cburt

in

interpreting

relied

Chambers,

on similar

51

USLW

5162

the

Establishment

Clause.

historical arguments
(1983),

where

it

The

in Marsh v.

held

that

the

Nebraska legislature's practice of opening each day with a
prayer by a state-paid chaplain did not violate the First
Amendment.

The Marsh Court did not even mention the three-

prong Lemon test.
The

appellants'

historical

arguments

prove

too

much, for the Court summarily affirmed CAll's holding that
teacher-led prayer violated
would

be

justify
~ayer.

state

a

ridiculous

to

moment

silence,

a moment-of-silence
to

hold

constitutional,
the day •

..........

of

hold

that
but

tradition
do

not

and

justify

It

history
spoken

Prior to the Engel decision in 1962, not a single

had

decides

the Establishment Clause.

that

statute.

vocal,

Unless

teacher-led

the Court
prayer

is

the historical arguments should not carry

1461-

7.

The Court should not rely on Marsh-type historical
arguments to hold that all prayer, both spoken and silent,
is

permissible

in

the

public

schools.

The

purely

historical arguments should prevail only when there is no
real danger that the challenged state practice constitutes

m establishment of religion.
as

much

cpinion

when

it

quoted

in Abington

The Marsh Court recognized

Justice

School

Goldberg's

District v.

concurring

Schmepp,

374

u.s.

203 {1963) :
It is of course true that great consequences can
grow from small beg innings, but the measure of
constitutional adjudication is the ability and
willingness to distinguish between real threat
and mere shadow.
The prayer

involved

"shadow."

After all,

adults,

"not

in

the individuals claiming injury were

readily

indoctrination."
children

in the Marsh case was no more than a

susceptible

Marsh, 51 USLW at 5164.

the

public

schools

particularly by their teachers.
danger

of

religious

schoolteachers
prayer.

to

permitted

are

In contrast, the

easily

lead

influenced,

There would be a serious

indoctrination
to

religious

their

were

public

students

in vocal

If the Court does not limit its use of historical

tests to those cases in which the challenged action poses
an insignificant threat,

there will be very little left of

the Establishment Clause.
If

the

Court

decides

that

the

historical

acceptance of prayer in the public schools is not relevant,
the Lemon test is the logical place to turn for guidance.

'.

"'
,:

.,,

'

8.

If one applies this three-prong test in a straightforward
-------------------·~

be

held

correct

The

unconstitutional.
that

the

statute

had

appellees

both
There

appear

~rpose

the

·-

to

be

-

and

the

is no question that

the state legislature intended to make prayer a part of the
daily classroom activity.

~~

Nevertheless,

~

~plication

~

mconsistent

of

the

with

think

I

Lemon

test

~~ _ -~~~~ tablishment Clause cases.

~·

u.s.

664

(1970),

exemption

urged

result ~of

the

for

the

that

by

the

mechanical
appellees

Court's

is

earlier

In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397

example,

the

Court

upheld
The

for

a

tax

statute

creating the tax exemption clearly had both the purpose and
effect

of

advancing

religion.

Board of Education, 330

u.s.

Similarly,

in

Ever son

v.

1 (1947), the Court held that

the First Amendment permitted the reimbursement of parents
for

cost

schools.
manner

of

transporting

Again,
had

their

children

to

the expenditure of public funds

the purpose

parochial
in this

and effect of advancing religion.

These cases illustrate that the Lemon test,

if applied in

the manner suggested by CAll, is not of much help.
The CAll's
fails

to account for

accomodate
~rach

public

interpretation of the Lemon test also

the

religious

v. Clausen,
schools

the fact that a state is allowed to
beliefs

of

its

citizens.

In

the Court upheld a program under which

released

students

during

the

day

so

that

l

8.

0.

If one applies this three-prong test in a straightforward

.

"""'----

be

held

correct

The

unconstitutional.
that

the

statute

had

appellees

both

~rpose

the

There

appear

to

be

-

and

the

is no question that

the state legislature intended to make prayer a part of the
daily classroom activity.

~~

Nevertheless,

~

~plication

~

mconsistent

of

the

think

I

Lemon

with

test

~' _ -~~~~ tablishment Clause cases.

~·

u.s.

664

(1970),

exemption

urged

result ~of

the

for

the

that

by

the

mechanical
appellees

Court's

is

earlier

In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397

example,

the

Court

upheld
The

for

a

tax

statute

creating the tax exemption clearly had both the purpose and
effect

of

advancing

religion.

Board of Education, 330

u.s.

1

Similarly,

in

Everson

v.

(1947), the Court held that

the First Amendment permitted the reimbursement of parents
for

cost

schools.
manner

of

transporting

Again,
had

the

the

their

children

to

expenditure of public funds

purpose

parochial
in this

and effect of advancing religion.

These cases illustrate that the Lemon test,

if applied in

the manner suggested by CAll, is not of much help.
The CAll's
fails

to account for

accomodate
~rach

public

interpretation of the Lemon test also

v.

the

religious

Clausen,

schools

the fact that a state is allowed to
beliefs

of

its

citizens.

In

the Court upheld a program under which

released

students

during

the

day

so

that

1

9.

they

could

go

to

religious

devotional exercises.
purpose
the

and

Court

for

instruction

advancing

that

the

EStablishment Clause of

practice

the

Nevertheless,

religion.
did

not

nature

of

-

such
our

---------

accommodation

people."

In

the

Zorach

the government

"respects

other

The

~;tic-e

to accommodate the exercise of religion;
that

violate

First Amendment.

Court recognized that it was desirable for

wrote

and

This practice certainly had both the

effect of

held

centers

the

cases,

Dougla1
religious

the

Court

has

recognized that the "limits of permissible accommodation to
religion

by

are

noninterference

no

means

mandated

by

co-extensive

the

Walz, at 673.
Court

has

would

Exercise

the

Clause."

Zorach illustrates that the

sanctioned

accommodates
CAll's

Free

with

a

religious

broad

range of

beliefs

interpretation of Lemon,
be permissible

under

and

state

action
Under

practices.

however,

that
the

no accommodation

the First Amendment.

This is

because a statute that accommodates religious beliefs, by
definition,
religion.

has
In

the

this

purpose

case,

the

and

effect

appellants

of

advancing

argue

that

the

moment-of-silence statute was designed to accommodate the
religious practices of schoolchildren.
plausible argument,
the CAll

says

accommodate

the

it

is

it means.
religious

foreclosed
If

the

beliefs

Although this is a
if Lemon means what

statute was
of

schoolschildren,

clearly has the purpose of advancing religion.
think, however,

intended to
it

I do not

that the prior cases permit this Court to

10.

dispose of

the accommodation argument with the simplistic

application

of

the

Lemon

test

---·-----._
~tice O'-~onn_o<)has

adopted

by

the

court

of

appeals.

c£

the

Lemon ·· ·· test

Cburt's

prior

Ibnnelley,
Moreover,

that

the

seems

Establishment

52 USLW 4317,
test

suggested an interpretation
to

explain

Clause

4322

most

opinions.

(O'Connor,

of
Lynch

this
v.

J., concurring).

that she proposes allows

the state to

accommodate religious beliefs without automatically running
afoul
stated

of

the

that

Establishment Clause.
the Court

entanglement

-

and

Justice

O'Connor

has

focus ~ lY on insti tuti Q_nal

should

endorsement

religion.

of

The

institutional entanglement inquiry she suggests is similar
to the "excessive entanglement" test of Lemon, as it is now
interpreted by the
modification of

lower courts.

this

prong

of

Justice 0 'Connor's only

the

test

is

to state that

political divisiveness is irrelevant to the inquiry.
Unlike
first

and

the

second

substantially

"excessive

prongs

under

of

the

the

Lemon

O'Connor

{ O'Connor would decide whether

l or

entanglement"
test

factor,
are

approach.

the

modified
Justice

the statute had the purpose

e~~~n.

To

her~

it is irrelevant

whether the state action was intended to advance religion,
or
(1)

if it had that effect.

As long as the state's action:

was not intended to endorse religion; and

( 2)

did not

have the effect of advancing religion, it is is permissible
under the First Amendment.

5~

s~~~Jc~

~~~~UA-/~
- ~1-8 ~r.r-~~

If the ~Connor interpretation is adopted, I think
that the judgment of the CA should be reversed.
that

the

moment-of-silence

~~------------------

-

endorse

statute

religion.
_____.......

The

.....

remarks of

was

It appears

not

intended

the bill's sponsor

to
and

the Governor simply suggest that the state wanted to return
voluntar

rayer to the public schools.

This does not mean

that they wanted to give the state's imprimatur of approval
to school prayer; they wanted only to make accomodation for
those schoolchildren who wanted to pray at the ~ tart of the
day.

Similarly, while the challenged statute may have had

the effect of advancing religion,
had

the

upon

effect

of placing

If

it.

the

the

statute

I do not think that it

state's

is

stamp of

fairly

approval

implemented,

all

religions will be treated equally, and religion will not be
our ing a one minute period,

prefer red over non-religion.
every

student

manner

will

have

an

opportunity

to

pray

in

the

in which he chooses, or not to pray at all.

This

statute therefore is far different from one providing for
vocal,

teacher-led

"communicate
endorse"

a

prayer.

message

that

the prayer's message.

Teacher-led
the

prayer

government

Lynch,

at 4324

would

intends

to

(O'Connor,

J. , concurring) .

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION
The Court should reject appellants' arguments:

(1)

that the First Amendment prohibits only the establishment
of a national church, and (2) that the Establishment Clause

12.

is

not

incorporated

in

the

Fourteenth

Amendment.

issues were decided by the Court long ago,
noting

probable

jurisdiction

clearly

Court did not want to reconsider

These

and the order

indicated

that

its position.

the

The Court

likewise should not hold that the Alabama statute is valid
simply because of

the

the public schools.
history

justifies

historical acceptance of prayer

in

This argument proves too much, for if
a

moment-of-silence,

justify vocal prayer.

it

should

also

More importantly, I think that this

Court should limit the use of the purely historical test to
those cases where the challenged state action poses only an
insignificant

danger,

such

as

in

Marsh,

the

Nebraska

chaplain case.
If
arguments,

the
the

Court

refuses

three-prong

Lemon

used to analyze the statute.
of-silence

will

applied

the

in

be

found

to

rely

on

historical

test probably should

be

The provision for a moment-

unconstitutional

if

Lemon

simplistic manner suggested by CAlL

is
The

CA's interpretation of Lemon, however, is inconsistent with
fue results in prior cases and does not allow the state to
make

accommodations

for

religious

beliefs

and

practices.

Therefore, the interpretation of Lemon proposed by Justice

1

O'Connor is preferable.

oot

5b't.

violate

purpose

the

--

Under her approach, a statute does

Establishment

Clause

or

unless

it

has

the
the

Alabama law does not have such a purpose or effect, it does
not run afoul of the First Amendment.

13.

I recommend that the judgment of CAll be reversed.

·.•
'·.,

83-812
83-929

WALLACE v. JAFFREE
SMITH v. JAFFREE

Argued 12/4/84
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TO: Justice Powell
FROM: Lee
RE: Nos. 83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v. Jaffree and Smith v.
Jaffree - Articles by Prof. Paul Freund

I read the two pieces by Paul Freund that you mentioned
yesterday.

Both were interesting, but had little to say about

the moment-of-silence.

In Storms over the Supreme Court, 69

A.B.A. Journal 1474 (1983), Professor Freund discussed various
controversies in the Court's history (e.g., the Dred Scott
decision and the Court-packing plan).

At the end of his short

piece, Professor Freund stated that the current Court, unlike its
IDchnerizing predecessor, was concerned with areas that are fit
for judicial resolution.

Nevertheless, he argued that the Court

is sometimes like the little boy who knows how to spell banana,
but does not know when to stop.

According to Freund, the

ultimate test of whether the Court knows "when to stop" will come
when it considers a moment-of-silence statute.

Freund stated

that if the Court regards this as an establishment issue, it will
&rike down the stautute.

On the other hand, if it is viewed as

a free exercise problem, "silent prayer not in unison,
w~.....,

accompanied by other forms of private meditation, would not
offend the Constitution."

-------------------In a short book,

Religion in the Public Schools, Freund

does not even mention a moment-of-silence.

Nevertheless, he does

address the reasons that he thinks vocal prayer should be
unconstitutional.

First, he states that a truly non-sectarian

prayer might not offend the First Amendment.

But he argues that:

(1) there may be no such thing; and (2) more importantly, the
~preme

Court is a secular institution incapable of deciding

whether a prayer is truly non-sectarian.

Freund also contends

that vocal prayer would never be truly voluntary because young
children would feel psychological coercion to participate from
their teacher and peers.

Freund's analysis certainly suggests

that a moment-of-silence statute is distinguishable.
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CH .. MBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

December 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

83-812 - Wallace v. Jaffree

At oral argument the question whether the as peal
is almost, ~o~ t arose. In t r y1ng to answer that
questio~, I have d1pped into the record and found the
following chronology which may be of interest to you:
i~, ~?r

1. On April 29, 1981, the statute that is at
issue now (§16-1-20.1) became effective.
(SG's Brief
p.3, n.l).

On January 30, 1982, plaintiffs filed their
second amended complaint, containing the following
allegation:
2.

"32. (f) Pursuant to the grant of authority
contained in Section 16-1-20.1, Defendants GREEN,
BOYD and PIXIE ALEXANDER, have led their classes
in religiously based prayer activities." Joint
App. 21, 25.

3. The District Court's findings of fact state,
in part:
"Defendant Boyd, as early as September 16,
1981, led her class at E.R. Dickson in singing the
following phrase:
"'God is great, God is good,
Let us thank him for our food,
bow our heads we all are fed,
Give us Lord our daily bread.
Amen!'

-2-

"The recitation of this phrase continued on a
daily basis throughout the 1981-82 school year."
App. to Juris. Statement 4d.
4. On July 8, 1982, the statute which prescribes
a form of spoken prayer (§16-1-20.2) became effective.
(SG's Brief p.3, n.l).
It seems rather clear from the foregoing that the
District Court's findings of fact concerning the 19811982 school year explain how §16-1-20.1 was applied
before the 1982 statute was passed, and that those
findings establish the accuracy of the allegation in
paragraph 32(f) of the second amended complaint.
Respectfully,

alb

12/06/84

TO: Justice Powell
FROM: Lee
RE: No. 83-812, Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice Stevens' memo to the
Conference
It seems to me that Justice Stevens is trying to turn
this facial challenge to the moment-of-silence statute into an
"as applied" challenge.

The DC found that the defendant teacher

was leading her class in vocal prayer

("God is great, God is

good, etc.) during the 1981-1982 school year.

The moment-of-

silence statute was in effect during this time period.

The

statutory provision for vocal prayer was not enacted until after
fue 1981-1982 school year.

Therefore, according to Justice

Stevens, the vocal prayer during this school year was conducted
pursuant to the moment-of-silence statute.

He concludes that the

quoted provision from the complaint is a challenge to the momentof-silence statute "as applied."
I disagree with Justice Stevens' approach.

The vocal

prayers discussed above were not conducted pursuant to the
moment-of-silence statute.

That statute certainly did not

provide for teacher led prayer.

Instead, the teachers in Mobile

were ignoring both the federal constitution and the state
statute.
If one decides that the actions of the teachers during
the 1981-1982 school year were not conducted pursuant to the
moment-of-silence statute, then there is possibly a ripeness

problem.
enforced.

The moment-of-silence statute apparently has never been
Nevertheless, the threat of enforcement probably makes

this a justiciable controversy.

See United Public workers v.

u.s.

After vocal prayer was enjoined,

Mitchell, 330

75 (1947).

it was certainly reasonable to believe that the moment-of-silence
statute would be implemented immediately.

This is not a statute

that has been on the books for a hundred years and ignored by
state officials.

Therefore, I think that the case is ripe for

adjudication.
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CHAMISERS 01"

.JUSTICE WM • ..J . BRENNAN, .JR.

December 7, 1984

Dear Chief,

~~

~
agreed~try his

John has
hand at
an opinion for the C rt in No. 83-812,
Wallace v. Jaffree, and No. 83~929,
Smith v. Jaffree.
I'll undertake to
so 1n No. 83-5954, Lindahl v. OPM.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

~u.prtmt

<!Jttttrl ttf tqt ~tb .Statts

~ht.sJringbnt. ~.

OJ.

2ll.;t'!.;l

C HAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 29, 1985
Re:

No. 83-812)
83-929)

Wallace v. Jaffree
Smith v. Jaffree

Dear John,
I will shortly circulate a combined d ~ nt covering t~ case,
the ~ se and th ~ ase.
------~
Sincerely,

b)lV---

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

·'

CHAMI!IERS Or

..JUSTICE

w...

..J . BRENNAN, ..JR.

February 1, 1985

No. 83-812)
)

Wallace, et al.
v. Jaffree, et al.

)
)

--

)

Smith, et al.
v. Jaffree-;-et al.

No. 83-929)

Dear John,
I agree.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

---

,jnprtnu Ofoud of tlft ~~ .itafte

'Illas Jringhtn. ~. Of. 2D.;t'l~
CHAMISERS OP'

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

February 4, 1985

Re:

Nos. 83-812 and 929-Wallace and Smith v. Jaffree

Dear John:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~T.M.

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

~tm.t

"Jouri &tf tift ~b ..tatt•

. . .Jrittghnt. ~.

"+·

2llc?'l~

CHAMI!IERS OF"

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

February 11, 1985

v/
Re: No. 83-812) Wallace v. Jaffree
No. 83-929) Smith v. Jaffree
Dear John:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

-Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

February 19, 1985
TO:

Lee Bentley

FROM:

LFP, JR.

Re:

83-812

Wallace v. Jaffree

83-929

Smith v. Jaffree

As you know,

I see nothing unconstitutional in

the "moment of silence" provided by Alabama.

Justice
scholarly.

Rehnquist's

dissent

is

wide-ranging

I agree with much of what he has said.

and

But we

have the New York and Michigan cases involving the federal
statute, and I voted the "other way" in those cases.
much as

I

would like

to uphold the federal statute,

As
for

the reasons that Lynda has set forth persuasively I find
it difficult to reconcile the rendering of direct federal
aid to parochial schools with the prior decisions of this
Court.

Judge Friendly's opinion is highly persuasive in

this respect.

When I

refer to the "federal" statute,

I appreciate

that the Michigan case involves a comparable state statute
that

authorizes

schools.

similar

direct

assistance

to

non-pulbic

As nothing has been circulated - so far as I know on the New York and Michigan cases, what I need to know at
this

time

is

what

to do

in

the

Alabama case.

Justice

Rehnquist•s opinion is written so broadly that it is clear
he also had the New York and Michigan cases in mind.
anyone else writing on the Alabama case?
you -

with help from Lynda -

If not, perhaps

should try your hand at a

brief opinion.

LFP, JR.

LFP/vde

Is

i'ttFtntt Clfomi af tltt ~b !ltatt•
Jlasltinght~ ~.

<!f.

2Dt?,.~

CHAMBERS 01'"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

Re:

February 28, 1985

No. 83-812 - Wallace v. Jaffree
83-929 - Smith v. Jaffree

Dear John,
In due course, assuming you get a Court, I will be
adding a few dissenting observations.

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

lfo/ss 04/11/85

DATE:

'1'0:

r.ee

FROM:

Lewis

~.

ApriJ 11, 1985

Powell, Jr.

83-812

~allace

v. Jaffree

83-q29 Smith v. Jaffree

Until today,

t

~ad

not

rea~

Justice

St~vens'

opin-

ion circulated in January but had understood that tt invalidated the "moment of si1ence" statute,

~16-l-20.

ion states, however, that ap9ellees have
that

~16-1-20

aban~oned

r-tis opin-

any claim

is unconstitutional, and on p. 20 Justice Ste-

vens indicates that he would approve such a statute.
His opinion lnvalidates

~16-1-20.1,

enacted in

1981 three years after the earlier statute, authorizinq

aperiod of silence "for meditation of voluntary prayer".
Section 16-1-20.2 enacted in 1982 authorized teachers to
lead "willinq students" in a prescribed prayer.

i

j

I have not reread your bench memo, hut have been

~

i

un~er
~as

the imPression that the principal. question before us

the "moment of silence" statute.

I do not think I have

focused on the other two statutes.
T

alc;o have read Bill Rehnquist's dissent, and

while it refl@cts a vast aMount of interestinq history, it
does not specifically

ad~ress

the statutes at all.

I wou1d aPPreciate beinq enliahtened as to the
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~1.6-1.20.1

_

T think

.

the most recent statute.

.

~16- 1 -20.2,

I have doubts as to the vAliditv of

.

status of this case.

2.

presents a closer question - authorizing a period of silence
"for

me~itation

tl-touqht~

or voluntary praver".

I

would like vour

on the c;tatus of the currPnt situation,

an~

your

advice.

'I,

r... F.: • p
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J
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,J r •
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04/11/85

TO: Justice Powell
FROM: Lee
RE: Nos. 83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v. Jaffree, et al., and Smith
v. Jaffree
(?-tu-r~r ~· :h-eJ ~

~~~~~-f-2..-l:J(L) ~.?D(2-) ~

..
~~
Apri'111 , I reexamine
.t .
d
After receiVIng
your memo o f~
Justice Stevens' opinion.

He does suggest that the 1978 moment-

of-silence statute (§16-1-20) was constitutional.

Therefore, his

opinion can be read narrowly, so as to invalidate only the 1981
moment-of-silence statute (§16-1-20.1).

Nevertheless, Justice

Stevens' draft has a problem that should keep you in the dissent.
Justice Stevens assumes that a State cannot accomodate
the religious beliefs of its citizens unless a failure to take
such action would violate the Free Exercise Clause.

45, pp. 18-19.
prior decisions.

See footnote

This assumption is inconsistent with the Court's

u.s.

In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397

664 (1970),

the Court held that a tax exemption for religious organizations
did not violate the Establishment Clause.

In reaching that

conclusion, the Court said that "[t]he limits of permissible
state accomodation are by no means co-extensive with the
noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause."

673.

Similarly, in Zorach v. Clausen, 343

u.s.

!d., at

306 (1952), the

~

Court upheld a program under which public schools were release!
students during the day so that they could go to religious
centers for instruction and devotional exercises.

There is no

reason to believe that the students in Zorach would have been

~

."'/ ...

able to prevail on a Free Exercise claim if the schools had
refused to release them early.
It is not surprising that Justice Stevens has "gutted"

___

the accomodation doctrine.
statute (§16-1-20.1)

He surely realizes that if the 1981
...;..-

is viewed as an accomodation to those

___

students who wish to pray silently, it can......,.
be upheld.
~

A State

should be allowed to establish a moment-of-silence so that
students, who are required by law to attend school, can exercise
their religious beliefs.

There must, of course, be some limits

on permissible accomodation.
~ecluded

A State, for example, should be

from "accomodating" religious students by instituting

vocal prayer, which might tend to coerce non-religious students.
A moment-of-silence, however, accomodates those students who wish
to pray without abridging the rights of non-participating
students.
If the moment-of-silence is analyzed as an
"accomodation," it should not matter that the statute has the
(

purpose of advancing religion.

All statutes designed to

accomodate religion have this purpose.

The sponsors of 1981

moment-of-silence bill clearly wanted to give students the

opti~

e--

of praying silently in school.

Although the 1978 statute (§16-1-

20) already set aside a moment-of-silence for "meditation,"
state legislators may have feared that teachers and students
would be unaware that it was permissible to pray during this
time.

The 1981 statute simply made it clear that students can

pray to themselves during this silent period.

1\

The Chief currently is working on a dissent, which
analyzes the 1981 moment-of-silence statute as an "accomodation."
Because that is how I believe the case should be approached, I
recommend waiting for the Chief's opinion.

I am, of course,

ready to take any other course that you may suggest.

alb

04/13/85

TO: Mr. Justice Powell
FROM: Lee
RE: Nos. 83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v. Jaffree, et al., and Smith
v. Jaffree
The moment-of-silence statute, Ala. Code Ann. §16-120.1, should not be held unconstitutional.

This 1981 legislation

simply "accomodates" those students who wish to pray silently in
the public schools.

If the statute is analyzed in this manner,

however, two limitations on the ability of States to advance
religion by making accomodations for believers must be
recognized.

1

First, if the legislation does not lift a

governmental burden on religious practices, it cannot be
characterized as an accomodation.

Second, accomodation

legislation cannot coerce non-believers into supporting either
one particular faith or religion in general.
The Alabama statute can be treated as an accomodation,
notwithstanding these two limitations.

Section 16-1-20.1 eases a

governmental restriction on the right to practice religion.
Children in Alabama are required to attend school until they
reach the age of 16, and their school day is scheduled fully.
Without a moment of silence, these captive students would be
unable to pray unless they were willing to sacrifice the benefits
of scheduled activities.

A student is free to pray silently

during his Math Class, for example, only if he is willing to
forego learning long division.

Moreover, the moment of silence

does not coerce non-believers into supporting either one

-

....

particular faith or religion in general.

Each student remains

free to reflect on whatever he chooses during the quiet period.
Neither the student's teacher nor his peers will know whether he
is praying or thinking about the afternoon baseball game.
Because the Alabama statute is an "accomodation," it is
clear that the Lemon test cannot be applied in a straight-forward
manner.

Accomodation legislation, by definition, is intended to

make it easier for believers to engage in religious activities.
Therefore, all accomodation statutes have the "purpose of
advancing religion," within the meaning of Lemon's first prong.
It is irrelevant that the state legislator sponsoring the momentof-silence bill wanted to "return voluntary prayer to the public
schools."

There is no indication that this legislator thought

the statute would be used to coerce non-believing students into
prayer.

The quoted remark simply suggests that the legislator's

purpose in proposing the bill was to "advance religion" by giving
faithful students an opportunity to pray silently.
Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor both assert that
the Alabama statute cannot be analyzed as an accomodation to
religious students.
flawed.

Their arguments, however, are seriously

Justice Stevens assumes that a State cannot accomodate

the religious beliefs of its citizens unless a failure to take
such action would violate the Free Exercise Clause.
45, pp. 18-19.

See footnote

This assumption is inconsistent with many of the

Court's prior decisions.

In upholding the validity of property

tax examptions for churches, the Court has stated that "[t)he
limits of permissible state accomodation are by no means co-

extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise
Qause."

Walz v. Tax Commission, 397

u.s.

664 (1970).

Similarly, in Everson v. Board of Education, 330

u.s:

1 (1947),

the Court held that the state could pay the bus fares of
parochial school students, even though it was not contended that
the failure to take such action would violate the Free Exercise
Clause.

See also Zorach v. Clausen, 343

u.s.

306 (1952).

Justice O'Connor recognizes that the government may
enact an accomodation statute, even when such legislation is not
compelled by the Free Exercise Clause.
opinion.

See page 15 of concurring

Despite this moderate approach, she goes on to state

that the Alabama statute does not constitute an accomodation.
Unfortunately, Justice O'Connor does not explain adequately why
§16-1-20.1 cannot be characterized as an accomodation to
believers.
~o

17.

She first states that "[n]o law prevents a student

is so inclined from praying in the public schools."

See page

This argument, however, fails to recognize that, without a

moment of silence, students will be unable to pray without
foregoing the benefits of scheduled activities.

Even

"stu~

halls" are designed for study, not silent prayer.
Justice O'Connor's second reason for refusing to treat
the Alabama statute as an accomodation is even less persuasive.
It relies on the fact that "state law already provided a moment
of silence •••• "

See page 17.

The 1978 statute to which she

refers provided a moment of silence "for meditation."
§16-1-20.

Ala. Code

This 1978 statute apparantly was superseded by the

statute at issue here, which provides a moment of silence for

I

'

"meditation or voluntary prayer."
added) •

Ala. Code §16-1-20.1 (emphasis

There is no reason to hold that the second statute is

not "accomodation legislation" simply because it superseded a
similar statute.

The 1981 statute had the limited purpose of

making clear to students and teachers that the quiet period couM

be used for voluntary silent prayer, as well as for reflection on
~cular

subjects.

Justice O'Connor's reasoning suggests that

States often will be precluded from modifying permissible
accomodation legislation.

m

summary, I believe that Alabama's moment-of-silence

statute should be upheld as a permissible accomodation to those
students who wish to pray silently in school.

Neither Justice

Stevens nor Justice O'Connor has explained adequately why the
statute cannot be characterized as accomodation legislation.

April 15, 1985
CJ8 GINA-POW
PERSONAL
83-812 and 83-929

Wallace Cases

Dear Chief:
Now that Sandra's opinion joining in the judgment has
been circulated, there is a Court to invalidate §16-1-20.1
of

the

Alabama

medication or
scholarly

Code

that

prayer ...

review

of

the

provides

for

a

moment

of

Bill Rehnquist has circulated a
history

of

the

Establishment

Clause, and the meandering of this Court over the years.
As

your

together

notes

will

show,

although

and

1 were

in the Wallace cases, we differ in our views as

to Fort Wayne and Aguliar.

As 1 read our prior decisions,

including what 1 wrote in Nyquist, they
the way I

you

voted.

strongly support

Henry Friendly's opinion in Aguliar is

particularly persausive in light of our authorities.
I

have been waiting until all of the writing in these

religious cases is in hand, and am particularly interested
in what you may say in your dissent in the Wallace cases.
1 cannot

join WHR because his opinion broadly disagrees

with the majority in all of the pending religious cases.

•;

2.

I

have

what

perhaps

Alabama Statute at issue.
to hold it invalid.
recognizes

that

is

a

simplicity

view

of

the

It trivializes the Constitution

Much if not most of Sandra's opinion

moment

of

silence

statutes

including

even the Alabama one - would be valid except she thinks it
was intended to promote religion.
first of

the

three

She thus relies on the

Lemon tests,

although she criticizes

and substitutes an "endorsement" test that I do not

~mon

understand.
In your opinion in the Connecticut case involving the
right

of

employees

to

a

day

off

for

worship,

you

emphasized that the Lemon test is flexible and not always
applied according

to

its

generally

along

these

reluctant,

however,

lines

have

test

fought

lower

the

to downgrade

it for

courts.

Sandra's

Court has

If

opinion),

other

in

you do in the Connecticut case.
coherent

We have said something

terms.

cases.

am

Lemon even as much as

After all, it is the only

ever

adopted,

a number of years,

and

we

(as

abandon
the

I

Lemon

Court

we

so have the
evidence

be

will

generally

even

by
more

fractionated than it is at present.
I
invalid

have
if

never
it

understood

"flunks"

one

of

that
the

a

state

three

statute

Lemon

is

tests.

3.

(Note to Lee:

Cite authorities).

Whatever the purpose of

fue Alabama Statute may be, I would sustain it because its
effect on religion generally is too remote and tangential
(if at all).
are

not

Children are not required to pray, teachers

authorized

to

lead

them

in prayer,

the

statue

provides for medication or prayer, and the truth is that
children will
please.
state.

Nor

use
will

the moment to think of whatever
there

Accordingly,

be

any

entanglement

the Alabama Statute,

as I

they

with

the

view it,

meets two of the Lemon tests and this is sufficient.

I

would cite the views of Professor Ely, Freund, and others.
It

is

possible,

I

believe,

statute

on

the

Walz v.

Tax Commissioner,

authority

of

our

1.

to

sustain

this

"accommodation cases".

u.s.

397

u.s.

Board of Education, 330

also

664,

and Everson v.

I would prefer, however,

not to apply the "accommodation" analysis - though it can
be mentioned

as

in a

note as a

supportive alternative.

This may be important because both John and Sandra reject
the

accommodation

rationale

in

spite

of

the

Court's

decisions in Walz and Everson.
I

am

generally

passing
my

these

position.

views
I

on

would

to

you

prefer

to
not

indicate
to

write

4.

separately,

and

therefore

hope

dissent.
Sincerely,

that

I

can

join

your

April 15, 1985
CJ8 GINA-POW
PERSONAL
83-812 and 83-929

Wallace Cases

Dear Chief:
Now that Sandra's opinion joining in

he judgment has

been circulated, there is a Court to

alidate §16-1-20.1

of

for

the

Code

that

scholarly

the

ry

of

of

the

Establishment

Court over the years.
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moment
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Bill Re

medication o

a

your

although

you

and

I
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we differ in our views as
to Fort Wayne and

As I read our prior decisions,

including what

they

the way I vote
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particularly

of our authorities.

been waiting until al

of the writing in these

cases is in hand, and am
say in your dissent
I
w~

c nnot

strongly support

join WHR because his

h the majority in all of the

articularly interested
the Wallace cases.
broadly disagrees
eligious cases.
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I

have

what

perhaps

Alabama Statute at issue.
to hold it invalid.
recognizes

that

is

a

simplicity

view

of

the

It trivializes the Constitution

Much if not most of Sandra's opinion

moment
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silence

statutes

including

even the Alabama one - would be valid except she thinks it
was intended to promote religion.
the

three

She thus relies on the

first

of

Lemon tests,

although she criticizes

~mon

and substitutes an "endorsement" test that I do not

understand.
In your opinion in the Connecticut case involving the
right

of
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to

a
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alb

05j03j85

TO: Justice Powell
FROM: Lee
RE: Nos. 83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v. Jaffree and Smith v.
Jaffree
1 believe that your changes have greatly improved the
First Chambers Draft.

Almost all of your changes are

incorporated in the most recent typewritten draft, which is
attached.
A, p.4.

~\did

not include the footnote you suggested in Rider

Given our decision yesterday to delete the requirement

that the statute's "predominant" purpose be secular, 1 felt that

a.-~L£..4-Lr ~hL ~ ~ <.~)" ~.

this footnote should be left out.

1 consolidated the discussion

of the lower courts' opinions, which you discussed in Rider A,
p.3 and Rider A, p.4.

The remainder of the Riders have been

incorporated, although 1 did make some minor language changes for
your consideration.
1 am very happy that you decided to eliminate the
statement that the Court should look to the statute's
"predominant" purpose.

1 believe that such a standard would

invite lower courts to engage in ad hoc balancing whenever there
is a statute with dual purposes.

I am referring to the Conference Michael Lindsey's
'f?...L~
application for a stay of his death sentenceA ~ expect to
~

be

~~~ th

/

the Court later this afternoon if a stay is not

entered below.

Lindsey is scheduled to be executed at 12:01

a.m., tomorrow morning.

He was convicted of the 1981 murder of

an elderly woman during the course of a burglary in Mobile,
Alabama.

The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and

sentence, and we denied certiorari.
5969).

u.s.

( 19 8 5)

(No • 8 4-

Lindsey filed his first federal habeas petition in DC for

the S.D. of Ala.

(Cox, J.) this morning.

As yet, we have no word

from the DC.
The Clerk's office expects to have by early afternoon
the papers filed in the DC.

I have instructed the Clerk's office

to circulate these and any other papers made available to the
Court.

I will keep the Conference posted on further

developments.

.'•

alb

05j04j85

TO: Justice Powell
FROM: Lee
RE: Nos. 83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v. Jaffree and Smith v.
Jaffree, suggestions for Justice Stevens
I believe that nothing in Justice Stevens' opinion is
necessarily inconsistent with your view that a statute can have
dual purposes.

He repeatedly states that Alabama's moment-of-

silence statute violates the Establishment Clause because it has
no secular purpose.

Therefore, Justice Stevens has not

explicitly ruled out the possiblity that a statute is
constitutional if it has

~secular

purpose.

Justice Stevens does suggest, however,

that~

secular

purpose may not be enough to satisfy the first prong of the Lemon
test.

On page 17, he says, "[A]t the very least, the First

Amendment requires that a statute be invalidated if ' it is
entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion."

Page 17.

This sentence could be paraphrased as follows: "At the very
least, the First Amendment requires that a statute be invalidated
if it has no secular purpose."

Justice Stevens' use of the

phrase, "at the very least," suggests that more than the
existence of a secular purpose may be required to satisfy the
purpose prong of Lemon.
As you suggested, it might be a good idea to ask Justice
Stevens to modify his opinion slightly to make clear that a
statute with dual purposes does not violate the first prong of

Lemon.

This might be done simply by deleting four words--"at the

very least"--on page 17 (see preceding paragraph).
As an alternative, you could suggest that Justice
Stevens add a sentence on page 17, in addition to modifying the
objectionable sentence.

If this change were made, the first

.

paragraph on page 17 would end as follows:

~-~

/

Cla~se

"A statute does not viola { e the Establishment
simply because it is motiJated in part by a religious
purpose. The First Amendm nt, however, requires that a
statute be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a
purpose to advance religion."
Although these changes would be helpful, I doubt that
you should make your "join" contingent upon their being made.
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83-817 Wallace v. Jaffree

Dear John:
My vote, aq you will recall, was to reverse in
these cases. I still am inclined to think that whatever the
purpose, the ~labama statute will have little or no effect
on religion. School agP children are going to do as they
please in the minute for meditation or prayer.
;~ut tlie case is here.
~.vhile our F.stablishment
Clauses cases have nnt been entirely consistent, the threecart Lemon test has not been abandoned and - desnite criti~ism -hAs been rather consistently applied.
This case involves only the "purpose" prong, and you conclude in a persu.=tsive opinion that in the absence of anv secular purpose
the statute flunk!? the te ~t. 'T'hu:; you r~o not reach the other two comoonents. Despite my vote to the contrary, I am
giving serious consideration to joining your opinion or at
least the iudgment in a seoarate concurring opinion.

t write to inquire whether you would strengthen
one aspect of your opinion. After emphasizing the absence
of any evidence of a secular purpose, on oaqe 17 you say,
"[c.tl the verv lt:?ast, t'!-te First Amendment requires that ,
statute be invali~ated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion". This imPlies that if there were
both a religious and a secular purpo~e, this would be suf~i
cient to satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test. This
has been my understanding of that test.

r-vould you be willing to clarify your page 17 sentence as follows:
{i) omit the phrase "at the very least",
and {ii) add a sentence along the following lines:
"A statute does not violate the Establishment
Clause simply because it may be motivated in
part by a religious purpose. The First
Amen~ment, ho~ever, requires that a statute
be invalidate~ if - as in thi s casP - it is
entirely motivated by a purpose to adv .::1nce
religion."

.if

..

'.

'

.

2•

.'A..

a good

~eal

t4illingness to make such a change would help me
in deciding whether to join your opinion .
Sincerely ,

Justice Stevens
lfP/SS
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CHAMBERS OF

JUST ICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 7, 1985

Re:

83-812 - Wallace v. Jaffree

Dear Lewis:
Instead of the statement that you propose in your
letter, I wonder if this modification would be
sufficient. Rewrite the "At the very least" sentence
to read this way:
"Even though a statute that is motivated in part
by a religious purpose may satisfy the first
criterion, see e.g., Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-303 (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring), the First Amendment requires that a
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely
motivated by a purpose to advance religion."

Justice Powell

v

CHAI<II!IER8 OF"

JUSTICE

w... J . SRENNAN, JR .

May 8, 1985

No. 83-812
Wallace v. Jaffree

Dear John,
I

agree

sentence at
indicated

with

Lewis's

the middle of page 17,

in

your

note

Harry and me of May 8.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
cc:

proposed

Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell

to

as

Thurgood,

83-812 Wallace v . Jaffree

Dear John:
Please join me i.n yonr opinion for tha r.ourt circulate(! today.

expresses

I am circulatinq a concurring opinion that
views .

ad~itional

Sincerely,

,Just ice

StevE.~ns

lfp/ss
cc :

The Conference

-.

-

-

May 9, lQ85

83-812 Wallace v. JAffree

Dear John:
Please ioin me.
I am circulating a concurring opinion that
expresses additional. views.

Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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Mav 9 ,

83-812 and 83-929

1gss

Wallace

~ase

Dear Chief:
Following our telephone discussion of this case, I
spent most of a week on this case and reluctantly have concluaed that under Lemon and its progeny , the Alabama Statute
is invalid . I therefore am joining John , and circulating a
concurrjng opinion .
~e have three religion cases pendinq (in addition to
your Connecticut case of Thornton v . Calrlor) . At ~onfer
ence , my vote ,,,as to affirm in both Ral1 and Aguilar as 1
thought then - an~ still do - that Benry Friendlv was correct in his careful review of our decisions, and conclusion
that thP type of aid to parochial schools in these cases is
invalid . Bill Br~nnan has applie~ thP Lemon three part test
affirming both cases. Tam ioininq Bill with a concurrinq
o::;>inion .

In the Alabama cases (Wallace}, I voted to reverse because - as you do - I think a straight forwar~ "moment of
silence" statute \,1ould be perfectly valid . But I am now
persuaded, havinq gone back over the record before us with
somA care, that !)16-1-/0 . 1 was enacted solely for religious
purposes . There is no showing of any secular purpose. Both
the DC and CAll agreed as to its reliqious purpose and the
absence of a secular purpose . I find no basis for disagreeing with thes~ findinqs .
As I inaicated in my letter to you of April 22 in
Thornton v . Calder , Inc ., I think it would be a mistake for
the Court to weaken or fail to follow Lemon . The three part
test that you articulated in that case has provided the only
analytical framework for the deciding of reliqious cases
since Lemon was decided in 1972 . If a majority of the Court
wishes to overrule Lemon, of course it can be done .
In any event , so long as Lemon - that I followed soecifically in my necision tn Nyquist - remains the law , I
feel obligated to follot¥ it . The Alabama Legislature , in
the enactment of the three statutes dealing with school
prayer, was motivated solely ~y a religious ourpose (as the

------~------~-----------------------~------~~-----~,-,..,-----~
.. 1

..

'

·~

2.

DC found in its first opinion) and therefore this
flunked the "purposP prongu of your test.

statut~

I have maae clear in my concurring opinion, however,
that J\labam;'i can make a fresh start and adopt a simple "moment nf silence for meditation" type statute that many
states have adopted. In doing so, it can articulate secular
purposes, and the statute would be valid.

I know my aecision will disaPpoint you. We are usually
together, but i.n the end each of us has to make his ovm decisionB.

Sjncerely,

LFP/vde
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CHAMeERS 01'"

THECHIEFJUSTICE

Re:

May 31, 1985

No. 83-812 - Wallace v. Jaffree
No. 83-929 - Smith v. Jaffree

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
The final draft of my dissent is enclosed with minor
changes as marked and footnotes 3 and 4 added.
If anyone wants to delay announcement, I have no
objections.
Regards,

83-812 Wallace v. Jaffree (Lee)
JPS for the Court 12/10/84
1st draft 1/29/85
2nd draft 2/1/85
3rd draft 5/9/85
Joined by WJB 2/1/85
TM 2/4/85
HAB 2/11/85
LFP 5/9/85
WHR will dissent 1/29/85
1st draft 1/30/85
2nd draft 2/4/85
3rd draft 2/25/85
4th draft 4/10/85
5th draft 5/15/85
SOC concurring in the judgment
1st draft 4/12/85
2nd draft 5/10/85
3rd draft 5j29j85
LFP concurring
1st draft 5/9/85
2nd draft 5/17/85
CJ dissent
1st draft 5j20j85
2nd draft 5/28/85
BRW dissenting
1st draft 5/29/85
CJ will dissent 2/28/85
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ThanY '' f or y our letter o f June

20 and the copy of y our opinion in the
Alabama case •.
I have read it ·.ri th int erest . The key
po jnt, expressed in your se cond sent ence,
is clear . ~numbe r of p int sec •1 pe rtinent with respect to both s i des of t he
auestion , i 1cluding your r eferenc e to
the de ci si on in Iv:arsh v, Chanbers that
openin~ the Ne braska le ·i slature with
'l)ro.yer was a cc eptabl ., as a pract i c e that
hrv1 become " part of the fabric o +' our
soc i e t v . 11
'. 'li thout vvishin :, in any way to n.r.(;ue
iV i th y ou ( ev c ept ne rho..pR a t s ome Friday
lunch f' on) , as a nr r son who has 1 on., had
mmy doub t s about or,r~'l-nized reJ it";ion , I
st ill f ind it har d to ~ccept t ~a t the
Foundin,o; Father s soue;ht to ensure neutro..li ty to .:ard rel i g ion it self or towonrd
nrayer - the effort to distinguish be t 1neen
r i ght and wronG ·

The "fabr ic of our s ociety" contains
a ood de<=J.l of fa ith. l e put "In tJ.od we
trust on our curr ency ·:.tn d h i -rh Government offici als fr om the J oundi n~ ~athers
to thi s day take the oath of their off ice
vith one hand on a Bibleand end the oa th
with "S o help my God . 1
Thanks

a~ain ,

have a good summer,
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Justice Marshall
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Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

0

The Chief Justice

Circulated:

MAY 2Q1985

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 83-812

AND

83-929

GEORGE C. WALLACE, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE
OF ALABAMA, ET AL., APPELLANTS
v.
83-812
ISHMAEL JAFFREE ET AL.
DOUGLAS T. SMITH, ET AL., APPELLANTS
83-929
v.
ISHMAEL JAFFREE ET AL.
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1985]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.
Some who trouble to read the opinions in this case will find
it ironic-perhaps even bizarre-that on the very day we
heard arguments in this case, the Court's session opened
with an invocation for Divine protection. Across the park a
few hundred yards away, at noon, the House of Representatives and the Senate each opened with a prayer. These legislative prayers were not just one minute in duration, but
were extended, thoughtful invocations and prayers for Divine guidance. They were given, as they have been since
1789, by clergy appointed as official Chaplains and paid from
the Treasury of the United States. Congress has also provided chapels in the Capitol, at public expense, where Members and others may pause for prayer, meditation, or a moment of silence.
Inevitaply some wag is bound to say that the Court's holding today reflects a belief that members of the Judiciary and
Congress are more in need of Divine guidance than our
schoolchildren are. Still others will say that all this contro-
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versy is "much ado about nothing," since no power on earthincluding this Court and Congress-can stop any teacher
from opening the school day with a moment of silence for pupils to meditate, to plan their day, or to pray. I have only
several points to make about this case.
1. It makes no sense to say that Alabama has "endorsed
prayer" by merely enacting a new statute "to specify expressly that voluntary prayer is one of the authorized activities during a moment of silence," ante, at 12 (O'CONNOR, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). Nor does it
make any sense to imply that, although a moment-of-silence
statute that includes the word "prayer" unconstitutionally
endorses religion, one that simply provides for a moment of
silence would not. To invalidate a statute that contains the
word "prayer" but to suggest that one omitting the word is
constitutional exhibits a blatant, undisguised hostility toward
religion. For decades our opinions have stated that hostility
toward any religion or toward all religions is as much forbidden by the Constitution as is an official establishment of religion. The Alabama legislature has no more "endorsed" religion than a state or the Congress does when it provides for
legislative chaplains, or than this Court does when it opens
each session with a religious invocation.
2. The inexplicable aspect of the foregoing opinions, however, is what is advanced as support for the holding on the
purpose of the Alabama legislature. Rather than determining legislative purpose from the face of the statute as a
whole, 1 the opinions rely on three factors in concluding that
the Alabama legislature had a "wholly religious" purpose for
enacting the statute under review, Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1
The foregoing opinions likewise completely ignore the statement of
purpose that accompanied the moment-of-silence bill throughout the legislative process: "To permit a period of silence to be observed/or the purpose
of meditation or voluntary prayer at the commencement of the first class of
each day in all public schools." 1981 Ala. Sen. J. 14 (emphasis added).
See also id., at 150, 307, 410, 535, 938, 967.
1
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(Supp. 1984): (a) statements of the statute's sponsor, (b) admissions in Governor James' Answer to the Second Amended
Complaint, and (c) the difference between§ 16-1-20.1 and its
predecessor statute.
(a) Curiously, the opinions do not mention that all of the
sponsor's statements relied upon-including the statement
"inserted" into the Senate Journal-were made after the legislature had passed the statute; indeed, the testimony that
the Court finds critical was given well over a year after the
statute was enacted. There is not a shred of evidence that
the legislature as a whole shared the sponsor's motive or that
a majority in either house was even aware of the sponsor's
view of the bill when it was passed. The sole relevance of
the sponsor's statements, therefore, is that they reflect the
personal, subjective motives of a single legislator. No case
in the 195-year history of this Court supports the disconcerting idea that post-enactment statements by individual legislators are relevant in determining the constitutionality of
·
legislation.
Even if an individual legislator's after-the-fact statements
could rationally be considered relevant, all of the opinions fail
to mention that the sponsor also testified that one of his purposes in drafting and sponsoring the moment-of-silence bill
was to clear up a misunderstanding among his constituents
that a schoolchild is legally prohibited from engaging in silent, individual prayer once he steps inside a public school
building. See App. 53-54. That testimony is at least as important as the statements the Court relies upon, and surely
that testimony manifests a permissible purpose.
(b) The Court also relies on the admissions of Governor
James' Answer to the Second Amended Complaint.
Strangely, however, the Court neglects to mention that there
was no trial bearing on the constitutionality of the Alabama
statutes; trial became unnecessary when the District Court
held that the Establishment Clause does not apply to the
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states. 2 The absence of a trial on the issue of the constitutionality of § 16-20.1 is significant because the Answer filed
by the State Board and Superintendent of Education did not
make the same admissions that the Governor's Answer made.
See 1 Record 187. The Court cannot know whether, if this
case had been tried, those State officials would have offered
evidence to contravene appellees' allegations concerning legislative purpose. Thus, it is completely inappropriate to accord any relevance to the admissions in the Governor's
Answer.
(c) The preceding opinions conclude that the principal difference between § 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor statute
proves that the sole purpose behind the inclusion of the
phrase "or voluntary prayer" in § 16-1-20.1 was to endorse
and promote prayer. Such logic-if it can be called thatwould lead the Court to hold, for example, that a state may
enact a statute that provides reimbursement for bus transportation to the parents of all schoolchildren, but that the
state may not add parents of parochial school students to an
existing program providing reimbursement for · parents of
public school students. Further, Congress amended the
statutory Pledge of Allegiance 31 years ago to add the words
"under God." Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68
Stat. 249. Do the Court's several opinions today render the
Pledge unconstitutional? That would be the consequence of
their method of focusing on the difference between
§ 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor statute rather than examining the challenged statute as a whole. Any such holding
would of course make a mockery of our decisionmaking in
Establishment Clause cases. And even were the Court's
method correct, the inclusion of the words "or voluntary
prayer" in § 16-1-20.1 is wholly consistent with the clearly
permissible purpose of clarifying that silent, voluntary
prayer is not forbidden in the public school building.
2

The four days of trial to which the Court refers concerned only the
alleged practices of vocal, group prayer in the classroom.
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3. The Court's extended treatment of the "test" of Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), suggests a naive preoccupation with an easy, bright-line approach for addressing constitutional issues. We have repeatedly cautioned that
Lemon did not establish a rigid caliper capable of resolving
every Establishment Clause issue, but that it sought only to
provide "signposts." "In each [Establishment Clause] case,
the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be
framed." Lynch v. Donnelly,-- U.S. - - , - - (1984).
In any event, our responsibility is not to apply tidy formulas
by rote; our duty is to determine whether the statute or practice at issue is a step toward establishing a state religion.
Given today's decision, however, perhaps it is understandable that the opinions in support of the judgment all but ignore the Establishment Clause itself and the concerns that
underlie it.
4. . The notion that the Alabama statute is a step toward
creating an established church borders on, if it does not trespass into, the ridiculous. ~he statute does not remotely
threaten religious liberty; it affirmatively furthers the values
of religious freedom and tolerance that the Establishment
Clause was designed to protect. Without pressuring those
who do not wish to pray, the statute simply creates an opportunity to think, to plan, or to pray if one wishes-as Congress
does by providing chaplains and chapels. It accommodates
the purely private, voluntary religious choices of the individual pupils who wish to pray while at the same time creating a
time for reflection for those who do not choose to pray. The
statute also provides a meaningful opportunity for schoolchildren to appreciate the absolute constitutional right of each individual to worship and believe as the individual wishes.
The statute "endorses" only the view that the religious observances of others should be tolerated and, where possible,
accommodated.
The Court today has ignored the wise admonition of Justice
Goldberg that "the measure of constitutional adjudication is
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the ability and willingness to distinguish between real threat
and mere shadow." School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S.
203, 308 (1963) (concurring opinion). The innocuous statute
that the Court strikes down does not even rise to the level of
a shadow. As JuSTICE O'CONNOR paradoxically acknowledges, "It is difficult to discern a serious threat to religious
liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren."
Ante, at 7. 3
It is suggested that the public likely will "misperceive" today's holding because the line drawn by the Court is such a
fine one. See id., at 18. The suggestion is well taken; I
must be included with those who "misperceive."
The mountains have labored and brought forth a mouse. 4

8

The principal plaintiff in this action has stated: "'I probably wouldn't
have brought the suit just on the silent meditation or prayer statute ....
If that's all that existed, that wouldn't have caused me much concern, unless it was implemented in a way that suggested prayer was the preferred
activity."' Malone, Prayers for Relief, ABAJ., Apr. 1985, at 61, 62, col. 1
(quoting Ishmael Jaffree).
'Horace, Odes, bk. III, line 139.
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, 'dissenting.
Some who trouble to read the opinions in this case will find
it ironic-perhaps even bizarre-that on the very day we
heard arguments in this case, the Court's session opened
with an invocation for Divine protection. Across the park a
few hundred yards away, the House of Representatives and
the Senate regularly open each session with a prayer. These
legislative prayers are not just one minute in duration, but
are extended, thoughtful invocations and prayers for Divine
guidance. They are given, as they have been since 1789, by
clergy appointed as official Chaplains and paid from the
Treasury of the United States. Congress has also provided
chapels in the Capitol, at public expense, where Members
and others may pause for prayer, meditation, or a moment of
silence.
Inevitably some wag is bound to say that the Court's holding today reflects a belief that the historic practice of the
Congress and this Court is justified because members of the
Judiciary and Congress are more in need of Divine guidance
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than schoolchildren are. Still others will say that all this
controversy is "much ado about nothing," since no power on
earth-including this Court and Congress-can stop any
teacher from opening the school day with a moment of silence
for pupils to meditate, to plan their day-or to pray if they
voluntarily elect to do so.
I wish to make several points about this case.
1. It makes no sense to say that Alabama has "endorsed
prayer" by merely enacting a new statute "to specify expressly that voluntary prayer is one of the authorized activities during a moment of silence," ante, at 12 (O'CONNOR, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). And to
imply that, although a moment-of-silence statute that includes the word "prayer" unconstitutionally endorses religion, one that simply provides for a moment of silence would
not, is to exhibit a blatant, undisguised hostility toward religion. For decades our opinions have stated that hostility toward any religion or toward all religions is as much forbidden
by the Constitution as is an official establishment of religion.
The Alabama legislature has no more "endorsed" religion
than a state or the Congress does when it provides for legislative chaplains, or than this , Court does when it opens each
session with a religious invocation. Today's decision recalls
the observations of Justice Goldberg:
"[U]ntutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can
lead to invocation or approval of results which partake
not simply of that noninterference and noninvolvement
with the religious which the Constitution commands, but
of a brooding and pervasive dedication to the secular and
a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious.
Such results are not only not compelled by the Constitution, but, it seems to me, are prohibited by it."
School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 306 (1963)
(concurring opinion).
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2. The inexplicable aspect of the foregoing opinions, however, is what they advance as support for the holding concerning the purpose of the Alabama legislature. Rather
than determining legislative purpose from the face of the
statute as a whole, 1 the opinions rely on three factors in
concluding that the Alabama legislature had a "wholly religious" purpose for enacting the statute under review, Ala.
Code§ 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984): (a) statements of the statute's
sponsor, (b) admissions in Governor James' Answer to the
Second Amended Complaint, and (c) the difference between
§ 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor statute.
(a) Curiously, the opinions do not mention that all of the
sponsor's statements relied upon-including the statement
"inserted" into the Senate Journal-were made after the legislature had passed the statute; indeed, the testimony that
the Court finds critical was given well over a year after the
statute was enacted. As even the appellees concede, see
Brief for Appellees 18, there is not a shred of evidence that
the legislature as a whole shared the sponsor's motive or that
a majority in either house was even aware of the sponsor's
·view of the bill when it was passed. The sole relevance of
the sponsor's statements, therefore, is that they reflect the
personal, subjective motives ·of a single legislator. No case
in the 195-year history of this Court supports the disconcerting idea that post-enactment statements by individual legislators are relevant in determining the constitutionality of
legislation.
Even if an individual legislator's after-the-fact statements
could rationally be considered relevant, all of the opinions fail
to mention that the sponsor also testified that one of his pur-

·

1
The foregoing opinions likewise completely ignore the statement of
purpose that accompanied the moment-of-silence bill throughout the legislative process: "To permit a period of silence to be observed/or the purpose
of meditation or voluntary prayer at the commencement of the first class of
each day in all public schools." 1981 Ala. Sen. J. 14 (emphasis added).
See also id., at 150, 307, 410, 535, 938, 967 .
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poses in drafting and sponsoring the moment-of-silence bill
was to clear up a widespread misunderstanding that a schoolchild is legally prohibited from engaging in silent, individual
prayer once he steps inside a public school building. See
App. 53-54. That testimony is at least as important as the
statements the Court relies upon, and surely that testimony
manifests a permissible purpose.
(b) The Court also relies on the admissions of Governor
James' Answer to the Second Amended Complaint.
Strangely, however, the Court neglects to mention that there
was no trial bearing on the constitutionality of the Alabama
statutes; trial became unnecessary when the District Court
held that the Establishment Clause does not apply to the
states. 2 The absence of a trial on the issue of the constitutionality of§ 16-1-20.1 is significant because the Answer filed
by the State Board and Superintendent of Education did not
make the same admissions that the Governor's Answer made.
See 1 Record 187. The Court cannot know whether, if this
case had been tried, those State officials would have offered
evidence to contravene appellees' allegations concerning legislative purpose. Thus, it is completely inappropriate to
accord any relevance to the admissions in the Governor's
Answer.
,
(c) The several preceding opinions conclude that the principal difference between§ 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor statute proves that the sole purpose behind the inclusion of the
phrase "or voluntary prayer" in § 16-1-20.1 was to endorse
and promote prayer. This reasoning is simply a subtle way
of focusing exclusively on the religious component of the
statute rather than examining the statute as a whole. Such
logic-if it can be called that-would lead the Court to hold,
for example, that a state may enact a statute that provides
reimbursement for bus transportation to the parents of all
schoolchildren, but may not add parents of parochial school
2

The four days of trial to which the Court refers concerned only the
alleged practices of vocal, group prayer in the classroom.
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students to an existing program providing reimbursement for
parents of public school students. Congress amended the
statutory Pledge of Allegiance 31 years ago to add the words
"under God." Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68
Stat. 249. Do the several opinions in support of the judgment today render the Pledge unconstitutional? That would
be the consequence of their method of focusing on the difference between § 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor statute rather
than examining § 16-1-20.1 as a whole. Any such holding
would of course make a mockery of our decisionmaking in
Establishment Clause cases. And even were the Court's
method correct, the inclusion of the words "or voluntary
prayer" in § 16-1-20.1 is wholly consistent with the clearly
permissible purpose of clarifying that silent, voluntary
prayer is not forbidden in the public school building.
3. The Court's extended treatment of the "test" of Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), suggests a naive preoccupation with an easy, bright-line approach for addressing
constitutional issues. We have repeatedly cautioned that
Lemon did not establish a rigid caliper capable of resolving
every Establishment Clause issue, but that it sought only to
provide "signposts." "In each [Establishment Clause] case,
the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be
framed." Lynch v. Donnelly,-- U. S. - - , - - (1984).
In any event, our responsibility is not to apply tidy formulas
by rote; our duty is to determine whether the statute or practice at issue is a step toward establishing a state religion.
Given today's decision, however, perhaps it is understandable that the opinions in support of the judgment all but
ignore the Establishment Clause itself and the concerns that
underlie it.
4. The notion that the Ala2_ama statute is a step toward
creati an ':stablished churchborders on, if it does not trespass into, the r1 ICulous. The statute does not remotely
threaten religious liOerty; it affirmatively furthers the values
of religious freedom and tolerance that the Establishment

--
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Clause was designed to protect. Without pressuring those
who do not wish to pray, the statute simply creates an opportunity to think, to plan, or to pray if one wishes-as Congress
does by providing chaplains and chapels. It accommodates
the purely private, voluntary religious choices of the individual pupils who wish to pray while at the same time creating a
time for nonreligious reflection for those who do not choose to
pray. The statute also provides a meaningful opportunity
for schoolchildren to appreciate the absolute constitutional
right of each individual to worship and believe as the individual wishes. The statute "endorses" only the view that the
religious observances of others should be tolerated and,
where possible, accommodated. If the government may not
accommodate religious needs when it does so in a wholly
neutral and noncoercive manner, the "benevolent neutrality''
that we have long considered the correct constitutional standard will quickly translate into the "callous indifference" that
the Court has consistently held the Establishment Clause
does not require.
The Court today has ignored the wise admonition of Justice
Goldberg that "the measure of constitutional adjudication is
the ability and willingness to distinguish between real threat
and mere shadow." School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S.
203, 308 (1963) (concurring opinion). The innocuous statute
that the Court strikes down does not even rise to the level of
a shadow. As JusTICE O'CONNOR paradoxically acknowledges, "It is difficult to discern a serious threat to religious
liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren."
Ante, at 7. 3 I would add to that, "even if they choose to
pray."
3

The principal plaintiff in this action has stated: "'I probably wouldn't
have brought the suit just on the silent meditation or prayer statute . . ..
If that's all that existed, that wouldn't have caused me much concern, unless it was implemented in a way that suggested prayer was the preferred
activity.'" Malone, Prayers for Relief, ABA J ., Apr. 1985, at 61, 62, col. 1
(quoting Ishmael Jaffree).
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It is suggested that the public likely will "misperceive" today's holding because the line drawn by the Court is such a
fine one. See id., at 18. The suggestion is well taken; I
must be included with those who "misperceive."
The mountains have labored and brought forth a mouse. 4
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the J·udgment. ~
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silence law is to endorse voluntary prayer in the public
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schools. I write separately to identify the peculiar features
•of the Alabama law that render it invalid, and to explain why
moment of silence laws in other States do not necessarily
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manifest the same infirmity. I also write to explain why in C~ ~
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my view neither history nor the Free Exercise Clause of the
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Although a distinct jurisprudence has enveloped
each of these clauses, their common purpose is to secure religious liberty. See Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962).
On these principles the Court has been and remains
unanimous.
As this case once again demonstrates, however, "it is far
easier to agree on the purpose that underlies the First
Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
than to obtain agreement on the standards that should govern their application." Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S.
664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). It once appeared
that the Court had developed a workable standard by which
to identify impermissible government establishments of religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1970).
Under the now familiar Lemon test, statutes must have both
a secular legislative purpose and a principal or primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and in addition
they must not foster excessive government entanglement
with religion. I d., at 612-613. Despite its initial promise,
the Lemon test has proven problematic. ':fhe required inquiry into "entanglement" has been modified and questioned,
see Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, - - n. 11 (1983), and in
one case we have upheld state action against an Establishment Clause challenge without applying the Lemon test at
all. Marsh v. Chambers,-- U.S.-- (1983). The author of Lemon himself apparently questions the test's general
applicabilty. See Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,-- U. S. - (1985), Lynch v. Donnelly, -U.S. - , (1984).
JusTICE REHNQUIST toda suggests that we ab ndon emon
en~, an m the process hmi
e reac oft e stablishment Clause to state discrimination between sects and government designation of a particular church as a "state" or
"national" one. Post, at - - .
Perhaps because I am new to the struggle, I am not ready·
to abandon all aspects of the Lemon test. I do believe, however, that the standards announced in Lemon should be re-

303 (1940).
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examined and refined in order to make them more useful in
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment.
We must strive to do more than erect a constitutional "signpost," Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 741 (1973), to be followed or ignored in a particular case as our predilections may
dictate. Instead, our goal should b~ "to~ame a pri,!l~i~le
constitutional adjudiCation thatffinot on y grounde m he
hist~ the first amendment, but one that is
also capable of consistent application to the relevant problems." '-Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed
Constitutional Standard, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 332-333 (1963)
(footnotes ommitted). Last Term, I proposed a refinement
of the Lemon test with this goal in mind. Lynch v. Donnelly,-- U. S. - - , - - (1984) (concurring opinion).
The Lynch concurrence suggested that the religious liberty
protected by the Establishment Clause is infringed when the
government makes adherence to religion relevant to a person's standing in the political community. Direct govern- ~
ment action endorsing reli~on or a particular religious practice is invalid under this approach because it "sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community." !d., at--. Under this
view, Lemon's inquiry as to the purpose and effect of a statute requires
to examine he er ove~ur
pose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually
conve s a message of enaorsemen .
he n orsemen es 1s useful because of the analytic~n
t&nt it gives to t e emon-mandated in ui into Ie 'slative
p~ect. In th1s country, church and state must
necessarily operate within the same community. Because of
this coexistence, it is inevitable that the secular interests of
Government and the religious interests of various sects and
their adherents will frequently intersect, conflict, and combine. A statute that ostensibly promotes a secular interest

{or
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often has an incidental or even a primary effect of helping or
hindering a sectarian belief. Chaos would ensue if every
such statute were invalid under the Establishment Clause.
For example, the State could not criminalize murder for fear
that it would thereby promote the Biblical command against
killing. The task for the Court is to sort out those statutes
and government practices whose purpose and effect go
against the grain of religious liberty protected by the First
Amend~
m~e~n~t~
· --~----~

The ndorsement test oes not preclude government from
acknowle ging religion or from taking religion into account in
making law and policy. It does preclude government from
conveying or attem tin to conve a messa e that -religion or
a particular re 1gious belief is favored or referred. Such
endorsemen 1 mges the religious liberty of the nonadherent, for "[w]hen the power, prestige, and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities
to conform to the prevailing officially approved reli ·on is
is
plain." Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S., at 431. At ssue to
whether st~nt of silence statutes in general, and Alabama's moment of silence statute in particular, embody an
impermissible endorsement of prayer in public schools.

an

-1..9~

A
Tw~nty-five_stat~permit or require public school teachers
to have-stuaeiitsOl{serve a moment of silence in their classrooms. 1 A few statutes provide that the moment of silence
1
See Ala. Code §§ 16-1-20, 16~0.1 (Supp. 1984): Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 15-522 (1984); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1607.1 (1980); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 10-16a (Supp. 1984); 61 Del. Laws, Ch. 547 (1978) (as interpreted in Op.
Att'y Gen 79-I 011 (1979)); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 233.062 (West Supp. 1985);
Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-1050 (1982); Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 122, ~ 771 (1984);
Ind. Code § 20-10.1-7-11 (1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72.5308a (1980); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:2115A (West 1982); ·Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20-A,
§ 4805 (1983); Md. Educ. Code Ann. § 7-104 (1985); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.,
Ch. 71, § 1A (1982); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.1565 (Supp. 1984); N. J.
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is for the purpose of meditation alone. See Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 15-522 (1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-16a (Supp. 1984 ·
R. I. Gen. Laws § 16-12-3.1 (1981). The p1ca statute ;
however, calls for a moment of silence at the beginning o the
school day during which students riiay meditate, pray, or refleet on the activities oftheaay. 8ee,e. g., Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 80-1607.1 (19 ); a. ode Ann. § 20-2-1050 (1982); Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 771 (1984); Ind. Code § 20-10.1-7-11
(1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-5308a (1980); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit.
24, § 15-1516.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984). Federal trial courts
have divided on the constitutionality of these moment of silence laws. Compare Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337
(D. Mass. 1976) (upholding statute) with May v. Cooperman,
572 F. Supp. 1561 (D.N. J. 1983) (striking down statute);
Duffy v. Las Cruces Public Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013
(D. N. M. 1983) (same); and Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp.
1161 (M. D.Tenn. 1982) (same). See also Walter v. West
Virginia Board of Education, Civ. Action No. 84-5366 (SD
W. Va. March 14, 1985) (striking down state constitutional
amendment). Relying on this Court's decisions disapproving vocal prayer and Bible reading in the public schools, see
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963),
Engle v. Vitale 370 U. S. 421 (1962), the courts that have
struck down the moment of silence statutes generall conclude that their purpose and effect is to encourage prayer in
public c oo s.
TneFingle and Abington decisions are not dispositive on
the constitutionality of moment of silence laws. In those
Rev. Stat. § 18A:36-4 (West Supp. 1984); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-4.1
(1981); N. Y. Educ. Law § 3029-a (McKinney 1981); N. D. Cent. Code
§ 15-47-30.1 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.60.1 (1980); Pa. Stat.
Ann., Tit. 24, § 15.1516.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984); R. I. Gen. Laws
§ 16-12-3.1 (1981); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-1004 (1983); Va. Code
§ 22.1-203 (1980); W. Va. Canst. Art. III,§ 15-a. For a useful comparison
of the provisions of many of these statutes, see Note, Daily Moments of
Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev.
364, 407-408 (1983).

~
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cases, public schoo~ and students led their classes in
devotional exercik__In/Engle, a New ~e requir~ to lead their classes in a vocal prayer. The
Court concluded that "it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people~ religious program carried on
by the government." 370 U. S., at 424. In Abington, the
Court addressed Pennsylvania and Maryland statutes that
authorized morning B~s in public schools. The
Court reviewed the purpose and effect of the statutes, concluded that they required religious exercises, and therefore
found them to violate the Establishment Clause. 374 U. S.,
at 223-224. Under all of these statutes, a student who did
not share the religious beliefs expressed in the course of the
exercise was left with the choice of participating, thereby
compromising the nonadherent's beliefs, or withdrawing,
thereby calling attention to his or her non-conformity. The
decisions acknowledged the coercion implicit under the statutory schemes, see Engle, 370 U. S., at 431, but they expressly turned only on the fact that the government was
sponsoring a manifestly religious exercise.
A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is
different from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading.
First, a moment of silence is not inh e
eli · s. Silence, unli e prayer or Bib e rea ing, nf:!e~~ted
with ~e. Second, a pUpJIWl1o participates
in a momentOrsil~ need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer
is left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of others. For these simple
reasons, a moment of silence statute does ~ fall
unen
ause~_ccor m o ow the Court
re~er Or1ffi>Iereading. Scholars and at least
one member of this ourt have recognized the distinction and
suggested that a moment of silence in public schools uld~
constitutional. See Abington, 374 U. S., at 281
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J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of reverent
silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular
purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing
either the religious liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres
of religion and goverment"); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal
Issue," in Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper,
supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public
Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1031, 1041
(1963). A~~ general matter, I agree. It is difficul to dis- j
cern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent,
thoug
sc oo c 'l<lre .
y man ating a moment of silence, a State does not necessarily endorse any activity that might occur during the
period. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 272 n. 11
(1981) ("by creating a forum the [State] does not thereby
endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there"). ,
Even if a .§tatute SJ>ecifies ..that ]- student may choose to w:ay
silw~j~ ggiet moment, the..State has not .tQ.e reby
en~ed .E_rl:!-ye.r over o.t.~r. sJ2ecit.led alterl!atives. Nonetheless, iris also possible that a moment of silence statute,
either as drafted or as actually implemented, could effectively favor the child who prays over the child who does not.
For example, the message of endorsement would seem inescapable if the teacher exhorts children to use the designated
time to pray. Si~ly, the face of the statute or~sla
tive history may clearl establish t a 1t seeks to encoJJrage
or promot vo un ary praE r over other alternatives, rather
than merelyp roVide a quiet moment that may be dedicated to
prayer by those so inclined. The crucial question is whether
the State has conveyed or at e te
vey the message
that ch1
n sliou use e moment of silence for prayer. 2

J

2

Appellants argue that Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313-314
(1952) suggests there is no constitutional infirmity in a State's encouraging
a child to pray during a moment of silence. The cited dicta from Zorach,
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This question cannot be answered in the abstract, but instead
requires courts to exa ·net e ·
age, and administration of a particular statute to determine whether it operates as an endorsement of religion. Lynch, - - U. S., at
--(concurring opinion) ("Every government practice must
be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether
it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion").
law --.19
Before reviewin Alabama's momen o ·1
determme whether it endorses rayer, some general ob~ations on
e proper scope of the inquiry are in order.
~ ' the inquiry into the purposEl.Q.f the ~gislfl_ture in enactmg a moment of silence law SFiOuid l:)edeferelltial and limited.
See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 6 (1947)
(courts must exercise "the most extreme caution" in assessing whether a state statute has a proper public purpose). In
determining whether the government intends a moment of
silence statute to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion, a court has no license to psychoanalyze the
legislators. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 466
(1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). If a legislature ex- ~ ~ LA_)
presses a plausible secular purpose for a moment of silence
~
statute in either the text or the legislative history, 3 or if the
~-'2
statute di~s an intent to encourage prayer oveu lternatives during a moment-of silence,l then courts should gener~~~
ally defer to that stated intent. See Committee for Public
~
however, is inapposite. There the Court stated that "When the state en~~
courages religious instruction . . . by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions." Id. (em- ~~
phasis added). When the State provides a moment of silence during which ~~-prayer may occur at the election of the student, it can be said to be adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs. But when the State
also encourages the student to pray during a moment of silence, it converts
an otherwise inoffensive moment of silence into an effort by the majority to
use the machinery of the State to encourage the minority to participate in a
religious exercise. See Abington, supra, 374 U. S., at 226.
3
See, e. g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-1004 (1983).
'See, e. g., W.Va. Const. Art. III, §15-a.

~

,.

83-812 & 83-929-CONCUR
WALLACE v. JAFFREE

9

Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
773 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 678-679
(1971). It is particularly troublesome to denigrate an expressed secular purpose due to p~ony by
particular legislators or by interested persons who Witnessed
the drafting of the statute. Eyen if the text and offici.2:! history of a statute express no secular ur ose, the statute
shou
e
o ave an improper ur ose onlYifit is
beyond purview tha en orsemen o reli ·on or a religious
belie was a 1
w s reason for exist nee." Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 10 (1968). Since there is arguably a secular pedagogical value to a moment of silence in
public schools, courts should find an improper purpose behind
such a statute only if the statute on its face, in its official legislative history, or in its interpretation by a responsible
administrative agency suggests it has the primary purpose of
endorsin£:.-l)~R-e.r:---,.....,...

STICE REHNQUIST s gests that this sort of deferential
i uiry into le · · e purpose "means little," because "it
onl
mres the le ·slature to ex ress an secular ur ose
an omit all sectarian references." Post, at--. It is not a
triVI~, to require that the legislature manifest a secular purpose and omit all sectarian endorsements
from its laws. That requirement is precisely tailored to the
Establishment Clause's purpose of assuring that Government
not intentionally endorse religion or a religious practice. It
is of course possible that a legislature will enunciate a sham
secular purpose for a statute. I have little doubt that our
courts are capable of distinguishing a sham secular purpose
from a sincere one, or that the Lemon inquiry into the effect
of an enactment would help decide those close cases where
the validity of an expressed secular purpose is in doubt.
While the secular purpose requirement alone may rarely be
determinative in striking down a statute, it nevertheless
serves an important function. It reminds government that
when it acts it should do so without endorsing a particular

--

.
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religious belief or practice that all citizens do not share. In
this sense the secular purpose requirement is squarely based
in the text of the Establishment Clause it helps to enforce.
Second, the Lynch concurrence suggested that the effect
of a moment of silence law is not entirely a question of fact:
"[W]hether a government activity communicates
endorsement of religion is not a question of simple historical fact. Although evidentiary submissions may
help to answer it, the question is, like the question
whether racial or sex-based classifications communicate
an invidious message, in large part a legal question to be
answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social
facts." - - U. S., at-- (concurring opinion).

The relevant issue is whether an bbjective observer,~ ~c- )
quainted Wit111Tie text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement
of prayer in public schools. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union,-- U.S.--,-- n. 1 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (noting that questions whether fighting words are "likely
to provoke the average person to retaliation," Street v. New
York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969), and whether allegedly obscene material appeals to "prurient interests," Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973), are mixed questions of law
and fact that are properly subject to de novo appellate review). A moment of silence law that is clearly drafted and
reflecimplemented so as to ermit ra r, medita ion
tion within the prescrl ea perio ' without endorsigg one
alt~s, should pass this test.
1

B
The analysis above suggests that moment of silence laws in
many States should pass Establishment Clause scrutiny because they do not favor the child who chooses to pray during
a moment of silence over the child who chooses to meditate or
reflect. Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 does not stand on the
same footing. However deferentially one examines its text

I
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room activity, and that both the District Court and the Court
of Appeals concluded that the law's ~ose was to encourage
religio~ ~c~ivity. ~ n. (p ura 1 y opinion).
In lig ht oftfie legislative history, I agree with the plurality
that the State intended Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 to convey
a message that prayer was the endorsed activity during the
state-prescribed moment of silence. While it is therefore
unnecessary also to determine the effect of the statute,
Lynch,-- U. S., at-- (concurring opinion), it also seems
likely that the message actually conveyed to objective observers by Alabama Code§ 16-1-20.1 is approval of the child
who selects prayer over other alternatives during a moment
of silence.
Given this evidence in the record, candor requires us to
admit that this Alabama statute was intended to convey a
message of state encouragement and endorsement of religion. In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 669
(1970), we stated that the religion clauses of the First
Amendment are flexible enough to "permit religious exercise
to exist without sponsorship and without interference." Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 oes more than permit ra er to
occur~ moment of silence "without interf.erence." It
end~ decision to pray during a moment of silence, and
accordingly/~ a religious exercisJ.' For that reason, I
concur in the judgment of the Court.
II

In his dissenting opinion, post, at - - , JusTICE REHNQUIST reviews the text and history of the First Amendment
religion clauses. His opinion suggests that a long line of this
Court's decisions are inconsistent with the intent of drafters
of the Bill of Rights. He urges the Court to correct the historical inaccuracies in its past decisions by embracing a far
more restricted interpretation of the Establishment Clause,
an interpretation that presumably would permit vocal group

1
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prayer in public schools. See generally R. Cord, Separation
of Church and State (1982).
The United States, in an amicus brief, suggests a less
sweeping modification of Establishment Clause principles.
In the Federal Government's view, a state sponsored moment of silence is merely an "accommodation" of the desire of
some public schoolchildren to practice their religion by praying silently. Such an accommodation is contemplated by the
First Amendment's guaranty that the Government will not
prohibit the free exercise of religion. Because the moment
of silence implicates free exercise values, the United States
suggests that the Lemon-mandated inquiry into purpose and
effect should be modified. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae 22.
There is an element of truth and much helpful analysis in
each of these suggestions. Particularly when we are interpreting the Constitution, "a page of history is worth a volume
of logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349
(1921). Whatever the provision of the Constitution that is at
issue, I continue to believe that "fidelity to the notion of constitutionalr- as opposed to purely judicial- limits on governmental action requires us to impose a heavy burden on those
who claim that practices accepted when [the provision] was
adopted are now constitutionally impermissible." Tennessee
v. Garner,-- U.S.--,-- (dissenting opinion). The
Court properly looked to history in upholding legislative
prayer, Marsh v. Chambers, - - U. S. - - (1983), property tax exemptions for houses of worship, Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1970), and Sunday closing laws,
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961). As Justice
Holmes once observed, "[i]f a thing has been practised for
two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong
case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it." Jackman
v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S. 22, 31 (1922).
JUSTICE REHNQUIST does not assert, however, that the
drafters of the First Amendment expressed a preference for
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prayer in public schools, or that the practice of prayer in public schools enjoyed uninterrupted government endorsement
from the time of enactment of the Bill of Rights to the
present era. The simple truth is that free public education
was virtually non-existent in the late eighteenth century.
See Abington, 374 U. S., at'238 and n. 7 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Since there then existed few government-run
schools, it is unlikely that the persons who drafted the First
Amendment, or the state legislators who ratified it, anticipated the problems of interaction of church and state in the
public schools. Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress, and the Schools: An Historical Perspective, 52 Va. L.
Rev. 1395, 1403-1404 (1966). Even at the time of adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, education in Southern States
was still primarily in private hands, and the movement toward free public schools supported by general taxation had
not taken hold. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S.
483, 489-490 (1954).
This uncertainty as to the intent of the Framers of the Bill
of Rights does not mean we should ignore history for guidance on the role of religion in public education. The Court
has not done so. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
When the intent of the Framers is unclear, I believe we
must employ both history and reason in our analysis. The
primary issue raised by JusTICE REHNQUIST's dissent is
whether the historical fact that our Presidents have long
called for public prayers of Thanks should be dispositive on
the constitutionality of prayer in public schools 5 • I think
not. At the very least, Presidential proclamations are
distinguishable from school prayer in that they are primarily
Even assuming a taxpayer could establish standing to challenge such
a practice, see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, 454 U. S. 464 (1982), these Presidential
proclamations would probably withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny
given their long history. See Marsh v. Chambers, - U. S . - (1983).
5
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directed at adults, who presumably are not readily susceptible to unwilling religious indoctrination. This Court's decisions have recognized a distinction when government sponsored religious exercises are directed at impressionable
children who are required to attend school, for then government endorsement is much more likely to result in coerced
religious beliefs. See, e. g., Marsh v. Chambers, - U. S., at - - ; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 686. Although history provides a touchstone for constitutional·problems, the Establishment Clause concern for religious liberty
is dispositive here.
The element of truth in the United States' arguments, I believe, lies in the suggestion that Establishment Clause analysis must comport with the mandate of the Free Exercise
Clause that government make no law prohibiting the- free
exercise of religion. Our cases have interpreted the Free
Exercise Clause to compel the Government to exempt persons from some generally applicable government requirements so as to permit those persons to freely exercise their
religion. See, e. g., Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana
Employment·Secutiy Division, 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U. S. 398 (1963). Even where the Free Exercise Clause
does not compel the Government to grant an exemption, the
Court has suggested that the Government in some circumstances may voluntarily choose to exempt religious observers
without violating the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437, 453 (1971); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U. S. 599 (1961). The challenge posed by the
United States' argument is how to define the proper Establishment Clause limits on voluntary government efforts to
facilitate the free exercise of religion. On the one hand, a
rigid application of the Lemon test would invalidate legislation exempting religious observers from generally applicable
government obligations. By· definition, such legislation has
a religious purpose and effect in promoting the free exercise
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of religion. On the other hand, judicial deference to all legislation that purports to facilitate the free exercise of religion
would completely vitiate the Establishment Clause. Any
statute pertaining to religion can be viewed as an "accommod~tion" of fr~ exercise rights. Indeed, the statute at issue
in Lemon, wliiCh provided salary supplements, textbooks,
and instructional materials to Pennsylvania parochial schools,
can be viewed as an accommodation of the religious beliefs
of parents who choose to send their children to religious
schools.
It is obvious that the either of the two Religion Clauses, "if
expanded to its logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other." Walz, 397 U. S., at 668-669. The Court has long
exacerbated the conflict by calling for government "neutrality'' toward religion. See, e. g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1973), Board of Education
v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968). It is difficult to square any
notion of "complete neutrality," ante, at-- (plurality opinion), with the mandate of the Free Exercise Clause that government must sometimes exempt a religious observer from
an otherwise generally applicable obligation. A government
that confers a benefit on an explicitly religious basis is not
neutral toward religion. See Welsh v. United States, 398
U. S. 333, 372 (1970) (WHITE, J., dissenting).
The solution to the conflict between the religion clauses lies
not in "neutrality," but rather in identifying workable limits
to the Government's license to promote the Free Exercise of
religion. The text of the Free Exercise Clause speaks of
laws that prohibit the free exercise of religion. On its face,
the Clause is directed at government interference with free
exercise. Given that concern, one can plausibly assert that
government pursues free exercise clause values when it lifts
a government-imposed burden on the free exercise of religion. If a statute falls within this category, then the standard Establishment Clause test should be modified accordingly. It is disingenuous to look for a purely secular purpose
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when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate the
free exercise of religion by lifting a government-imposed burden. Instead, the Court should simply acknowledge that the
religious purpose of such a statute is legitimated by the Free
Exercise Clause. I would also go further. In assessing the
effect of such a statute- that is, in determining whether the
statute conveys the message of endorsement of religion or a
particular religious belief- courts should assume that the
"objective observer," ante, at - - , is acquainted with the
Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes. Thus individual perceptions, or resentment that a religious observer is
exempted from a particular government requirement, would
be entitled to little weight if the Free Exercise Clause
strongly supported the exemption.
While this "accommodation" analysis would help reconcile
our Free Exercis e and Establishment Clause standards, it
would not save Alabama's moment of silence law. If we assumet hat thereligfOOsactivitythatAlabama seeks to protect is silent prayer, then it is difficult to discern any stateimposed burden on that activity that is lifted by Alabama
Code § 16-1-20.1. No law prevents a student who is so inclined from praying silently in public schools. Moreover,
state law already provided a moment of silence to these
appellees irrespective of Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1. See
Ala. Code § 16-1-20. Of course, the State might argue that
§ 16-1-20.1 protects not silent prayer, but rather group silent
prayer under State sponsorship. Phrased in these terms,
the burden lifted by the statute is not one imposed by the
State of Alabama, but by the Establishment Clause as interpreted in Engle and Abington. In my view, it is beyond the
authority of the State of Alabama to remove burdens imposed by the Constitution itself. I conclude that the Ala- )
bama statute at issue today lifts no state-imposed burden on
the free exercise of religion, and accordingly cannot properly
be viewed as an accommodation statute.

rr
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III
I agree with JUSTICE REHNQUIST that the "hopelessly: divid~s," post, at--, which characte~
and many of our Establishment Clause decisions are unfortunate. Even more unfortunate is the likelihood the public will
misperceive today's decision. The Court does not hold that
the Establishment Clause is so hostile to religion that it precludes the States from affording schoolchildren an opportunity for voluntary silent prayer. To the contrary, the
moment of silence statutes of many States should satisfy the
Establishment Clause standard we have here applied. The
Court holds only that Alabama has intentionall cro ed the
line between creating a uiet moment durm which thos so
inc~ay, an affirmative
endorsin the articular
reli~r. T ·s line may be a fine one, but
our precedents and the principles of religious liberty require
that we draw it. In my view, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals must be affirmed.
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
Nothing in the United States Constitution as interpreted
by this Court or in the laws of the State of Alabama prohibits
public school students from voluntarily praying at any time
before, during, or after the school day. Alabama has facilitated voluntary silent prayers of students who are so inclined
by enacting Ala. Code§ 16-1-20, which provides a moment of
silence in appellees' schools each day. The parties to these
proceedings concede the validity of this enactment. At issue
in these appeals is the constitutional validity of an additional
and subsequent Alabama statute, Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1,
which both the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded was enacted solely to officially encourage prayer during the moment of silence. I agree with the judgment of the
Court that, in light of the findings of the Courts below and
the history of its enactment,§ 16-1-20.1 of the Alabama Code
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
In my view, there can be little doubt that the purpose and
likely effect of this subsequent enactment is to endorse and
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sponsor voluntary prayer in the public schools. I write separately to identify the peculiar features of the Alabama law
that render it invalid, and to explain why moment of silence
laws in other States do not necessarily manifest the same infirmity. I also write to explain why n ., · ·
·1.; >tory nor the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Arr. l uuu::m validate the
Alabama law struck down by the Courc wday.
I

The religion clauses of the First Amendment, coupled with
the Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty of ordered liberty,
preclude both the Nation and the States from making any law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296,
303 (1940). Although a distinct jurisprudence has enveloped
each of these clauses, their common purpose is to secure religious liberty. See Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962).
On these principles the Court has been and remains
unanimous.
As this case once again demonstrates, however, "it is far
easier to agree on the purpose that underlies the First
Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
than to obtain agreement on the standards that should govern their application." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664,
694 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.). It once appeared that the
Court had developed a workable standard by which to identify impermissible government establishments of religion.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971). Under the
now familiar Lemon test, statutes must have both a secular
legislative purpose and a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and in addition they must
not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.
ld., at 612-613. Despite its initial promise, the Lemon test
has proven problematic. The required inquiry into "entanglement" has been modified and questioned, see Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 403 n. 11 (1983), and in one case we
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have upheld state action against an Establishment Clause
challenge without applying the Lemon test at all. Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983). The author of Lemon him~Plf ~r>oarently questions the test's general applicability.
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. - - , - - C
· US'TICE REHNQUIST today suggests that we abando .~emon entirely, and in the process limit the reach of the EsLablishment
Clause to state discrimination between sects and government
designation of a particular church as a "state" or "national"
one. Post, at--.
Perhaps because I am new to the struggle, I am not ready
to abandon all aspects of the Lemon test. I do believe, however, that the standards announced in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment.
We must strive to do more than erect a constitutional "signpost," Hunt v. McNa ir, 413 U. S. 734, 741 (1973), to be followed or ignored in a particular case as our predilections may
dictate. Instead, our goal should be "to frame a principle for
constitutional adjudication that is not only grounded in the
history and language of the first amendment, but one that is
also capable of consistent application to the relevant problems." Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed
Constitutional Standard, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 329, 332-333
(1963) (footnotes omitted). Last Term, I proposed a refinement of the Lemon test with this goal in mind. Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U. S., at-- (concurring opinion).
The Lynch concurrence suggested that the religious liberty
protected by the Establishment Clause is infringed when the
government makes adherence to religion relevant to a person's standing in the political community. Direct government action endorsing religion or a particular religious practice is invalid under this approach because it "sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored mem-
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hers of the political community." /d., at--. Under this
view, Lenwn's inquiry as to the purpose and effect of a statute requires courts to examine whether government's purpose is to enciorse religion and whether the statute actually
conveys
" ssa~re of endorsement.
The e1 Jrsement test is useful because of the analytic C< '
tent it gives to the Lemon-mandated inquiry into legislati ,!
purpose and effect. In this country, church and state must
necessarily operate within the same community. Because of
this coexistence, it is inevitable that the secular interests of
Government and the religious interests of various sects and
their adherents will frequently intersect, conflict, and combine. A statute that ostensibly promotes a secular interest
often has an incidental or even a primary effect of helping or
hindering a sectarian belief. Chaos would ensue if every
such statute were invalid under the Establishment Clause.
For example , the State could not criminalize murder for fear
that it would thereby promote the Biblical command against
killing. The task for the Court is to sort out those statutes
and government practices whose purpose and effect go
against the grain of religious liberty protected by the First
Amendment.
The endorsement test does not preclude government from
acknowledging religion or from taking religion into account in
making law and policy. It does preclude government from
conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or
a particular religious belief is favored or preferred. Such an
endorsement infringes the religious liberty of the nonadherent, for "( w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities
to confonn to the prevailing officially approved religion is
plain." Englev. Vitale, 370U. S., at431. Atissuetodayis
whether state moment of silence statutes in general, and Alabama's moment of silence statute in particular, embody an
impennissible endorsement of prayer in public schools.
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A
Twenty-five states permit or require public school teachers
to have students observe a moment of silence in their classrooms.' A few ~ .. ~ . . ·:t.- - ~rovide that the moment of silence
is for the purposE: ~...· • l..'rli'..ation alone. See Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 15-522 (l~:RJ); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-16a (1983); R. I.
Gen. Laws § 16-12-3.1 (1981). The typical statute, however, calls for a moment of silence at the beginning of the
school day during which students may meditate, pray, or reflect on the activities of the day. See, e. g., Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 80-1607.1 (1980); Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-1050 (1982); Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 771 (1983); Ind. Code § 20-10.1-7-11
(1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-5308a (1980); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit.
24, § 15-1516.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984). Federal trial courts
have divided on the constitutionality of these moment of silence laws. Compare Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337
(Mass. 1976) (upholding statute) with May v. Cooperman,
572 F. Supp. 1561 (NJ 1983) (striking down statute); Duffy v.
Las Cruces Public Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013 (NM 1983)
(same); and Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (MD Tenn.
'See Ala. Code §§ 16-1-20, 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984): Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 15-522 (1984); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1607.1 (1980); Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 10-16a (1983); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 14, § 4101 (1981) (as interpreted in
Del. Op. Atty. Gen. 79-1011 (1979)); Fla. Stat. § 233.062 (1983); Ga. Code
Ann. § 20-2-1050 (1982): Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 122, ~ 771 (1983); Ind. Code
§ 20-10.1-7-11 (1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72.5308a (1980); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 17:2115(A) (West 1982); Me. ReY. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20-A, § 4805
(1983); Md. Educ. Code Ann.§ 7-104 (1985); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 71,
§ 1A (1982); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.1565 (Supp. 1984-1985); N. J.
Stat. Ann. § 18A:36-4 (West Supp. 1984-1985); N. M. Stat. Ann.
§ 22-5-4.1 (1981); N. Y. Educ. Law§ 3029-a (McKinney 1981); N. D. Cent.
Code § 15-47-30.1 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3313.60.1 (1980); Pa.
Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, § 15.1516.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); R. I. Gen. Laws
§ 16-12-3.1 (1981); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-1004 (1983); Va. Code
§ 22.1-203 (1980); W. Va. Const., Art. III, § 15-a. For a useful comparison of the provisions of many of these statutes, see Note, Daily Moments of
Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev.
364, 407-408 (1983).
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1982) (same). See also Walter v. West Virginia Board of
Education, Civ. Action No. 84-5366 (SD W. Va., Mar. 14,
1985) (striking down state constitutional amendment). Relying on this Court's decisions nisapproving vocal prayer and
Bible reading in the publk schools, see Abington School District V. Schempp, 374 r. 8. 203 (1963), Engle v. Vitale,
supra, the courts that have struck down the moment of silence statutes generally conclude that their purpose and effect is to encourage prayer in public schools.
The Engle and Abington decisions are not dispositive on
the constitutionality of moment of silence laws. In those
cases, public school teachers and students led their classes in
devotional exercises. In Engle, a New York statute required teachers to lead their classes in a vocal prayer. The
Court concluded that "it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as part of a religious program carried on
by the government." 370 U. S., at 425. In Abington, the
Court addressed Pennsylvania and Maryland statutes that
authorized morning Bible readings in public schools. The
Court reviewed the purpose and effect of the statutes, concluded that they required religious exercises, and therefore
found them to violate the Establishment Clause. 374 U. S.,
at 223-224. Under all of these statutes, a student who did
not share the religious beliefs expressed in the course of the
exercise was left with the choice of participating, thereby
compromising the nonadherent's beliefs, or withdrawing,
thereby calling attention to his or her non-conformity. The
decisions acknowledged the coercion implicit under the statutory schemes, see Engle, supra, at 431, but they expressly
turned only on the fact that the government was sponsoring a
manifestly religious exercise.
A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is
different from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading.
First, a moment of silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, need not be associated

;
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with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates
in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer
is left to his or her O\Vn thoughts, ann i~ not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of othe ;
For these simple
reasons, a moment of silence· stat'1t1~ does not stand or fall
under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least
one member of this Court have recognized the distinction and
suggested that a moment of silence in public schools would be
constitutional. See Abington, supra, at 281 (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he observance of a moment of reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular
purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing
either the religious liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres
of religion and goverment"); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law§ 14-6, p. 829 (1978); P. Freund, The Legal Issue,
in Religion and the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, 47
Minn. L. Rev., at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and
the Supreme Court, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As
a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to discern a serious
threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful
schoolchildren.
By mandating a moment of silence, a State does not necessarily endorse any activity that might occur during the period. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 272, n. 11
(1981) ("by creating a forum the [State] does not thereby endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there").
Even if a statute specifies that a student may choose to pray
silently during a quiet moment, the State has not thereby encouraged prayer over other specified alternatives. Nonetheless, it is also possible that a moment of silence statute,
either as drafted or as actually implemented, could effectively favor the child who prays over the child who does not.
For example, the message of endorsement would seem ines-
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capable if the teacher exhorts children to use the designated
time to pray. Similarly, the face of the statute or its legislative history may clearly establish that it seeks to encourage
or promote voluntary prayer over other alternatives, rather
than merely provide a quiet moment that rna:
·dicated to
prayer by those so inclined. The crucial qm .on is whether
the State has conveyed or attempted to convey the message
that children should use the moment of silence for prayer. 2
This question cannot be answered in the abstract, but instead
requires courts to examine the history, language, and administration of a particular statute to determine whether it operates as an endorsement of religion. Lynch, 465 U. S., at
--(concurring opinion) ("Every government practice must
be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether
it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion").
Before reviewing Alabama's moment of silence law to determine whether it endorses prayer, some general observations on the proper scope of the inquiry are in order. First,
the inquiry into the purpose of the legislature in enacting a
moment of silence law should be deferential and limited.
See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 6 (1947)
(courts must exercise "the most extreme caution" in assessing whether a state statute has a proper public purpose). In
2
Appellants argue that Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313-314
(1952) suggests there is no constitutional infirmity in a State's encouraging
a child to pray during a moment of silence. The cited dicta from Zorach ,
however, is inapposite. There the Court stated that "When the state encourages religious instruction . . . by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions." Ibid. (emphasis added). When the State provides a moment of silence during which
prayer may occur at the election of the student, it can be said to be adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs. But when the State
also encourages the student to pray during a moment of silence, it converts
an otherwise inoffensive moment of silence into an effort by the majority to
use the machinery of the State to encourage the minority to participate in a
religious exercise. See Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S.
203, 226 (1963).
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determining whether the government intends a moment of silence statute to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion, a court has no license to psychoanalyze the
legislators. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 466
(1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). If a legislature expresses a plausible secular purpose for a moment of ·;ilr~nce
statute in either the text or the legislative history, 3 or if the
statute disclaims an intent to encourage prayer over alternatives during a moment of silence, • then courts should generally defer to that stated intent. See Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
773 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 678-679
(1971). It is particularly troublesome to denigrate an expressed secular purpose due to post-enactment testimony by
particular legislators or by interested persons who witnessed
the drafting of the statute. Even if the text and official history of a statute express no secular purpose, the statute
should be held to have an improper purpose only if it is beyond purview that endorsement of religion or a religious belief "was and is the law's reason for existence." Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 108 (1968). Since there is arguably
a secular pedagogical value to a moment of silence in public
schools, courts should find an improper purpose behind such
a statute only if the statute on its face, in its official legislative history, or in its interpretation by a responsible administrative agency suggests it has the primary purpose of endorsing prayer.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST suggests that this sort of deferential
inquiry into legislative purpose "means little," because "it
only requires the legislature to express any secular purpose
and omit all sectarian references." Post, at--. It is not a
trivial matter, however, to require that the legislature manifest a secular purpose and omit all sectarian endorsements
from its laws. That requirement is precisely tailored to the
• See, e. g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-1004 (1983).
• See, e. g., W. Va. Const., Art. III, § 15-a.
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Establishment Clause's purpose of assuring that Government
not intentionally endorse religion or a religious practice. It
is of course possible that a legislature will enunciate a sham
secular purpose for a statute. I have little doubt that our
courts are capable of distinguishing a sham secular purpose
from a sincere one, or that the Lemon inquiry into the effect
of an enactment would help decide those close cases where
the validity of an expressed secular purpose is in doubt.
While the secular purpose requirement alone may rarely be
determinative in striking dow•n a statute, it nevertheless
serves an important function. It reminds government that
when it acts it should do so without endorsing a particular religious belief or practice that all citizens do not share. In
this sense the secular purpose requirement is squarely based
in the text of the Establishment Clause it helps to enforce.
Second, the Lynch concurrence suggested that the effect of
a moment of silence law is not entirely a question of fact:
"[W]hether a government activity communicates endorsement of religion is not a question of simple historical fact. Although evidentiary submissions may help
answer it, the question is, like the question whether racial or sex-based classifications communicate an invidious message, in large part a legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social
facts." 465 U. S., at-- (concurring opinion).
The relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement
of prayer in public schools. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. - - , - - n. 1
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (noting that questions whether
fighting words are "likely to provoke the average person to
retaliation," Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969),
and whether allegedly obscene material appeals to "prurient
interests," Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973), are
mixed questions of law and fact that are properly subject to
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de novo appellate review). A moment of silence law that is
clearly drafted and implemented so as to permit prayer,
meditation, and reflection within the prescribed period, without endorsing one alternative over the others, should pass
this test.
B

The analysis above suggests that moment of silence laws in
many States should pass Establishment Clause scrutiny because they do not favor the child who chooses to pray during
a moment of silence over the child who chooses to meditate or
reflect. Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) does not
stand on the same footing. However deferentially one examines its text and legislative history, however objectively
one views the message attempted to be conveyed to the public, the conclusion is unavoidable that the purpose of the statute is to endorse prayer in public schools. I accordingly
agree with the Court of Appeals, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (1983),
that the Alabama statute has a purpose which is in violation
of the Establishment Clause, and cannot be upheld.
In finding that the purpose of Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 is
to endorse voluntary prayer during a moment of silence, the
plurality relies on testimony elicited from State Senator Donald G. Holmes during a preliminary injunction hearing.
Ante, at - - . Senator Holmes testified that the sole purpose of the statute was to return voluntary prayer to the public schools. For the reasons expressed above, I would give
little, if any, weight to this sort of evidence of legislative intent. Nevertheless, the text of the statute in light of its official legislative history leaves little doubt that the purpose of
this statute corresponds to the purpose expressed by Senator
Holmes at the preliminary injunction hearing.
First, it is notable that Alabama already had a moment of
silence statute before it enacted § 16-1-20.1. See Ala. Code
§ 16-1-20, reprinted ante, at--, n. 1. Appellees do not
challenge this statute-indeed, they concede its validity.
See Brief for Appellees 2. The only significant addition

'
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made by Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 is to specify expressly
that voluntary prayer is one of the authorized activities during a moment of silence. Any doubt as to the legislative purpose of that addition is removed by the official legislative history. The sole purpose reflected in the official history is "to
return voluntary prayer to our public schools." App. 50.
Nor does anything in the legislative history contradict an intent to encourage children to choose prayer over other alternatives during the moment of silence. Given this legislative
history, it is not surprising that the State of Alabama conceded in the courts below that the purpose of the statute was
to make prayer part of daily classroom activity, and that both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that
the law's purpose was to encourage religious activity. See
ante, at - - , n. 44. In light of the legislative history and
{ the findings of the courts below, I agree \\ith the Court that
the State intended Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 to convey a
message that prayer was the endorsed activity during the
state-prescribed moment of silence. 5 While it is therefore
unnecessary also to determine the effect of the statute,
Lynch, 465 U. S., at - - (concurring opinion), it also seems
likely that the message actually conveyed to objective observers by Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 is approval of the child
6
THE CHIEF JUSTICE suggests that one consequence of the Court's emphasis on the difference between § 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor statute
might be to render the Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutional because Congress amended it in 1954 to add the words .. under God." Post, a t -. I
disagree. In my view , the words "under God" in the Pledge, as codified at
36 U. S. C. § 172, serve as a acknowledgement of religion with "the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, [and] expressing
confidence in the future." Lynch, 465 U. S., a t - (concurring opinion).
I also disagree with THE CmEF JuSTICE's suggestion that the Court's
opinion invalidates any moment of silence statute that includes the word
"prayer." Post, a t - . As noted infra, a t - , "[e]ven if a statute
specifies that a student may choose to pray during a quiet moment, the
State has not thereby encouraged prayer over other specified
alternatives."

I
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who selects prayer over other alternatives during a moment
of silence.
Given this evidence in the record, candor requires us to admit that this Alabama statute was intended to convey a mesg!l~e of state encouragement and endorsement of religion.
'1• Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S., at 669, the Court stated
that the religion clauses of the First Amendment are flexible
enough to "permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference." Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1
does more than permit prayer to occur during a moment of
silence "without interference." It endorses the decision to
pray during a moment of silence, and accordingly sponsors a
religious exercise. For that reason, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
II
In his dissenting opinion, post, at - - , JUSTICE REHNQUIST reviews the text and history of the First Amendment
religion clauses. His opinion suggests that a long line of this
Court's decisions are inconsistent v.ith the intent of the drafters of the Bill of Rights. He urges the Court to correct the
historical inaccuracies in its past decisions by embracing a far
more restricted interpretation of the Establishment Clause,
an interpretation that presumably would permit vocal group
prayer in public schools. See generally R. Cord, Separation
of Church and State (1982).
The United States, in an amicus brief, suggests a less
sweeping modification of Establishment Clause principles.
In the Federal Government's view, a state sponsored moment of silence is merely an "accommodation" of the desire of
some public school children to practice their religion by praying silently. Such an accommodation is contemplated by the
First Amendment's guaranty that the Government will not
prohibit the free exercise of religion. Because the moment
of silence implicates free exercise values, the United States
suggests that the Lemon-mandated inquiry into purpose and
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effect should be modified. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22.
There is an element of truth and much helpful analysis in
each of these suggestions. Particularly when we are interprr-~ .~ •·. ·' ·· Constitution, "a page of history is worth a volume
of ~l~, ·--· .vew York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349
(L .:!l). Whatever the provision of the Constitution that is at
issue, I continue to believe that "fidelity to the notion of constitutional-as opposed to purely judicial-limits on governmental action requires us to impose a heavy burden on those
who claim that practices accepted when [the provision] was
adopted are now constitutionally impermissible." Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U. S. - - , - - (1985) (dissenting opinion).
The Court properly looked to history in upholding legislative
prayer, Marsh \'. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), property
tax exemptions for houses of worship, Walz v. Tax Comrn'n,
supra, and Sunday closing laws, McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U. S. 420 (1961). As Justice Holmes once observed, "[i]f a
thing has been practised for two hundred years by common
consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it." Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S.
22, 31 (1922).
JUSTICE REHNQUIST does not assert, however, that the
drafters of the First Amendment expressed a preference for
prayer in public schools, or that the practice of prayer in public schools enjoyed uninterrupted government endorsement
from the time of enactment of the Bill of Rights to the
present era. The simple truth is that free public education
was virtually non-existent in the late eighteenth century.
See Abington, 374 U. S., at 238, and n. 7 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Since there then existed few government-run
schools, it is unlikely that the persons who drafted the First
Amendment, or the state legislators who ratified it, anticipated the problems of interaction of church and state in the
public schools. Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress, and the Schools: An Historical Perspective, 52 Va. L.
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Rev. 1395, 1403-1404 (1966). Even at the time of adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, education in Southern States
was still primarily in private hands, and the movement toward free public schools supported by general taxation had
not taken h·; '
:-' , own v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483, 489-49l • , •.;tA).

This unce. t ainty as to the intent of the Framers of the Bill
of Rights does not mean we should ignore history for guidance on the role of religion in public education. The Court
has not done so. See, e. g., Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). When the intent of the Framers is unclear,
I believe we must employ both history and reason in our analysis. The primary issue raised by JUSTICE REHNQUIST's
dissent is whether the historical fact that our Presidents have
long called for public prayers of Thanks should be dispositive
on the constitutionality of prayer in public schools. 6 I think
not. At the very least, Presidential proclamations are
t distinguishable from school prayer in that they are received}
1 in a non-coercive setting and are primarily directed at adults,
who presumably are not readily susceptible to unwilling religious indoctrination. This Court's decisions have recognized
a distinction when government sponsored religious exercises
are directed at impressionable children who are required to
attend school, for then government endorsement is much
more likely to result in coerced religious beliefs. See, e. g.,
Marsh v. Chambers, supra, at--; Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U. S., at 686. Although history provides a touchstone
for constitutional problems, the Establishment Clause concern for religious liberty is dispositive here.
• Even assuming a taxpayer could establish standing to challenge such a
practice, see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc ., 454 U. S. 464 (1982), these Presidential proclamations would probably withstand Establishment Clause
scrutiny given their long history. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783
(1983).

.
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The element of truth in the United States' arguments, I believe, lies in the suggestion that Establishment Clause analysis must comport with the mandate of the Free Exercise
Clause that government make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. Our ~~"P" have interpreted the Free Exercise Clause .to com]. . . 1 hvernment to exempt persons
from some generally ~p plicable government requirements so
as to permit those persons to freely exercise their religion.
See, e. g., Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S.
398 (1963). Even where the Free Exercise Clause does not
compel the Government to grant an exemption, the Court has
suggested that the Government in some circumstances may
voluntarily choose to exempt religious observers without violating the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., Gillette v.
United States, 401 U. S. 437, 453 (1971); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U. S. 599 (1961). The challenge posed by the
United States' argument is how to define the proper Establishment Clause limits on voluntary government efforts to facilitate the free exercise of religion. On the one hand, a rigid
application of the Lemon test would invalidate legislation exempting religious observers from generally applicable government obligations. By definition, such legislation has a religious purpose and effect in promoting the free exercise of
religion. On the other hand, judicial deference to all legislation that purports to facilitate the free exercise of religion
would completely vitiate the Establishment Clause. Any
statute pertaining to religion can be viewed as an "accommodation" of free exercise rights. Indeed, the statute at issue
in Lemon, which provided salary supplements, textbooks,
and instructional materials to Pennsylvania parochial schools,
can be viewed as an accommodation of the religious beliefs of
parents who choose to send their children to religious
schools.
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It is obvious that the either of the two Religion Clauses, "if
expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other." Walz, 397 U. S., at 668-669. The Court has long
exacerbated the conflict by calling for government "neutrality" toward religion. See, e. [ - .. •ru itteefor Public Education & Religious Liberty v. 1 .J fJu~ '-, 413 U. S. 756 (1973),
Board of Education v. Allen, i,;:.(; U. S. 236 (1968). It is difficult to square any notion of "complete neutrality," ante, at
- - , with the mandate of the Free Exercise Clause that government must sometimes exempt a religious observer from
an otherwise generally applicable obligation. A government
that confers a benefit on an explicitly religious basis is not
neutral toward religion. See Welsh v. United States, 398
U. S. 333, 372 (1970) (WHITE, J., dissenting).
The solution to the conflict between the religion clauses lies
not in "neutrality," but rather in identifying workable limits
to the Government's license to promote the free exercise of
religion. The text of the Free Exercise Cl~use speaks of
laws that prohibit the free exercise of religion. On its face,
the Clause is directed at government interference with free
exercise. Given that concern, one can plausibly assert that
government pursues free exercise clause values when it lifts
a government-imposed burden on the free exercise of religion. If a statute falls within this category, then the standard Establishment Clause test should be modified accordingly. It is disingenuous to look for a purely secular purpose
when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate the
free exercise of religion by lifting a government-imposed burden. Instead, the Court should simply acknowledge that the
religious purpose of such a statute is legitimated by the Free
Exercise Clause. I would also go further. In assessing the
effect of such a statute-that is, in determining whether the
statute conveys the message of endorsement of religion or a
particular religious belief-courts should assume that the
"objective observer," ante, at--, is acquainted with the
Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes. Thus indi-
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It is obvious that the either of the two Religion Clauses, "if
expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other." Walz, 397 U. S., at 668-669. The Court has long
exacerbated the conflict by calling for government "neutrality" toward religion. See, e. [ - .. ;·:litteefor Public Education & Religious Liberty v. 1 • -..Ju~~, 413 U. S. 756 (1973),
Board of Education v. Allen, 0.:....! U. S. 236 (1968). It is difficult to square any notion of "complete neutrality," ante, at
- - , with the mandate of the Free Exercise Clause that government must sometimes exempt a religious observer from
an otherwise generally applicable obligation. A government
that confers a benefit on an explicitly religious basis is not
neutral toward religion. See Welsh v. United States, 398
U. S. 333, 372 (1970) (WHITE, J., dissenting).
The solution to the conflict between the religion clauses lies
not in "neutrality," but rather in identifying workable limits
to the Government's license to promote the free exercise of
religion. The text of the Free Exercise Cl:;mse speaks of
laws that prohibit the free exercise of religion. On its face,
the Clause is directed at government interference with free
exercise. Given that concern, one can plausibly assert that
government pursues free exercise clause values when it lifts
a government-imposed burden on the free exercise of religion. If a statute falls within this category, then the standard Establishment Clause test should be modified accordingly. It is disingenuous to look for a purely secular purpose
when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate the
free exercise of religion by lifting a government-imposed burden. Instead, the Court should simply acknowledge that the
religious purpose of such a statute is legitimated by the Free
Exercise Clause. I would also go further. In assessing the
effect of such a statute-that is, in detennining whether the
statute conveys the message of endorsement of religion or a
particular religious belief~ourts should assume that the
"objective observer," ante, at - - , is acquainted with the
Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes. Thus indi-

...
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vidual perceptions, or resentment that a religious observer is
exempted from a particular government requirement, would
be entitled to little weight if the Free Exercise Clause
strongly supported the exemption.
While this "accommodation" analysis would help reconcile
our Free Exercise and Establishment
-; ~andards, it
would not save Alabama's moment of si. .ce 1aw. If we assume that the religious activity that AHwama seeks to protect is silent prayer, then it is difficult to discern any stateimposed burden on that activity that is lifted by Alabama
Code§ 16-1-20.1. No law prevents a student who is so inclined from praying silently in public schools. Moreover,
state law already provided a moment of silence to these appellees irrespective of Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1. See Ala.
Code § 16-1-20. Of course, the State might argue that
§ 16-1-20.1 protects not silent prayer, but rather group silent
prayer under State sponsorship. Phrased in these terms,
the burden lifted by the statute is not one imposed by the
State of Alabama, but by the Establishment Clause as interpreted in E 'ngle and Abington. In my view, it is beyond the
authority of the State of Alabama to remove burdens imposed by the Constitution itself. I conclude that the Alabama statute at issue today lifts no state-imposed burden on
the free exercise of religion, and accordingly cannot properly
be viewed as an accommodation statute.
.J

III

t

The Court does not hold that the Establishment Clause is 11)111)$5/0,1)
so hostile to religion that it precludes the States from affording schoolchildren an opportunity for voluntary silent prayer.
To the contrary, the moment of silence statutes of many
States should satisfy the Establishment Clause standard we
have here applied. The Court holds only that Alabama has
intentionally crossed the line between creating a quiet moment during which those so inclined may pray, and affinnatively endorsing the particular religious practice of prayer.
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This line may be a fine one, but our precedents and the principles of religious liberty require that we draw it. In my
view, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be
affirmed.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala.
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. My concurrence is prompted by Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive statutes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a
The three statutes are Ala. Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of
silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence
for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers
authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted
over a span of four years. There is some question whether § 16-1-20 was
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affirmed the
Court of Appeals' holding that § 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree,
U. S . - (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity
of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3.
2
JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal
prayer:
1

"
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suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante,
at 20.
I write separately to express additional views and to respond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading,
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law,§ 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev.,
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 MichL.
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren."
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment).
3
JusTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in
Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., - - U. S. - - , - (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with
it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous
overruling of multiple precedents .... "). The appellants have not directly argued that the test should be discarded. Moreover, a majority of
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies standards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its threepronged test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases
on an ad hoc basis. 5
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recognizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere"; a law will not
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 9 (O'CoNthe Court today in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, - - U. S. - (1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, - - U. S. - - (1985), expressly follows
Lemon and applies its test.
4
In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), we held that the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of the practice, that had become "part of the fabric of our society."
Id., at--.
5
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), was a carefully considered
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices.
Lemon's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. Id., at--.
In Lynch v. Donnelley, - - U. S. - - (1984), we said that the Court is
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." I d., at
- - . The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S.
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to
the facts of that case. It focused on the "question whether there is a secular purpose for [the] display of the creche." !d., at--.
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NOR, J., concurring in the judgment). In Stone v. Graham,
449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments· in
public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even
though the Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was
educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of
Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have
"exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, - U. S. - - , - - n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much
conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past
would have been invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children
to parochial schools).
The record before us, however, makes clear that Alabama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public
schools. See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with JusTICE
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to establish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring
in the judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the
religious purpose of § 16-1-20.1 is manifested in other evidence, including the sequence and history of the three Alabama statutes. See ante, at 19.
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose,
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion.
6
The Court's opinion recognizes that "a statute motivated in part by a
religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion." Ante, at 17. The Court
simply holds that "a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated
by a purpose to advance religion." Ibid. (emphasis added).
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In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1
pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose."
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). Instead, the District Court found that the enactment of the
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to
encourage a religious activity." 7 Ibid. The Court of Appeals likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of
secular purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature."
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 1983). It
held that the objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement
of religion." Ibid. When both courts below are unable to
discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to find one.
I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identifies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has failed to
identify any non-religious reason for the statute's enactment.8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required
In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held .that
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recognized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless
ruled that its decision was justified because "the United States Supreme
Court has erred .... " Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp.
1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983).
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs,- U.S.- (1983) (POWELL, J., in
chambers).
8
Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the principal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9 et seq.
7
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by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong
of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment
Clause.
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or inhibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970).
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

9
If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that
some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala.
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. My concurrence is prompted by Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive statutes. 1 I agree fully with JusTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a
'The three statutes are Ala. Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of
silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence
for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers
authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted
over a span of four years. There is some question whether § 16-1-20 was
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affirmed the
Court of Appeals' holding that§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree,
U. S . - (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity
of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3.
2
JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal
prayer:

1
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suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante,
at 20.
I write separately to express additional views and to respond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading,
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J ., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev.,
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 MichL.
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren."
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment).
3
JusTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in
Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. , - - U . S . - - , - (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with
it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous
overruling of multiple precedents .... "). .!Ihe appellant! nave not-d'
rectly al'glied that the test !hould be discaraea. Moi=eeW-er,-tl--majm-ity-of------
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies standards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its threepronged test.
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783
4
(1983). Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases
on an ad hoc basis. 5
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recognizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere"; a law will not
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose e
ulated
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at ~A(O'CONthe-Caw-t today in th6Jnfl R9.pid:s School Dist. "'· Ba,U,
U. 8.
~'
(lQga), ana Aguil6ir v. ,_7i'elten,
U. 8.
(lQ~,.....e xpreaal;=fe~
T.eman and applies its

tes~

•In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), we held that the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of the practice, that had become "part of the fabric of our society."
ld., at--.
• Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), was a carefully considered
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices.
Lemon's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. ld., at--.
In Lynch v. Donnelley, - - U. S. - - (1984), we said that the Court is
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." I d., at
- - . The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S.
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to
the facts of that case. It focused on the "question whether there is a secular purpose for [the] display of the creche." ld., at--.
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NOR, J., concurring in the judgment). In Stone v. Graham,
449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in
public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even
though the Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was
educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of
Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have
"exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, - U.S.--,-- n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much
conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past
would have been invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children
to parochial schools).
The record before us, however, makes clear that Alabama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public
schools. See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with JUSTICE
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to establish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring
in the judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the
religious purpose of § 16-1-20.1 is manifested in other evidence, including the sequence and history of the three Alabama statutes. See ante, at 19.
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose,
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion.
e The Court's opinion recognizes that "a statute motivated in part by a t
religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion." Ante, at 17. The Court
simply holds that "a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated
by a purpose to advance religion." Ibid. (emphasis added).
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In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1
pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose."
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). Instead, the District Court found that the enactment of the
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to
encourage a religious activity." 7 Ibid. The Court of Appeals likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of
secular purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature."
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 1983). It
held that the objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement
of religion." Ibid. When both courts below are unable to
discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to find one.
I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identifies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has failed to
identify any non-religious reason for the statute's enactment. 8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required
7
In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recognized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless
ruled that its decision was justified because "the United States Supreme
Court has erred ... ." Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp.
1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983).
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs , U.S. (1983) (POWELL, J., in
chambers).
8
Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the principal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9 et seq.
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by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong
of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment
Clause.
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or inhibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970).
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

9

If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that
some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice .
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JUSTICE POWELL, concun-ing.
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala.
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. My concun-ence is prompted by Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive statutes.1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a
1
The three statutes are Ala. Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of
silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence
for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers
authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted
over a span of four years. There is some question whether § 16-1-20 was
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affirmed the
Court of Appeals' holding that§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree ,
U. S. (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity
of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3.
2
JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal
prayer:
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suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante,
at 20.
I write separately to express additional views and to respond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading,
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev.,
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 MichL.
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren."
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment).
8
JuSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in
Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., - - U . S . - - , - (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with
it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous
overruling of multiple precedents .... "). The appellants have not directly argued that the test should be discarded. Moreover, a majority of
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies standards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its three·pronged test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases
on an ad hoc basis. 5
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recognizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere"; a law will not
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 9 (O'CoNthe Court today in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, - - U. S. - (1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, - - U. S. - - (1985), expressly follows
Lemon and applies its test.
'In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), we held that the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of the practice, that had become "part of the fabric of our society."
Id., at--.
5
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), was a carefully considered
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices.
Lemon's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. Id., at--.
In Lynch v. Donnelley, - - U. S. - - (1984), we said that the Court is
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." !d., at
- - . The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S.
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to
the facts of that case. It focused on the "question whether there is a secular purpose for [the] display of the creche." !d., at--.
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NOR, J., concurring in the judgment). In Stone v. Graham,
449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in
public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even
though the Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was
educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of
Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have
"exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, - U. S. - - , - - n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much
conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past
would have been invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children
to parochial schools).
The record before us, however, makes clear that Alabama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public
schools. See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with JUSTICE
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to establish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring
in the judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the
religious purpose of § 16-1-20.1 is manifested in other evidence, including the sequence and history of the three Alabama statutes. See ante, at 19.
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose,
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion.
8
The Court's opinion recognizes that "a statute motivated in part by a
religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion." Ante, at 17. The Court
simply holds that "a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated
by a purpose to advance religion." Ibid. (emphasis added).

l
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In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1
pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose."
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). Instead, the District Court found that the enactment of the
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to
encourage a religious activity." 7 Ibid. The Court of Appeals likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of
secular purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature."
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 1983). It
held that the objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement
of religion." Ibid. When both courts below are unable to
discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to find one.
I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identifies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has failed to
identify any non-religious reason for the statute's enactment.8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required
In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recognized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless
ruled that its decision was justified because "the United States Supreme
Court has erred .... " Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp.
1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983).
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs,- U.S.- (1983) (POWELL, J., in
chambers).
8
Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the principal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9 et seq.
7
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by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong
of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishq~ent
Clause.
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or inhibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970).
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

9
If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils. As JusTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that
some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala.
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. My concurrence is prompted by Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive statutes. 1 I agree fully with JusTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a
'The three statutes are Ala. Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of
silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence
for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers
authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted
over a span of four years. There is some question whether § 16-1-20 was
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affirmed the
Court of Appeals' holding that§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree,
U. S. (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity
of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3.
2
JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal
prayer:
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suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante,
at 20.
I write separately to express additional views and to respond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies stand"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading,
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev.,
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich L.
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren."
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment).
8
JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in
Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., - - U . S . - - , - (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with
it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous
overruling of multiple precedents .... ").
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ards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its threepronged test.
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases
on an ad hoc basis. 5
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612 (1971). As JusTICE O'CONNOR recognizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere"; a law will not
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 10 (O'CoNNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). In Stone v. Graham,
449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in
• In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), we held that the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of the practice, that had become "part of the fabric of our society."
Id., at--.
6
Lerrwn v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), was a carefully considered
Qpinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices.
Lerrwn's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. I d., at --.
In Lynch v. Donnelley, - - U. S. - - (1984), we said that the Court is
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." /d., at
--. The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S.
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to
the facts of that case. It focused on the "question whether there is a secular purpose for [the] display of the creche." /d., at--.
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public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even
though the Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was
educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of
Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have
"exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, - U. S. - - , - - n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much
conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past
would have been invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children
to parochial schools).
The record before us, however, makes clear that Alabama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public
schools. See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with JusTICE
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to establish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring
in the judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the
religious purpose of§ 16-1~20.1 is manifested in other evidence, including the sequence and history of the three Alabama statutes. See ante, at 19.
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose,
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion.
In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1
pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose."
8
The Court's opinion recognizes that "a statute motivated in part by a
religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion." Ante, at 17. The Court
simply holds that "a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated
by a purpose to advance religion." Ibid. (emphasis added).

.
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Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). Instead, the District Court found that the enactment of the
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to
encourage a religious activity." 7 Ibid. The Court of Appeals likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of
secular purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature."
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 1983). It
held that the objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement
of religion." Ibid. When both courts below are unable to
discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to find one.
I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identifies a clear secular purpose, and the State al~o has failed to
identify any non-religious reason for the statute's enactment.8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required
by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong
of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment
Clause.
1

In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recognized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless
ruled that its decision was justified because "the United States Supreme
Court has erred .... " Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp.
1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983).
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs,- U.S.- (1983) (POWELL, J., in
chambers).
8
Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the principal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9 et seq.
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Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or inhibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970).
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

8
If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lerrwn, we would
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily con..
cerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that
some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice.

I " f'

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

04/30

From:

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ __ __ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 83-812

AND

83-929

GEORGE C. WALLACE, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE
OF ALABAMA, ET AL., APPELLANTS
83-812
v.
ISHMAEL JAFFREE ET AL.
DOUGLAS T. SMITH, ET AL., APPELLANTS
83-929
v.
ISHMAEL JAFFREE ET AL.
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1985]

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Alabama
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. I
agree particularly with JUSTICE
O'CONNOR that momen -of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 1 a view set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante,
1

JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal
prayer:
A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading,
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment
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at 20. f l w;ite separately to express additional views, and to
answer criticism of the three-prong Lemon test. 2
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies standards that have proven analytically useful in case after case
both in our decisions and those of other courts. It is the only
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted.
Only once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we analyzed an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its
three-prong test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783
(1983). 3 Abandonment or even continued criticism of
Lemon will leave this and other courts free to decide Establishment Clause cases on an ad hoc basis. ItThe first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged
statute has a "secular legislative p[~se." Lemon v.
Kurtzman,A~' 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONof silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev.,
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich L.
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren.
·
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring).
2
JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
3
In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), we held that the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of the practice, which had become "part of the fabric of our society."
/d., a t -- .
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NOR recognizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere;" a law
will not pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose
articulated by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 9
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). In Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. ,
39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a statute
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public
schools violated the Establishment Clause, even though the
Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was educational.
We have not interpreted the first prong of Lemon, supra,
however, as requiring that a statute have "exclusively secular" objectives. Lynch v. Donnelley, --U.S.--,-n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past would have been invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664
(1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious
organizations upheld); post, at 18 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("one of the purposes behind every statute, whether
stated or not, is to aid the target of its largesse").
Where a statute has both secular and religious purposes, a
court applying the Lemon test initially must identify the pre. dominant purpose. In this case the record before us makes
clear th t Alabama's purpose was solely religious in character Sen or Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that lSeame abama Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that
the purpose of this statute was "to return voluntary prayer"
to the public schools. See ante, at 18 n. 43. 4 I agree with
JUSTICE O'CONNOR that the statement of a single le'gislator,
particularly following enactmen , is not JWCessarily sufficient
to establish purpose. But, as noted in ;J.ystpfcE STEVENSZ...
opinion, there is other evidence of the real purpose of
§ 16-1-20.1, including the sequence and history of the three
Alabama statutes. I also consider important in this respect
the tone of the District Court's opinion and its holding as
• As the Court's opinion states, "the First Amendment requires that a
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion." Ante, at 17 (emphasis added).
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announced on January 14, 1982. Jaffree v. James, --554F."
Supp. 1130, 1132 (SD Ala. 1983). The District Court clearly
,""1-,A~f
.,lieved that teacher-led vocal prayer in the public schools
v rr--, proper, Supreme Court decisions to the contrary not*anding. Jaffree v. Bd. of School Commisf%f1rs,
- - , - - (1983) (POWELL, J., in chambers) .
.c1. different question would be presented if the statute also
had a clear secular purpose. The Court is "reluctan[t] to
attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, particularly
when a plausible secular purpose may be discerned from the
face of the statute." Mueller v. Allen,-- U. S. - - , - (1983). JUSTICE O'CONNOR's concurring opinion, as well as
JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion for the Court, convincingly show
that nothing in the record before us identifies a secular purpose. ~s virtually conceded by the State that the purpose} v
was o fUrther religion, and no secular purpose was identil
fied. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that no such purpose was shownj
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward
"moment-of-silence" statute is unlikely to "advance[] or in- \
hibit[] religion." 5 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon
6
If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). Given the
types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment of silence" as a time
for religious prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of the
typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that some children, raised in
strongly religious families, properly would use the moment to reflect on the
religion of his or her choice.
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v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970)).
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concuiTing.
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala.
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. My concuiTence ~ is prompted by Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive statutes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that
some moment-of-silence statu
· utional, 2 a
1

A~

16-1-~oment

The three statutes arel
Code §
of silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.Wffioment of silence for meditation or prayer);
and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.~chers authorized to lead students in vocal
prayer). These statutes were enacted over a span offour years. There is
some question whether § 16-1-20 was repealed by implication. The Court
already has summarily affinned the Court of Appeals' holding that
§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree, U. S. (1984). Thus,
our opinions today address only the validity of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3.
2
JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal
prayer:
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different
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. suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante,
at 20.
I write separately to express additional views and to
respond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading,
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve ''the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev.,
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 MichL.
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It i~;~ difficult to
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren."
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment).
8
JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
As I state in the text, the ~e fi• &Rg"ed' Lemon test has been applied
consistently in Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972.
In a word, it has been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us
to follow Lemon. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., - U. S. - - , - - (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial
decision, and with it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served
by the precipitous overruling of multiple precedents .... "). The appellants have not directly argued that the test should be discarded. Moreover, a majority of the Court today in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball,
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· Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies standards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its threepronged test.
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783
4
(1983). Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases
on an ad hoc basis. 5
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recognizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere;" a law will not
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated

by the legislature, ~ met'ly a "sham.'' Post, at 9 (O'CoNNOR, J. , concurrin .
n Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S . 39
U. S. ~ (1985), and A~ilar v. Felton,- U. S . - (1985), expressly follo~Lemon and app 1 s test.
'In Marsh v. Chambers, 4 U. S. 783 (1983), we held that the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of the practice, that had become "part of the fabric of our society."
Id. , a t -.
5
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), :Was a carefully considered
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices.
Lemon's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. I d., at - .
In Lynch v. Donnelley,- U. S . - (1984), we said that the Court is
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." Id. , at
- . The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S.
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to
the facts of that case.

83-812 & 83-929-CONCUR
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. (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a statute
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public
schools violated the Establishment Clause, even though the
Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was educational.
We have not interpreted the first prong of Lemon, supra,
however, as requiring that a statute have "exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, --U.S.--,-n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past would have been
invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664
(1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious
organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330
U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children to parochial
schools); post, at 18 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("one of the
purposes behind every statute, whether stated or not, is to
aid the target of its largesse").
The record before us, however, makes clear that Alabama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public
schools. See ante, at 1~ n. 43. I agree with JUSTICE
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to establish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., copcurring
in the judgment). But, as noted in t}\e Court's opinion, the
religious purpose of § 16-1-20.1 is manifested in other evidence, including the sequence and history of the three Alabama statutes. See ante, at 19.
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose,
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion.
6
As the Court's opinion states, "the First Amendment requires that a
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion." Ante, at 17 (emphasis added).
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· In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1
pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose."
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). Instead, the District Court found that the enactment of the
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to
encourage a religious activity." 7 ld. The Court of Appeals
likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of secular
purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature." Jaffree v.
Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CA111983). It held that the
objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement of religion."
~When both courts below are unable to discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to find one.
Despite the legislative 'Ristery a:ael tee finelings of the leweP Q
eems as to r9lig:ior~poiep I would vote to uphold the
Alabama statute if ttjhad a clear secular purpose. See
Mueller v. Allen,-- U.S.--,-- (1983) (the Court is
"reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the
state, particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be
discerned from the face of the statute"). Nothing in the
record before us, however, identifies a clear secular purpose,
and the State also has failed to identify any non-religious
reason for the statute's enactment. 8 Under these circum-
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In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recognized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless
L . -ruled that its decisi n was justified because "the United States Supreme
(' "'
:\
Court has err .
J ...{~ri!.Cl " · ~ - of )c.J,...J c_...,..s I sn· F:')..,, . uo'i ;). v . AI .. .
In my capacit as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs,- U.S.- (1983) (POWELL, J., in
chambers).
8
Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the principal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of

,.,u,.
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83-812 & 83-929-CONCUR
6

WALLACE v. JAFFREE

· stances, the Court is required by our precedents to hold that
the statute fails the first prong of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment Clause.
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advancM or inhibi#EJ-] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970).
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9( et seq.
9
If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that
some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala.
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. My concurrence ~ is prompted by Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive statutes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a
'The three statutes are: Ala. Code § 16-1-20 (moment of silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (moment of silence for meditation or prayer);
and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (teachers authorized to lead students in vocal
prayer). These statutes were enacted over a span of four years. There is
some question whether § 16-1-20 was repealed by implication. The Court
already has summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding that
§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree,- U. S . - (1984). Thus,
our opinions today address only the validity of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3.
2
JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal
prayer:
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different
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. suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante,
at 20.
I write separately to express additional views and to
respond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading,
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law,§ 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47. Minn. L. Rev. ,
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich L.
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren."
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment).
8
JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
As I state in the text, the three-pronged Lemon test has been applied
consistently in Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972.
In a word, it has been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us
to follow Lemon. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., - U. S. - - , - - (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial
decision, and with it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served
by the precipitous overruling of multiple precedents .... "). The appellants have not directly argued that the test should be discarded. Moreover, a majority of the Court today in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball,

•. f.
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· Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies standards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its threepronged test.
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases
on an ad hoc basis. 5
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recognizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere;" a law will not
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 9 (O'CoNNOR, J., concurr~ In Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39
U. S . - (1985), and Aguilar v. Felton,- U. S . - (1985), expressly follow Lerrwn and apply its test.
• In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), we held that the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of the practice, that had become "part of the fabric of our society."
!d., a t - .
5
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), :.Was a carefully considered
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices.
Lerrwn's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. I d., at - .
In Lynch v. Donnelley,- U. S. (1984), we said that the Court is
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." Id., at
- . The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S.
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to
the facts of that case.
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. (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a statute
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public
schools violated the Establishment Clause, even though the
Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was educational.
We have not interpreted the first prong of Lemon, supra,
however, as requiring that a statute have "exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, - - U . S . - - , - n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the pa:st would have been
invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664
(1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious
organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330
U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children to parochial
schools); post, at 18 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("one of the
purposes behind every statute, whether stated or not, is to
aid the target of its largesse").
The record before us, however, makes clear that Alabama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public
schools. See ante, at 18 n. 43. I agree with JUSTICE
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to establish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., cop.curring
in the judgment). But, as noted in t}\e Court's opinion, the
religious purpose of§ 16-1-20.1 is manifested in other evidence, including the sequence and history of the three Alabama statutes. See ante, at 19.
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose,
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion.
As the Court's opinion states, "the First Amendment 'requires that a
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion." Ante, at 17 (emphasis added).
6
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· In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1
pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose."
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). Instead, the District Court found that the enactment of the
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to
encourage a religious activity." 7 Id. The Court of Appeals
likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of secular
purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature." Jaffree v.
Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CA111983). It held that the
objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement of religion." ,
I d. When both courts below are unable to discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to find one
esp1 e the legislative history and the findings of the lower
wou d
up o t e
ourts as to reli ·ous pur ose
Alabama s atute i i~:a a clear secular purpose. See
Mueller v. Allen, --- U. S. - - , - - (1983) (the Court is
"reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the
state, particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be
discerned from the face of the statute"). Nothing in the
record before us, however, identifies a clear secular purpose,
and the State also has failed to identify any non-religious
reason for the statute's enactment. 8 Under these circum7
In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recognized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless
ruled that its decision was justified because "the United States Supreme
Court has erred."
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jaffree v. Bd. of Sclwol Comm'rs,- U. S . - (1983) (POWELL, J. , in
chambers).
8
Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the principal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of
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· stances, the Court is required by our precedents to hold that
the statute fails the first prong of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment Clause.
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advance[] or inhibit[] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.' " Lemon
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970).
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9, et seq.
9
If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that
some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala.
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. My concurrence, is prompted by Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive statutes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a
1

The three statutes are Ala. Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of
silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence
for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers
authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted
over a span of four years. There is some question whether § 16-1-20 was
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affirmed the
Court of Appeals' holding that§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree,
U. S. (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity
of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3.
2
JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal
prayer:
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suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante,
at 20.
I write separately to express additional views and to
respond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading,
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not compromis!'! his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law,§ 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev.,
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich L.
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren."
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment).
8
JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in
achieving the underlying purpose of the First ~endment." Post, at 2-3
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in
Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., - - U . S . - - , - (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with
it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous
overruling of multiple precedents .... "). The appellants have not directly argued that the test should be discarded. Moreover, a majority of
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies standards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its threepronged test.
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases
on an ad hoc basis. 5
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612 (1971). As JusTICE O'CONNOR recognizes, this secular purpose must be "sincerf,\1 a law will not
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 9 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). In Stone v. Graham,
the Court today in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, U. S. (1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, U. S. (1985), expressly follows
Lerrwn and applies its test.
• In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), we held that the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of the practice, that had become "part of the fabric of our society."
Id., a t - .
5
Lerrwn v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972),, was a carefully considered
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices.
Lerrwn's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lerrwn. I d., at - .
In Lynch v. Donnelley,- U.S.- (1984), we said that the Court is
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." I d., at
- . The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S.
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to
the facts of that case. H foc.u.~ ...,. .fk "t~~·....... w~ ...._., i)
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449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in
public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even
though the Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was
educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of
Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have
"exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, - U. S. - - , - - n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much
conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past
would have been invalidated. See, e.g:, Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children
to parochial schools~ ~88~, at 18 (ft:EHNQOISI, J., disseft\iRg) •
.("eRe of the ptw~eses behind evel.'y s~eiitte, n nether statee •
or not , ilil to a,ig t.A& ta~et of its largesse").9The record before us, however, makes clear that Alabama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public
schools. See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with JUSTICE
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to establish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring
in the judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the
religious purpose of § 16-1-20.1 is m_anifested in other evidence, including the sequence and history of the three Alabama statutes. See ante, at 19.
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose,
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion.
1

As the Court's opinion states, "the First Amendment requires that a
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion." Ante, at 17 (emphasis added).

-f
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In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1
pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose."
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). In/{' 1 ·
stead, the District Court found that the enactment of ~t.---statute was an "effort on the part o .the State of Alabama to
-;:encourage a religious activity." 7 . I .
e Court of Appeals
./
likewise applied the Lemon test
found "a lack of secular
purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature." J affree v.
Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CA111983). · It held that the
objective Of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement of religion."
Ibid. When both courts below are unable to discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to find one.
I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identifies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has failed to
identify any non-religious reason for the statute's enactment.8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required

b-j

7

In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that
prayer in the public schools~ven if led by the teacher-did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recognized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless
ruled that its decision was justified because uthe United States Supreme
Court has erred .... " Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp.
1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983).
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs,- U. S . - (1983) (POWELL, J., in
chambers).
8
Instead, the State criticizes the Lerrwn test and asserts that ''the prin" See Brief of
cipal problem [with the test] stems from the purposeS
~(oM~
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9 et seq.
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by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong
of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment
Clause.
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or inhibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970).
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

9

If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that
some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala.
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. My concurrence is prompted· by Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive statutes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a
1
The three statutes are Ala. Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of
silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence
for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers
authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted
over a span of four years. There is some question whether § 16-1-20 was
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affinned the
Court of Appeals' holding that§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree,
U. S. (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity
of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3.
2
JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal
prayer:
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suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante,
at 20.
I write separately to express additional views and to
respond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading,
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve ''the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev.,
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 MichL.
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren."
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment).
3
JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon
should be reexamined and refined in order to make them mo~e useful in
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in
Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., - - U . S . - - , - (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with
it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous
overruling of multiple precedents .... "). The appellants have not directly argued that the test should be discarded. Moreover, a majority of
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies stand~
ards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its threepronged test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it ~ould encourage
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases
on an ad hoc basis. 5
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recognizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere;" a law will not
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 9 (O'CoNNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). In Stone v. Graham,
the Court today in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball,- U.S.(1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, U. S. (1985), expressly follows
Lenum and applies its test.
'In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), we held that the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of the practice, that had become ''part of the fabric of our society."
Id., a t - .
5
Lenum v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), was a carefully considered
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices.
Lemon's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lenum. I d., at - .
In Lynch v. Donnelley,- U. S . - (1984), we said that the Court is
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." Id., at
- - . The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S.
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the
Court, without any criticism of Lenum, applied its three-pron~ .
the facts of that case. .f 1- ~ ~ ~ n {F
- - -· - ....

~~~~a.. ~4:ot•ld..V~

1-nt-[~J~~~ ~~":Jd~f- ..

83-812 & 83-929-CONCUR
WALLACE v. JAFFREE

4

0

449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in
public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even
though the Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was
educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of
Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have
"exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelley, - U.S.--,-- n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much
conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past
would have been invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may
~ .,'u~
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children
to parochial schools); J>;st, at 18 (REHNQUIST, J., dissen~ ~ t--' ~
("one of the purpos1~ehind every sta~tute whether stated
or not, is to aid the target of its largesse").
The record before us, however, m s clear that Alabama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public
schools. See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with JusTICE
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to establish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring
in the judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the
religious purpose of§ 16-1-20.1 is manifested in other evidence, including the sequence and history of the three Alabama statutes. See ante, at 19.
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose,
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion.
As the Court's opinion states, ''the First Amendment requires that a
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion." Ante, at 17 (emphasis added).
8
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In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1
pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose."
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). Instead, the District Court found that the enactment of the
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to
encourage a religious activity." 7 ld. The Court of Appeals
likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of secular
purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature." Jaffree v.
Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CA111983). It held that the
objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement of religion."
Ibid. When both courts below are unable to discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to find one.
I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identifies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has failed to
identify any non-religious reason for the statute's enactment.8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required
7

In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recognized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless
ruled that its decision was justified because "the United States Supreme
Court has erred .... " Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp.
1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983).
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs,- U.S.- (1983) (POWELL, J., in
chambers).
8
Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that ''the principal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9 et seq.

83-812 & 83-929-CONCUR
6

WALLACE v. JAFFREE

by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong
of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment
Clause.
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or inhibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970).
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

~If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils. As JusTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CoNNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that
some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala.
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. My concurrence~ is prompted by Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive statutes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a
1
The three statutes are Ala. Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of
silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence
for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers
authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted
over a span of fotir years. There is some question whether § 16-1-20 was
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affirmed the
Court of Appeals' holding that§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree,
U. S. (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity
of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3.
2
JuSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal
prayer:

83-812 & 83-929-CONCUR
2

WALLACE v. JAFFREE

suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante,
at 20.
I write separately to express additional views and to respond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading,
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev.,
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich L.
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren."
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment).
8
JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon
should be reexamined and refined in order to :make them more useful in
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in
Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., - - U . S . - - , - (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with
it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous
overruling of multiple precedents .... "). The appellants have not directly argued that the test should be discarded. Moreover, a majority of
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies standards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its threepronged test.
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases
on an ad hoc basis. 5
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recognizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere"; a law will not
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 9 (O'CoNthe Court today in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, U. S. - (1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, - - U. S. - - (1985), expressly follows
Lemon and applies its test.
'In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), we held that the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of the practice, that had become "part of the fabric of our society."
Id., at--.
5
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), was a carefully considered
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was joined by six other Justices.
Lemon's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. I d., at --.
In Lynch v. Donnelley, - - U. S. - - (1984), we said that the Court is
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." !d., at
--. The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S.
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to
the facts of that c:;ase. It focused on the "question whether there is a secular purpose for [the] display of the creche." !d., at--.
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NOR, J., concurring in the judgment). In Stone v. Graham,
449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in
public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even
though the Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was
educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of
Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have
"exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. .Donnelley, - U. S. - - , - - n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much
conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past
would have been invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children
to parochial schools).
The record before us, however, makes clear that Alabama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public
schools. See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with JUSTICE
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to establish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring
in the judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the
religious purpose of§ 16-1-20.1 is manifested in other evidence, including the sequence and history of the three Alabama statutes. See ante, at 19.
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose,
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion.
In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1
As the Court's opinion states, ''the First Amendment requires that a
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion." Ante, at 17 (emphasis added).
8
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pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose."
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). Instead, the District Court found that the enactment of the
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to
encourage a religious activity." 7 Ibid. The Court of Appeals likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of
secular purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature."
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 1983). It
held that the objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement
of religion." Ibid. When both courts below are unable to
discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to find one.
I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identifies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has failed to
identify any non-religious reason for the statute's enactment.8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required
by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong
7
In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment._ The District Court recognized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless
ruled that its decision was justified because "the United States Supreme
Court has erred .... " Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp.
1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983).
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs,- U.S.- (1983) (POWELL, J., in
chambers).
8
Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the principal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9 et seq.
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of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment
Clause.
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or inhibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.' " Lemon
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970).
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

9

'

1f it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would

be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that
some children, niised in strongly religious families, properly would use the
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice .
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala.
Code § 16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. My concurrence; is prompted by Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored
prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive statutes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's assertion that
some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a
1
The three statutes are Ala. Code § 16-1- 20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of
silent meditation); Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence
for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers
authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted
over a span of fotir years. There is some question whether § 16-1- 20 was
repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affirmed the
Court of Appeals' holding that§ 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree,
U. S . - (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity
of§ 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3.
2
JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal
prayer:
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suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante,
at 20.
I write separately to express additional views and to respond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different
from state sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of
silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading,
need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or
her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court
regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one member
of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment
of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, 374
U. S., at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a moment of
reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious
liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law, § 14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal Issue," in
Religion in the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev.,
at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 MichL.
Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to
discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren."
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment).
3
JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon
should be reexamined and refined in order to ~make them more useful in
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 2-3
(O'CONNOR, J ., concurring). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the
Lemon test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in
Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1972. In a word, it has
been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., - - U . S . - - , - (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with
it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous
overruling of multiple precedents ... . "). The appellants have not directly argued that the test should be discarded. Moreover, a majority of
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), identifies standards that have proven useful in analyzing case after case both
in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only
once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed
an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its threepronged test.
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783
(1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test
modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage
other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases
on an ad hoc basis. 6
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612 (1971). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recognizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere"; a law will not
pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated
by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 9 (O'CoNthe Court today in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, - - U. S. - (1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, - - U. S. - - (1985), expressly follows
Lemon and applies its test.
•In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), we held that the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of the practice, that had become ''part of the fabric of our society."
ld., at--.
5
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), was a carefully considered
opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was jvined by six other Justices.
Lemon's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Comm. of
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1974), for example, the Court
applied the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon. I d., at --.
In Lynch v. Donnelley, - - U. S. - - (1984), we said that the Court is
not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." !d., at
--. The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S.
783 (1983), was based primarily on the long historical practice of including
religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the
Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to
the facts of that ~ase. It focused on the "question whether there is a secular purpose for [the] display of the creche." !d., at--.
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NOR, J., concurring in the judgment). In Stone v. Graham,
449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in
public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even
though the Kentucky legislature asserted that its goal was
educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of
Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have
"exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. .Donnelley, - U. S. - - , - - n. 6. If such a requirement existed, much
conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past
would have been invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Bd. of
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children
to parochial schools).
The record before us, however, makes clear that Alabama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator
Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama
Code § 16-1-20.1, freely acknowledged that the purpose of
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public
schools. See ante, at 18, n. 43. I agree with JUSTICE
O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if
made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to establish purpose. See post, at 11 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring
in the judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the
religious purpose of§ 16-1-20.1 is m'anifested in other evidence, including the sequence and history of the three Alabama statutes. See ante, at 19.
I also consider it of critical importance that neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose,
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion.
In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of§ 16-1-20.1
6
As the Court's opinion states, ''the First Amendment requires that a
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion." Ante, at 17 (emphasis added).

83-812 & 83-929-CONCUR
WALLACE v. JAFFREE

5

pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that
the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose."
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). Instead, the District Court found that the enactment of the
statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to
encourage a religious activity." 7 Ibid. The Court of Appeals likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of
secular purpose on the part of the Alabama legislature."
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 1983). It
held that the objective of§ 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement
of religion." Ibid. When both courts below are unable to
discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to find one.
I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be discerned from the face of the
statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identifies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has failed to
identify any non-religious reason for the statute's enactment. 8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required
by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong
In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that
prayer in the public schools-even if led by the teacher-<lid not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment._ The District Court recognized that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421
(1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless
ruled that its decision was justified because ''the United States Supreme
Court has erred .... " Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp.
1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983).
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District
Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jaffree v. Bd. of School Comm'rs,- U.S.- (1983) (POWELL, J., in
chambers).
8
Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the principal problem [with the test] stems from the purpose prong." See Brief of
Appellant George C. Wallace, p. 9 et seq.
7
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of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment
Clause.
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the
Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or inhibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U. S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon
v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970).
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

'

'If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would
be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils. As JusTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence a
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is
left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers
or thoughts of others." Post, at 7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment
of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that
some children, r.Used in strongly religious families, properly would use the
moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice.
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to

its

identify

cases

have

invariably

terms.

(Lee

cite

standards

that

have

proved analytically useful in case after case both in our

2 Lee, cite the references
Rehnquist and O'Connor.

to criticism by Stevens,

3.

decisions and those of other courts.

After all, it is the

only

the

coherent

adopted.

test

If we

a

majority

of

should abandon Lemon,

Court

has

ever

one may

fear

that

the Court will be less consistent in its interpretation of
the Establishment Clause than is evident from some of our
prior decisions.
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the purpose
of the legislative enactment is to encourage support for a
particular religion or for religion in general.
our

cases

illustrate,

there

may

be

some

secular and general religious purposes.
if

any)

often

is

concession

Thus,

determination
In

unclear.
by

the

this

State of

of

combination of

(Lee - cite cases

the

case,

primary

however,

Alabama

Also, as

in

the

"purpose"
we

have

courts

a

below

that the purpose of the statute was to make prayer part of
daily

classroom

activity,

(Lee,

SOC

says

this

at

the

bottom of p. 12 but doesn't cite specifically - please do
so).

Moreover,

the

District

Court

and

the

Court

of

Appeals concluded that the legislative history made clear
that

the

activity.

law's
(Lee:

purpose

was

citations).

disagree with this view.

to
I

encourage
find

it

religious

difficult

to

4.

Although
Alabama

I

doubt

Statute

will

that

the

comport

actual
with

the

effect

of

the

Legislature's

purpose, and there is little basis for the application of
the

"entanglement"

prong

of

the

Lemon

test,

I

think

we

must accept the state's concession as to its sole purpose.
Under
this

Lemon,
is

statute.

,... . -:!

at least

sufficient
(citations?)

in the absence of something more,
under

our

cases

to

invalidate

the
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Rider A, p. 6 (Wallace)

WALL6 SALLY-POW
Where a statute has both secular and religious
purposes, a court under the Lemon test initially must
identify the predominant purpose.

In this case the record

before us makes clear that Alabama's purpose was religious
in character.

Senator Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the

bill that became Alabama Code §16-1-20.1, freely
acknowledged that the purpose of this amended statute was
"to return voluntary prayer" to the public schools.
ante, at 18, n. 43.

See

I agree with Justice O'Connor that

the statement of a single legislator, particularly
following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient alone
to establish purpose.

As noted in Justice Stevens'

opinion, there is other evidence of the real purpose of

2.

§16-1-20.1, including the sequence and history of the
three Alabama statutes.

I also consider important in this

respect the tone of the District Court's opinion and its
holding as announced on January 14, 1982.

Jaffree v.

James, 554 F.Supp. 1130, 1132 (S.D. Ala. 1983).

In that

decision the District Court in approving the sequence of
the Alabama statutes on this subject clearly believed that
even the conducting of prayers as a part of a school
program was proper, Supreme Court decisions to the
contrary.

(Here, Lee, cite my Chambers opinion).
A different question would be presented if the

statute also had a secular purpose.

u.s.

(1983).

See Mueller v. Allen,

The Court is "reluctan[t] to

attribute unconstitutional motives to the state,
particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be

3.

discerned from the face of the statute".

Justice

O'Connor's concurring opinion, as well as Justice Stevens'
opinion for the Court, convincingly show that nothing in
the record before us identifies a secular purpose.

It is

virtually conceded that the purpose was to further
religion, and no secular purpose was identified.

The

first prong of the Lemon test requires that a "statute
must have a secular legislative purpose".

Both the

District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that no
such purpose was shown.

)

u

..
,.

•
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Rider A, p. 8 (Wallace)

WAL8 SALLY-POW
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of
the Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a
straightforward "moment-of-silence" statute is unlikely to
"advance[] or inhibit[] religion".
v. Allen, 392

u.s.

236, 243 (1968).

See Board of Education
Nor would such a

statute "foster 'an excessive government

entangleme ~t wit ~
J
- - - -·

religion'.*
(1970)".

Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397

u.s.

..

''_.1

664, 674

Lemon, at 612-613.

*It is well to remember that if the "effect" prong of
Lemon were before us, we would be concerned primarily with
the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils.
As Justice O'Connor noted, during "a moment of silence, a
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be
the purpose] is left to his or her own thoughts, and is
not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of
others".
Post, at 7 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Given
the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily
concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would
use a simple "moment of silence" as a time for religious

2.

prayer.
There are too many other subjects on the mind of
the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that
some children, raised in strongly religious families,
properly would use the moment to reflect on the religion
of his or her choice.

lfp/ss 04j29j85

Footnote A (Wallace)

WALA SALLY-POW
As the Court's opinion states, "the First
Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if
it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance
religion".

,,

;

,,;
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Rider A, p. 6 (Wallace)

WALL6 SALLY-POW
Where a statute has both secular and religious
purposes, a court seeks to identify the predominant
purpose, and if this is not reasonably clear we move to
the other two components of the Lemon test.

In this case

- though the record is not without ambiguity - I think it
clear that Alabama's purpose basically was religious in
character.

Justice Stevens relies on the testimony of

Senator Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became
Alabama Code §16-1-20.1, and correctly notes that the
Senator conceded that the purpose of this amended statute
was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public schools.
See ante, at 18, n. 43.

I agree with Justice O'Connor

that the statement of a single legislator, particularly

2.

following enactment, would not be sufficient alone to
establish purpose.

As noted in Justice Stevens' plurality

opinion, there is other evidence of the real purpose of
the statute.

I consider important in this respect the

tone of the District Court's opinion and its holding as
announced on January 14, 1982.

Jaffree v. James, 554

F.Supp. 1130, 1132 (S.D. Ala. 1983).

In that decision the

District Court in approving the sequence of the Alabama
statutes on this subject clearly believed that even the
conducting of prayers as a part of a school program was
proper, Supreme Court decisions to the contrary.
Lee, cite my Chambers opinion).

,_ ....,

(Here,

lfp/ss 04j29j85

Rider A, p. 8 (Wallace)

WALLS SALLY-POW
It is reasonably clear that the challenged
statute comports with the other two prongs of the Lemon
test.

The "effect" on religion is likely to be de

minimis.

We are concerned primarily with the effect on

the minds and feelings of the pupils.

As Justice O'Connor

noted, during "a moment of silence, a student who objects
to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is left
to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen
to the prayers or thoughts of others".
(O'Connor, J., concurring).

Post, at 7

Given the types of subjects

useful minds are primarily concerned with, it is unlikely
that many children - even if so encouraged by the teacher
- will use a silent period as a time for religious prayer.

...

..

2•

There are too many other subjects on the mind of the
typical child.

For these reasons, the intense feelings as

to the effects of "moments-of-silence" statutes have
engendered seem misplaced.

Nor is there any suggestions

that this type of statute, requiring no affirmative
implementation nor legislative appropriations, will foster
"excessive government entangelement with religion".

See

Lemon, supra, at 615 (quoting Waltz v. Tax Commission, 397

u.s. u.s.

664, 674 (1970).

Nevertheless, under Lemon a

statute that wholly fails one part of the three-prong test
is invalid.

Stone v. Graham, supra, at 40-41.

As it is

virtually conceded that the purpose of §16-1-20.1 was
enacted solely to further religion, 1 concur in the
judgment of the Court that the statute violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

lfp/ss 04/29/85

Footnote A (Wallace)

WALA SALLY-POW
As the Court's opinion states, "the First
Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if
it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance
religion".

a-J<~ ~f 11 ( ~ .c::A~,tj

lfp/ss 04/29/85

Rider A, p. 1 (Wallace)

WALl SALLY-POW
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment
that Alabama Code §16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.

I also agree particularly

'?"<~ ~ 4-,J.~~
with Justice O'Connor's v-4:e-w£" that ·moment-of-silence
statutes may be constitutional,! a view also expressed in
the Court's opinion.

Infra, at 20.

express additional views, and

I write separately to

~i ~F~

criticism of the three-prong Lemon test.

to answer
2
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Rider A, p. 8 (Wallace)

WAL8 SALLY-POW
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of
the Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a
straightforward "moment-of-silence" statute is unlikely to
"advance[] or inhibit[] religion".

u.s.

v. Allen, 392

236, 243 (1968).

See Board of Education
Nor would such a

statute "foster •an excessive government entanglement with
religion'.*
(1970)".

Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397

u.s.

664, 674

Lemon, at 612-613.

1 ...,

<ilJ

~~/'&I'"

~ ~ ~A4•L~

lPf ~ ~-~---

*It is well to remember that if the "effect" prong of
Lemon were before us, we would be concerned primarily with
the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils.
As Justice O'Connor noted, during "a moment of silence, a
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be
the purpose] is left to his or her own thoughts, and is
not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of
others".
Post, at 7 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Given
the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily
concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would
use a simple "moment of silence" as a time for religious

2.

prayer.
There are too many other subjects on the mind of
the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that
some children, raised in strongly religious families,
properly would use the moment to reflect on the religion
of his or her choice.

lfp/ss 04/29/85

Rider A, p. 6 (Wallace)

WALL6 SALLY-POW
Where a statute has both secular and religious
purposes, a court under the Lemon test initially must
identify the predominant purpose.

In this case the record

~
before us makes clear that Alabama's purpose was religious
A

in character.

Senator Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the

bill that became Alabama Code §16-1-20.1, freely
acknowledged that the purpose of this amended statute was
nto return voluntary prayeru to the public schools.
ante, at 18, n. 43.

See

I agree with Justice O'Connor that

the statement of a single legislator, particularly
following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient ~

13e...f,
to establish purpose.

A~

noted in Justice Stevens'

opinion, there is other evidence of the real purpose of

2.

§16-1-20.1, including the sequence and history of the
three Alabama statutes.

I also consider important in this

respect the tone of the District Court's opinion and its
holding as announced on January 14, 1982.

Jaffree v.

James, 554 F.Supp. 1130, 1132 (S.D. Ala. 1983).

In that

decision the District Court in approving the sequence of
the Alabama statutes on this subject clearly believed that
even the conducting of prayers as a part of a school
program was proper, Supreme Court decisions to the
contrary.

(Here, Lee, cite my Chambers opinion).
A different question would be presented if the

statute also had a secular purpose.

u.s.

(1983).

See Mueller v. Allen,

The Court is "reluctan[t] to

attribute unconstitutional motives to the state,
particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be

.. ,.

3.

discerned from the face of the statute".

Justice

O'Connor's concurring opinion, as well as Justice Stevens'
opinion for the Court, convincingly show that nothing in
the record before us identifies a secular purpose.

It is

virtually conceded that the purpose was to further
religion, and no secular purpose was identified.
first prong of the Lemon test requires that a "statut

District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that no
such purpose was shown.

,,

'

;.
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Rider A, p. 3 (Wallace)

WALL3 SALLY-POW

s

Our cases have emphasized that the te1t is
flexible and not invariably applied strictly according to
its terms.

It is not unusual for a test to be expressed

in language subject to interpretation when applied.

Yet,

Lemon does identify standards that have proved
analytically useful in case after case both in our
decisions and those of other courts.

After all, it is the

only coherent test a majority of the Court has ever
adopted.

~ ~ ly

once since our decision in Lemon

have we analyzed an Establishment Clause issue without

~~--

resort to its three factors.
'\

u.s.

783 (1983). 3

See Marsh v. Chambers, 463

Abandonment or even continued criticism

2.

of Lemon will leave this and other courts free to decide
Establishment Clause cases on an ad hoc basis.

~~'1

s~-~<

1+

~';:

~ /'~

q

f'?t.-t)

lf7'

~

~

~I-t;

..
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83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v. Jaffree and Smith v. Jaffree
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment
that Alabama Code §16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.

I also agree particularly

with Justice O'Connor's reasons for stating that momentof-silence statutes may be constitutional, 1 a view also

1 JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-ofsilence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as
those providing for vocal prayer:
A state sponsored moment of silence in the
public schools is different from state sponsored
vocal prayer or Bible reading.
First, a moment
of
silence
is
not
inherently
religious.
Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, need
not be associated with a religious exercise.
Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of
silence need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who
objects to prayer is left to his or her own
thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the
prayers or thoughts of others. For these simple
reasons, a moment of silence statute does not
Footnote continued on next page.

2.

expressed in the Court's opinion.

AvJ....

lRi~a,

at 20.

I write

separately to express additional views, and to answer
criticism of the three-prong Lemon test. 2

stand or fall under the Establishment Clause
according to how the Court regards vocal prayer
or Bible reading.
Scholars and at least one
member
of
this Court
have
recognized
the
distinction and suggested that a moment of
silence
in
public
schools
would
be
constitutional.
See Abington, 374 u.s., at 281
(BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a
moment of reverent silence at the opening of
class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of
the devotional activities without jeopardizing
either the religious liberties of any members of
the community or the proper degree of separation
between
the
spheres
of
religion
and
government") ; L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law, §14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal
Issue," in Religion in the Public Schools 23
(1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., at 371;
Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme
Court, 61 Mich L. Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a
general matter, I agree.
It is difficult to
discern a serious threat to religious liberty
from
a
room
of
silent,
thoughtful
schoolchildren.
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring).
2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced
in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order to make
them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of
the First Amendment."
Post,
at 2-3
(O'CONNOR,
J.,
Footnote continued on next page.

3.

Our cases have e

Yet,
Lemon does identify standards that have proved
analytically useful in case after case both in our
decisions and those of other courts.

After all, it is the

only coherent test a majority of the Court has ever
adopted.

Only once since our decision in Lemon have we

analyzed an Establishment Clause issue without resort to
its three factors test.
783 (1983) • 3

See Marsh v. Chambers, 463

u.s.

Abandonment or even continued criticism of

concurring).
JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the Lemon
test entirely.
Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
3 1n Marsh v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983), we held that ,
the Nebraska Legislature Is practice of opening eaczh day .r
Footnote continued on next page.

~

4.

Lemon will leave this and other courts free to decide
Establishment Clause cases on an ad hoc basis.

The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the
challenged statute has a "secular legislative purpose."
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403

u.s.

602, 612 (1971).

As Justice

O'Connor recognizes, this secular purpose must be
"sincere;" a law will not pass constitutional muster if
the secular purpose articulated by the

legislature~
-\

"sham. n

~~

Post, at 9 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State did not
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of
the practice, which had become "part of the fabric of
society . "
Tttenmih;h--€~~:-l-l~"lYirt"'Lt-n-et1"rE"~t--rti"""i~'O'an-t~-f.r~ll...
perhaps best
challenged
practice
threat" to the purposes

9 (). ~t

~)

In Stone

at~
A-1-tt:...h-vk (.-~ .-t-L~~/1..-~~~M.
/A.A, 1-k

5.

v. Graham, 449

u.s.

39 (1980)

(per curiam), for example,

we held that a statute requiring the posting of the Ten
Commandments in public schools violated the Establishment
Clause, even though the Kentucky legislature asserted that
its goal was educational.

We have not interpreted the

first prong of Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a
statute have nexclusively secularn objectives.
Donnelley,

u.s.

n.6.

Lynch v.

If such a requirement

existed, much conduct and legislation approved by this
Court in the past would have been invalidated.
See,
~~"· \~ c_,... , (t-J ...h f,.."t'-'~ ~~'-- ~ ~t/)'-' -tr-~'"' ."iL.JJ)
EJJ-er son

7

11.

Bd. of Edueat ion 1 3 3 0 U.S. 1

that a township

may

transporting their

teimbur~e

chil~ren

(19 4 7)

~'

(l'lold in<}-

parents for the ces-t of

to parochial

at 18 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting)

school~);

post,

(none of the purposes

6.

behind every statute, whether stated or not, is to aid the
target of its largesse").
Where a statute has both secular and religious
purposes, a court under the Lemon test initially must
identify the predominant purpose.

In this case the record

before us makes clear that Alabama's purpose was solely
religious in character.

Senator Donald Holmes, the

sponsor of the bill that became Alabama Code §16-1-20.1,
freely acknowledged that the purpose of

this \ ~~

statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public
schools.

See ante, at 18, n. 43. 4

I agree with Justice

O'Connor that the statement of a single legislator,

4As the Court's opinion states, "the First Amendment
requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is
-::e..:..:n:...;:t:...:i:...:r:..:e:;..:l=...Y.._-='m~o-=t:-=i'-'v-=a;:..:t:"-'e~d~ by a purpose to advance religion".
Ante, at 17 (emphasis added).

7.

particularly following enactment, is not necessarily
sufficient to establish purpose.

But, as noted in Justice

Stevens' opinion, there is other evidence of the real
purpose of §16-1-20.1, including the sequence and history
of the three Alabama statutes.

I also consider important

in this respect the tone of the District Court's opinion
and its holding as announced on January 14, 1982.
v. James, 554 F.Supp. 1130, 1132 (S.D. Ala. 1983).

Jaffree
In

that decision the District Court in approving the sequence

)

of the Alabama statutes on this

subjec~clearly

believed

that even the conducting of prayers as a part of a school
program was proper, Supreme Court decisions to the

~~-VV'(..~""" ..L.....~~ .

~

-

contrary.

(Here, Lee, cite my Chambers opinion).

A

A different question would be presented if the

~
statute also had a secular purpose.

.A.

See Mueller v. Allen,

v

8.

u.s.

(1983}.

The Court is "reluctan[t] to

attribute unconstitutional motives to the state,
particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be
discerned from the face of the statute".

(\

Justice

O'Connor's concurring opinion, as well as Justice Stevens'
opinion for the Court, convincingly show that nothing in
the record before us identifies a secular purpose.

-4

It is

&$'4b-

virtually conceded that the purpose was to further

I\
religion, and no secular purpose was identified.

Both the

District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that no
such purpose was shown.
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of
the Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a
straightforward "moment-of-silence" statute is unlikely to
"advance[] or inhibit[] religion".

See Board of Education

9.

v. Allen, 392

u.s.

236, 243 (1968).

Nor would such a

statute .. foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
• •
1
re 1 1g1on
•5

(1970) ...

Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397

u.s.

664, 674

Lemon, at 612-613.
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

5 rt is well to remember that if the .. effect .. prong of
Lemon were before us, we would be concerned primarily with
the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils.
As Justice O'Connor noted, during .. a moment of silenc , a
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be
the purpose] is left to his or her own thoughts, and is
not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of
others ...
Post, at 7 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Given
the
types~ subjects
youthful minds are primarily
concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would
use a simple .. moment of silence .. as a time for religious
prayer.
There are too many other subjects on the mind of
the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that
some children, raised in strongly religious families,
properly would use the moment to reflect on the religion
of his or her choice.

~
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Rider A, p. 1 (Wallace)
(

WALLAl SALLY-POW
My concurrence is based on the unique Alabama
effort - by the enactment of three successive statutes to preserve state-sponsored prayer in the public schools. 1

1. There were three statutes: Alabama Code §§ 16-1-20
(moment of silent meditation), 16-1-22.1 (meditation or
voluntary prayer), and 16-1-20.1 (teachers authorized to
lead in prayer). These statutes were enacted by the
legislature of Alabama ovr a span of four years.
There is
a question whether §16-1-20 was repealed by implication,
and the Court today unanimously invalidates § 16-1-20.2.
Thus, our opinions address only §16-1-20.1.
See ante at
[Lee: Check the foregoing. My ante reference is
to Justice Stevens' opinion in which he discusses the
sequence of these statutes.
I don't have his opinion
before me.J

"
>\.
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Rider A, p. 2 (Footnote 4) Wallace
(Second Draft)

WALLA2 SALLY-POW
4.

Lemon was a carefully considered opinion of

the Chief Justice, joined by six other Justices.

~d

ab~ 9 t has been repeatedly followed since its adoption
in 1972.

u.s.

In Committee of Public Education v. Nyquist, 413

756, 772, five other Justices joined my opinion for

the Court, and the Chief Justice concurred in Part II-A

the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon.

Although

we found that the New York statute had a clearly "secular
legislative purpose", we held that the statute had the
"primarily effect" of advancing religion.
Donnelly, ____

u.s. ____

In Lynch v.

(1983), we said the Court is not

2.

"confined to any single test or criterion in this
sensitive area".

The decision in Lynch - like that in

-

Marsh v. Chambers, supra /\ was based primarily on the long

1'-r-~~
f Inc
. 1 u d'Ing

.
1 accQpeaAae o
. t orica
h IS

the celebration of Christmas.
the Lemon test.

',

.
.
re 1'Igious
sym b o 1 s In

There was no criticism of

.
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Rider A, p. 4 (Wallace)
(Second Draft)

WALLA4 SALLY-POW
Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found
a secular purpose.

In its first opinion, in addresing

both Senate Bill 8 and §16-1-20.0, the District Court said
that since "these statutes do not reflect a clearly
secular purpose, no consideration of the remaining two
parts of the Lemon test is necessary".
decision; see 7ld of appendix).

(Lee:

Cite to the

The Court of Appeals,

citing Lemon, Nyquist, and Walz, applied the Lemon test.
It found "a lack of secular legislative purpose on the
part of the Alabama legislature."

[cite]

It is fair to

say that the state of Alabama in effect concedes there is
no evidence of a secular purpose.

Rather, it criticizes

2.

the Lemon three-part test, and states that nthe principal
problems [with the test] stems from the purpose prongn.
See brief of appellant, George

c.

Wallace, p. 9, et seq.*

*The state, and the Solicitor General in the amicus curiae
brief for the United States, argue that the statute should
be sustained as an effort by the state nto accommodate the
practice of religionn.
(Cite) This Court has not yet
sustained a statute on the naccommodationn theory where
its principal purpose was the advancement of religion.
As
noted above, a statute that clearly has both a secular and
religious purpose would present a different question from
that before us.
A court - in applying the Lemon test then would be required to identify the predominant
purpose.

...

lfp/ss 05/01/85

Rider A, p. 3 (Wallace)
(Second Draft)

WALLA3 SALLY-POW
In the first opinion of the District Court (injoining
enforcement of §16-1-20.1 pending a hearing on the
merits), it noted that the enactment of this statute "is
an effort on the part of the state of Alabama to encourage
a religious activity.

Even though [it is] permissive in

form, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an
establishment of religion".

(Lee:

Add cite.)

The

District Court applyied the Lemon test, stated that the
statute does not "reflect a clearly secular purpose" and
therefore "no consideration of the remaining two parts of
the Lemon test is necessary".

(Lee: Cite ------' p. 7ld

and 72d of the appendix to the Jurisdictional Statement).

2.

ln the District Court's second opinion, following a
hearing on the merits, it concluded from a review of the
history of the Establishment Clause that the decisions of
this Court have been in error, and declined to follow
them.*

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

stated that "both statutes [including §16-1-20.1] advance
and encourage religious activities", and also quoted from
the District Court's first opinion.

(Lee:

See appendix p.

17a.)
Senator Donald Holmes, sponsor of the bill that
became §16-1-20.1 freely acknowledged that the purpose of
this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the
public schools.

See, ante, at 18, n. 43.

I

agree with

Jutice O'Connor that the statement of a single legislator,
particularly following enactment, is not sufficient to

3.

establish purpose.

But here, we have not only this

acknowledgment by the sponsor of §16-1-20.1; as noted,
both of the courts below were in agreement as to the
religious purpose.

Nor was there any evidence supporting

a secular purpose.

*See my Chambers opinion in which I stayed the judgment of
the District Court pending final disposition of the case,
noting that the Court had ruled nthat the United States
Supreme Court has erredn.
(Lee: cite).

lfp/ss 05/01/85

Rider A, p. 2 (Footnote 4) Wallace
(Second Draft)

WALLA2 SALLY-POW
4.

Lemon was a carefully considered opinion of

the Chief Justice, joined by six other Justices.

As noted

above, it has been repeatedly followed since its adoption
in 1972.

u.s.

In Committee of Public Education v. Nyquist, 413

756, 772, five other Justices joined my opinion for

the Court, and the Chief Justice concurred in Part II-A
thereof.

In that part of the opinion, the Court followed

the "now well defined three part test" of Lemon.

Although

we found that the New York statute had a clearly "secular
legislative purpose", we held that the statute had the
"primarily effect" of advancing religion.
Donnelly,

u.s.

In Lynch v.

(1983), we said the Court is not

2.

"confined to any single test or criterion in this
sensitive area".

The decision in Lynch - like that in

Marsh v. Chambers, supra, was based primarily on the long
historical acceptance of including religious symbols in
the celebration of Christmas.
the Lemon test.

There was no criticism of

.

lfp/ss 05/02/85

Rider X, Wallace

WALLX SALLY-POW
Possibly add a footnote as follows:

The Court of Appeals that decided this case
included two Florida judges and a Georgia judge.

There

are 12 active Circuit Court judges on the Court of
Appeals, and the vote denying the Suggestion for Rehearing
En Bane was 8 to 4.

Judge Roney wrote a dissent joined by

three other Circuit judges from states other than Alabama.
Apparently the three members of that court from Alabama,
Chief Judge Godbold, and Judges Henderson and Vance voted
against rehearing en bane.

I do not suggest that the

foregoing is significant except one may assume that the

2.

three judges from Alabama had a greater familiarity with
the history of this case and the statutes involved.

'

'

lfp/ss 05j03j85

Rider A, p. 3 (Wallace)
(Third Draft)

WALLA3 SALLY-POW
In the first opinion of the District Court (injoining
enforcement of §16-1-20.1 pending a hearing on the
merits), it noted that the enactment of this statute "is
an effort on the part of the state of Alabama to encourage
a religious activity.

Even though [it is] permissive in

form, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an
establishment of religion".

(Lee:

Add cite.)

The

District Court applied the Lemon test, stated that the
statute does not "reflect a clearly secular purpose" and
therefore "no consideration of the remaining two parts of
the Lemon test is necessary".

(Lee: Cite

- - -,

p. 7ld

and 72d of the appendix to the Jurisdictional Statement).

2.

In the District Court's second opinion, following a
hearing on the merits, it concluded from a review of the
history of the Establishment Clause that the decisions of
this Court have been in error, and declined to follow
them.*

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

found that "both statutes [including §16-1-20.1] advance
and encourage religious activities", and it also quoted
from the District Court's first opinion.
appendix p. 17a.)

(Lee:

See

Although these findings may be mixed

questions of fact and law, the Court normally would
hesitate to disagree where both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals have made these critical findings.
I also note that Senator Donald Holmes, sponsor
of the bill that became §16-1-20.1 freely acknowledged
that the purpose of this statute was "to return voluntary

3.

prayer" to the public schools.

See, ante, at 18, n. 43.

I agree with Jutice O'Connor that the statement of a
single legislator, particularly following enactment, is
not sufficient to establish purpose.

But here, we have

not only this acknowledgment by the sponsor of §16-1-20.1:
as noted, both of the courts below were in agreement as to
the religious purpose.

Nor was there any evidence

supporting a secular purpose.

*See my Chambers opinion in which I stayed the judgment of
the District Court pending final disposition of the case,
noting that the Court had ruled "that the United States
Supreme Court has erred".
(Lee: cite).

lfp/ss 05/03/85

Rider X, Wallace
(Second Draft)

WALLX SALLY-POW
Possibly add a footnote as follows:

The Court of Appeals .that decided this case
included two Florida judges and a Georgia judge.

There

are 12 active Circuit Court judges on the Court of
Appeals, and the vote denying the Suggestion for Rehearing
En Bane was 8 to 4.

Judge Roney wrote a dissent

emphasizing that the question was important and merited en
bane consideration.

He was joined by three Circuit judges

from states other than Alabama.

Apparently the three

members of that court from Alabama, Chief Judge Godbold,
and Judges

~nd

Vance voted against rehearing en

2.

bane.

I do not suggest that the foregoing is particularly

significant except one may assume that the three judges
from Alabama had a greater familiarity with the history of
this case and the statutes involved.

..

•<

lfp/ss 05/03/85

.

~·,
~
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tllace)

(Third Draft)
WALLA3 SALLY-POW
In the first opinion of the District Court (injoining
enforcement of §16-1-20.1 pending a hearing on the
merits), it noted that the enactment of this statute "is
an effort on the part of the state of Alabama to encourage
a religious activity.

Even though [it is] permissive in

form, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an
establishment of religion".

(Lee:

Add cite.)

The

District Court applied the Lemon test, stated that the
statute does not "reflect a clearly secular purpose" and
therefore "no consideration of the remaining two parts of
the Lemon test is necessary".

(Lee: Cite - - - ' p. 7ld

and 72d of the appendix to the Jurisdictional Statement).

2.

In the District Court's second opinion, following a
hearing on the merits, it concluded from a review of the
history of the Establishment Clause that the decisions of
this Court have been in error, and declined to follow
them.•

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

found that "both statutes [including §16-1-20.1] advance
and encourage religious activities", and it also quoted
from the District Court's first opinion.
appendix p. 17a.)

(Lee:

See

Although these findings may be mixed

questions of fact and law, the Court normally would
hesitate to disagree where both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals have made these critical findings.
I also note that Senator Donald Holmes, sponsor
of the bill that became §16-1-20.1 freely acknowledged
that the purpose of this statute was "to return voluntary

·~

3.

prayer" to the public schools.

See, ante, at 18, n. 43.

I agree with Jutice O'Connor that the statement of a
single legislator, particularly following enactment, is
not sufficient to establish purpose.

But here, we have

not only this acknowledgment by the sponsor of §16-1-20.1;
as noted, both of the courts below were in agreement as to
the religious purpose.

Nor was there any evidence

supporting a secular purpose.

*See my Chambers opinion in which I stayed the judgment of
the District Court pending final disposition of the case,
noting that the Court had ruled "that the United States
Supreme Court has erred".
(Lee: cite) .
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PRAYER

GI ~
83-812 and 83-929

Wallace Cases

Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment.
With

reluctance,

I

concur

in

the

judgment

of

the

Court that Alabama Code 16-1-20.1 providing for a "moment
of meditation or prayer" is contrary to the precedents of
this Court.
concurring

I agree in major part with Justice O'Connor's
opinion,

and

particularly with

the

extent

to

which she carefully distinguishes the Alabama Statute from
the moment of silence statutes that have been adopted in a
number of other states.
opinion.
portion

Infra at
of

Justice

See particularly Part lA of her
1

In the margin below, I quote a

O'Connor's

opinion

with

which

I

particularly agree.
It takes a uniquely suspicious mind to believe that a
minute of silence at the beginning of a school day, with

1 "(Lee - at this point I would like to set forth in
full in a footnote the paragraph that beg ins near the
bottom of page 6 of O'Connor's opinion and goes all the
way through to the end of that paragraph on page 7 .

.,

2.

no

leadership

by

the

teacher

or

characterization

of

a

religious purpose, would constitute any sort of threat to
the purpose of
bear

in

mind

the Establishment Clause.
that

we

are

It is well to

primarily concerned

with

effect on the minds and feelings of the pupils.

the

Given the

types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned
with,

it

is

unlikely

that

many

children

-

even

if

so

encouraged by the teacher - will use the silent period as
a

time

for

subjects
reasons

on
the

religious
the

prayer.

mind

intense

of

There are

the

typical

feelings

that

too many other

child.

"moments

For
of

these

silence"

statutes have engendered seem misplaced.
The opinions of other Justices in this case reflect
dissatisfaction with the Lemon three
I

am

reluctant

emphasized
applied
cases) •

that

the

strictly
Yet,

to

downgrade
test

does

Lemon.

Our

cases

is flexible and not

according

Lemon

part test. 2

to

its

identify

have

invariably

terms.

(Lee

cite

standards

that

have

proved analytically useful in case after case both in our

2 Lee, cite the references
Rehnquist and O'Connor.

to critic ism by

Stevens,

3.

decisions and those of other courts.

After all, it is the

only

the

coherent

adopted.

test

a

majority

of

If we should abandon Lemon,

Court

has

ever

one may fear

that

the Court will be less consistent in its interpretation of
the Establishment Clause than is evident from some of our
prior decisions.
The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the purpose
of the legislative enactment is to encourage support for a
particular religion or for religion in general.
our

cases

illustrate,

there

may

be

some

secular and general religious purposes.
if

any)

often

is

concession

Thus,

determination

unclear.
by

the

In

this

of

combination of

(Lee- cite cases

the

case,

primary

however,

State of Alabama

Also, as

in

"purpose"
we

have

the courts

a

below

that the purpose of the statute was to make prayer part of
daily

classroom

activity,

(Lee,

SOC

says

this

at

the

bottom of p. 12 but doesn't cite specifically - please do
so).

Moreover,

the

District

Court

and

the

Court

of

Appeals concluded that the legislative history made clear
that

the

activity.

law's

purpose

(Lee:

citations).

disagree with this view.

was

to
I

encourage
find

it

religious

difficult

to

4.

Although
Alabama

I

doubt

that

will

comport

Statute

the

actual
with

the

effect

of

the

Legislature's

purpose, and there is little basis for the application of
the

"entanglement"

prong

of

the

Lemon

test,

I

think we

must accept the state's concession as to its sole purpose.
Under
this

Lemon,
is

statute.

at least in the absence of something more,

sufficient

under

(citations?)

•

our

cases

to

invalidate

the

Nos.

83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v.

Jaf free and Smith v.

Jaffree
~

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
With
judgment

r

that

reluctance,
Ala.

Code

I

concur

§16-1-20.1

in
violates

--Ame~~gree

Establishment Clause of the First

..,.,_...

;;;. ~ ~~~4)-r~. S,~~
much) of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion,

--cJ-

includi

her assessment that other moment-of-silence statutes ar
not necessarily unconstitutional. 1

Nevertheless,

I write

1 JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-ofsilence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as
those providing for vocal prayer:
A state sponsored moment of silence in the
public schools is different from state sponsored
vocal prayer or Bible reading.
First, a moment
of
silence
is
not
inherently
religious.
Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, need
not be associated with a religious exercise.
Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of
silence need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who
objects to prayer is left to his or her own
thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the
prayers or thoughts of others. For these simple
Footnote continued on next page.

2.

separately

because

I

cannot

join

modification of the three-prong Lemon test.
Kurtzman, 403

L_

The

u.s.

o•connor•s~

Justice

See Lemon v. (

602 (1971). ("

opinions

of

other

Justices

reasons, a moment of silence statute does not
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause
according to how the Court regards vocal prayer
or Bible reading.
Scholars and at least one
member
of
this
Court
have
recognized
the
distinction and suggested that a moment of
silence
in
public
schools
would
be
constitutional.
See Abington, 374 u.s., at 281
(BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a
moment of reverent silence at the opening of
class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of
the devotional activities without jeopardizing
either the religious liberties of any members of
the community or the proper degree of separation
between
the
spheres
of
religion
and
government"); L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law, §14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal
Issue," in Religion in the Public Schools 23
(1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., at 371;
Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme
Court, 61 Mich L. Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963).
As a
general matter, I agree.
It is difficult to
discern a serious threat to religious liberty
from
a
room
of
silent,
thoughtful
schoolchildren.

I

Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring).

...

'·

/

3.

i ssa t r-s.,(act ion

with

the

- &4-~,4;
nderstandable

for

th

test

has

not

always

prQdnged
1\

consistent

results.

Se

post,

at

20-21

(REHNQUIST,

J.,

I

dissenting) . ( N~verthele

I

am reluctant

to modify or

abandon the Lemon ~ ~·
~~~.,

~

test identifies stantlards that have proven

1\

useful in case after case.
in

Lemon have we

without

resort

Only once since our decision

analyzed an Establishment Clause
to

its

three

factors.
~

Chambers, 463

u.s.

783 (1983) .3

~

See

~~

issue

Marsh

v.

4-..

fear that if we abandon
1\

2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced
in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order to make
them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of
the First Amendment."
Post,
at
2-3
(O'CONNOR,
J.,
concurring).
JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the Lemon
test entirely. ~, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).

(

.·

3 In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983), we held that
the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day
with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State did not
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Footnote continued on next page •

~ i.,., I

this

1

-./s•f..
without

~~test,

a

coherent

th

substitute,

Court will be even less consistent with its interpretatio
of

Establishment Clause than it has been in the past.

-

The
challenged

first

inquiry

statute

has

a

Lemon v. Kurtzman,

403

u.s.

O'Connor

recognizes,

"sincere;"
the

a

secular

"sham."
v. Graham,

under

Lemon

"secular
602,

this

is

whether

legislative

612

secular

(1971).
purpose

the

purpose."
As Justice
must

be

law will not pass constitutional muster
purpose articulated

by the legislature

Post, at 9 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
449

u.s.

39

(1980)

if

is a

In Stone

(per curiam), for example,

Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of
the practice, which had become "part of the fabric of our
society."
The Marsh Court • s willingness to depart from
the
Lemon
test
is
perhaps
best
explained
by
our
observation
that
the
challenged
practice
did
not
constitute a
"real threat"
to the purposes of the
Establishment Clause.

5.

we held that a

statute requiring

the posting of the Ten

Commandments in public schools violated the Establishment
Clause, even though the Kentucky legislature asserted that
its

goal

was

educational.

We

have

not

interpreted

the

first prong of Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a
statute have

u.s. __ ,

Donnelley,
existed,

much

conduct

n.6.
and

If

such

legislation

a

that

a

Bd.

township

transporting
at 18

of Education,
may

330

reimburse

u.s.

parents

requirement

approved

Court in the past would have been invalidated.
Everson v.

Lynch v.

"exclusively secular" objectives.

1

See,

(1947)
for

by

the

J.,

dissenting)

("one of

~,

(holding
cost of

their children to parochial schools);

(REHNQUIST,

this

post,

the purposes

behind every statute, whether stated or not, is to aid the
target of its largesse").

6.

~

Because a valid statute may have both secular and

religious

purposes,

discussion

of

Donald Holmes,

the

I

find

unpersuasive

legislative

the

history.

plurality's

State

Senator

the sponsor of the bill that became Ala.

Code §16-1-20.1, apparently did have only a religious goal
in mind when he introduced the challenged legislation.

I

1\
db

not

believe,

however,

that

the

statements

of

one

legislator can support a holding that a statute lacks a
secular purpose.

Almost every statute with dual purposes

is passed by a coalition of legislators whose reasons for
supporting it vary widely.

Some legislators may view such

legislation

for

religious
supporting

as

desirable

reasons.

Undoubtedly,

dual-purpose

both

religious

however,

legislation

will

and

non-

many lawmakers
have

either

I
solely

sectarian

or

purely

secular

motives.

I

do

not

7.

believe

that

should

be

a

statute

with

invalidated

legislators

expressed

an obvious

simply

solely

secular

because

religious

one

purpose
or

reasons

more

for

its

/

passage.
Although

I

do

not

!

find

the

remarks

of

State

~

hold
that

the

secu ar

statute
purpose.

at

issue

The

here

does

educational

not

value

have

of

a

a

clear

moment

of

"reluctan[t]

to

/

' silence

Allen,

is not obvious to

_u.s._,/ / _

attribute

unconstitutional

particularly
discerned

(1983)

when

from

the

a

(Court
motives

plausible
face

of

is

secular

- --

to

the

purpose

the _statute").

state,
may

be

8.

J-

l

1--k~

4.~ ~ ~ ~~ <; ~....._.__ :.,t~llliiiiiiiiliit;J~""\..;._::...._

havi

reached

the

{ egislative
purpose.

history,
Finally,

find
s

far

nothing
as I can

I
I

tell

from my

examination of

the

reco d,

nowhere

in the

course of this litigation have the respondents explained
/

I

what secular purpose the momentj of silence serves.

Under

'

these

circumstance ,

~--<. ~~
~ to disagree

I

J

I)

with

the

I
Court of

Appeals'

conclysion

that

a

secular

lacking.

See 705 F.2d 1526, 1535 (CAll 1983).

purpose

is

I

I doubt that the ch llenged statute will have the
"primary effect" of advancing
at 612.

r~igion.

See Lemon, supra,

Given the subjects of con ern to schoolchildren,

it is unlikely that many students--eve
teacher--will use the silent period for

if encouraged by a
yer.

Moreover,

it seems that there is little basis for arguing that §161-20.1 would foster an "excessive government entanglement

I

~

9.

with relig'on."
397

u.s.

664,

statute must be

/

!d., at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
674

because

purpose, I concur in
violates

th~

!

(1970)).

Never the less,

under Lemon a

n ld invalid if it fails just one part of

the three-prong
Therefore,

--

/

Stone v. Graham,
lacks

supra, at 40-41.
a

clear

secular

judgment that the statute

Establishment Cla se of the First Amendment.

lfp/ss 04/29/85
83-812 and 83-929, Wallace v. Jaffree and Smith v. Jaffree
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
1 concur in the Court's opinion and judgment
that Alabama Code §16-1-20.1 violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.

1 also agree particularly

with Justice O'Connor's reasons for stating that momentof-silence statutes may be constitutional, 1 a view also

1 JUST!CE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-ofsilence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as
those providing for vocal prayer:
A state sponsored moment of silence in the
public schools is different from state sponsored
vocal prayer or Bible reading.
First, a moment
of
silence
is
not
inherently
religious.
Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, need
not be associated with a religious exercise.
Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of
silence need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who
objects to prayer is left to his or her own
thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the
prayers or thoughts of others. For these simple
reasons, a moment of silence statute does not
Footnote continued on next page.

2.

expressed in the Court's opinion.

Infra, at 20.

I write

separately to express additional views, and to answer
criticism of the three-prong Lemon test. 2

stand or fall under the Establishment Clause
according to how the Court regards vocal prayer
or Bible reading.
Scholars and at least one
member
of
this Court
have
recognized
the
distinction and suggested that a moment of
silence
in
public
schools
would
be
constitutional.
See Abington, 374 u.s., at 281
(BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a
moment of reverent silence at the opening of
class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of
the devotional activities without jeopardizing
either the religious liberties of any members of
the community or the proper degree of separation
between
the
spheres
of
religion
and
government")~ L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law, Sl4-6, at 829 (1978) ~ P. Freund, "The Legal
Issue," in Religion in the Public Schools 23
(1965) ~ Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., at 371~
Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme
Court, 61 Mich L. Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a
general matter, I agree.
It is difficult to
discern a serious threat to religious liberty
from
a
room
of
silent,
thoughtful
schoolchildren.
Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring).
2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced
in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order to make
them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of
the First Amendment."
Post,
at 2-3
(O'CONNOR, J.,
Footnote continued on next page.

3.

Our cases have emphasized that the test is
flexible and not invariably applied strictly according to
its terms.

It is not unusual for a test to be expressed

in language subject to interpretation when applied.

Yet,

Lemon does identify standards that have proved
analytically useful in case after case both in our
decisions and those of other courts.

After all, it is the

only coherent test a majority of the Court has ever
adopted.

Only once since our decision in Lemon have we

analyzed an Establishment Clause issue without resort to
its three factors test.
783 (1983). 3

See Marsh v. Chambers, 463

u.s.

Abandonment or even continued criticism of

JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the Lemon
concurring).
test entirely. Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
3 In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983), we held that
the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day
Footnote continued on next page.

4.

Lemon will leave this and other courts free to decide
Establishment Clause cases on an ad hoc basis.

The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the
challenged statute has a "secular legislative purpose."
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403

u.s.

602, 612 (1971).

As Justice

O'Connor recognizes, this secular purpose must be
"sincere:" a law will not pass constitutional muster if
the secular purpose articulated by the legislature is a
"sham."

Post, at 9 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

In Stone

with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State did not
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of
the practice, which had become "part of the fabric of our
society. •
The Marsh Court's willingness to depart from
the
Lemon
test
is
perhaps
best explained
by our
observation
that
the
challenged
practice
did
not
constitute a
"real threat"
to the purposes of the
Establishment Clause.

s.

v. Graham, 449

u.s.

39 (1980)

(per curiam), for example,

we held that a statute requiring the posting of the Ten
Commandments in public schools violated the Establishment
Clause, even though the Kentucky legislature asserted that
its goal was educational.

We have not interpreted the

first prong of Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a
statute have "exclusively secular" objectives.
Donnelley,

u.s.

,

n.6.

Lynch v.

If such a requirement

existed, much conduct and legislation approved by this
Court in the past would have been invalidated.
Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330

u.s.

1 (1947)

See,

~,

(holding

that a township may reimburse parents for the cost of
transporting their children to parochial schools); post,
at 18 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting)

("one of the purposes

6.

behind every statute, whether stated or not, is to aid the
target of its largessew).
Where a statute has both secular and religious
purposes, a court under the Lemon test initially must
identify the predominant purpose.

ln this case the record

before us makes clear that Alabama's purpose was solely
religious in character.

Senator Donald Holmes, the

sponsor of the bill that became Alabama Code §16-1-20.1,
freely acknowledged that the purpose of this amended
statute was wto return voluntary prayerw to the public
schools.

See ante, at 18, n. 43. 4

I

agree with Justice

O'Connor that the statement of a single legislator,

4As the Court's opinion states, wthe First Amendment
requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is
..:e.:.:n:...::t:..:i:..:r:....:e:...:l:.Y'--...:m:o::;.t=i...;.v.=a...,::t:..::e=-d by a pur pose to advance religionw.
Ante, at 17 (emphasis added).

7.

particularly following enactment, is not necessarily
sufficient to establish purpose.

But, as noted in Justice

Stevens' opinion, there is other evidence of the real
purpose of §16-1-20.1, including the sequence and history
of the three Alabama statutes.

I also consider important

in this respect the tone of the District Court's opinion
and its holding as announced on January 14, 1982.
~James,

554 F.Supp. 1130, 1132 (S.D. Ala. 1983).

Jaffree
In

that decision the District Court in approving the sequence
of the Alabama statutes on this subject clearly believed
that even the conducting of prayers as a part of a school
program was proper, Supreme Court decisions to the
contrary,.

(Here, Lee, cite my Chambers opinion).
A different question would be presented if the

statute also had a secular purpose.

See Mueller v. Allen,

8.

__u.s.

__ ,

(1983).

The Court is "reluctan[t] to

attribute unconstitutional motives to the state,
particularly when a plausible secular purpose may be
discerned from the face of the statute".

Justice

O'Connor's concurring opinion, as well as Justice Stevens'
opinion for the Court, convincingly show that nothing in
the record before us identifies a secular purpose.

It is

virtually conceded that the purpose was to further
religion, and no secular purpose was identified.

Both the

District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that no
such purpose was shown.
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of
the Lemon test, 1 note that the "effect" of a
straightforward "moment-of-silence" statute is unlikely to
"advance[] or inhibit[] religion".

See Board of Education

9.

v. Allen, 392

u.s.

236, 243 (1968).

Nor would such a

statute "foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion•. 5
(1970)".

Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397

u.s.

664, 674

Lemon, at 612-613.
1 join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

5 It is well to remember that if the "effect" prong of
Lemon were before us, we would be concerned primarily with
the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils.
As Justice O'Connor noted, during "a moment of silence, a
student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be
the purpose] is left to his or her own thoughts, and is
not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of
others".
Post, at 7 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Given
the types~ subjects youthful minds are primarily
concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would
use a simple "moment of silence" as a time for religious
prayer.
There are too many other subjects on the mind of
the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that
some children, raised in strongly religious families,
properly would use the moment to reflect on the religion
of his or her choice.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I
that

Ala.

concur
Code

in

the

Court • s

§16-1-20.1

opinion

violates

Clause of the First Amendment.

the

and

judgment

Establishment

My concurrence is prompted

by Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute statesponsored prayer in the public schools by enacting three
successive

statutes. 1

I

agree

fully

with

JUSTICE

O'CONNOR's assertion that some moment-of-silence statutes

1 The three statutes are: Ala. Code §16-1-20 (moment of
silent meditation); Ala. Code §16-1-20.1
(moment of
silence for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code §16-120.2
(teachers authorized to lead students in vocal
prayer).
These statutes were enacted over a span of four
years.
There is some question whether §16-1-20 was
repealed by implication.
The Court already has summarily
affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding that §16-1-20.2 is
invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree,
U.S.
(1984) [104 S.Ct.
1704].
Thus, our opinions l address only the validity of
§16-1-20.1. See ante, at 3.

h-4'

2.

may

be

constitutional, 2

a

suggestion

set

forth

in

the

2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-ofsilence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as
those providing for vocal prayer:
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the
public schools is different from state sponsored
vocal prayer or Bible reading.
First, a moment
of
silence
is
not
inherently
religious.
Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, need
not be associated with a religious exercise.
Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of
silence need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who
objects to prayer is left to his or her own
thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the
prayers or thoughts of others. For these simple
reasons, a moment of silence statute does not
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause
according to how the Court regards vocal prayer
or Bible reading.
Scholars and at least one
member
of
this Court have
recognized
the
distinction and suggested that a moment of
silence
in
public
schools
would
be
constitutional.
See Abington, 374 u.s., at 281
(BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a
moment of reverent silence at the opening of
class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of
the devotional activities without jeopardizing
either the religious liberties of any members of
the community or the proper degree of separation
between
the
spheres
of
religion
and
government"): L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law, §14-6, at 829 (1978): P. Freund, "The Legal
Issue," in Religion in the Public Schools 23
(1965): Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., at 371:
Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme
Court, 61 Mich L. Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a
general matter, I agree.
It is difficult to
Footnote continued on next page.
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Court's opinion as well.
I
and

to

test.

write

respond

3

separately
to

Lemon

Ante, at 20.
to

express

critic ism of

v.

Kurtzman,

the
403

additional

views

three-pronged

Lemon

u.s.

602

(1972)'

identifies standards that have proven useful in analyzing
case

after

case

other courts.

both

in

our

decisions

and

in

those

of

It is the only coherent test a majority of

the Court has ever adopted.

Only once since our decision

in Lemon, supra, have we addressed an Establishment Clause

discern a serious
from
a
room
schoolchildren."

threat
of

to religious liberty
silent,
thoughtful

Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment).
3

JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced
in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order to make
them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of
the
First Amendment."
Post,
at
2-3
(O'CONNOR,
J.,
concurring).
JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the Lemon
test entirely.
Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).

4.

(
issue without resort to its three-pronged test.
v.

Chambers,

463

u.s.

783

(1983).

:1 '

See Marsh

b~ndonment or even
leave

this

courts free to decide Establishment Clause cases on an ad
hoc basis. 5

4 rn Marsh v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983), we held that
the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day's
session with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State did
not
violate
the
Establishment Clause of
the
First
Amendment.
Our holding was based upon the historical
acceptance of the practice, "-wJH.e.h had become "part of the
fabric of our society." Id., at __ •
5 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (1972), was a carefully
considered opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was
joined by six other Justices.
Lemon's three-pronged test
has
been
repeatedly
followed.
In Comm.
of
Public
Education v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756 (1974), for example,
the Court applied the "now well defined three part test"
of Lemon.
Id., at
In Lynch v. Donnelley,
u.s.
(1984), we said that
the Court is not "confined to any single test or criterion
in this sensitive area."
!d., at
The decision in
Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783
(1983),
was based primarily on the long historical
practice of including religious symbols in the celebration
of Christmas.
Nevertheless,
the Court,
without any
criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to the
facts of that case.

'

.
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Post, at 9 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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In Stone v.

a
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recognizes,

"sincere;"
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first

Graham,

449

u.s.

39

(1980)

(per curiam), for

example, we held that a statute requiring the posting of
the

Ten

Commandments

in

public

schools

violated

the

Establishment Clause, even though the Kentucky legislature
asserted

that

its

goal

was

educational.

interpreted the first prong of Lemon,
requiring

that

objectives. 6

a

statute

have

Lynch v. Donnelley,

supra,

.we

however,

"exclusively

u.s. __,

have

not
as

secular"

n.6.

Footnote(s) 6 will appear on following pages.
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6.

such a requirement existed, much conduct and legislation
approved

by

this

invalidated.

See,

(1970)

Court

in

the

past

would

dissenting)
whether

u.s.

Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397

~,

(New York's property tax exemption for

organizations

have

upheld);

post,

at

18

been
664

religious

(REHNQUIST,

J. ,

("one of the purposes behind every statute,

stated

or

not,

is

to

aid

the

target

of

its

largesse") •
The record before us, however, makes clear that
Alabama's

purpose

was

solely

religious

in

character.

Senator Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became
Alabama

Code

§16-1-20.1,

freely

acknowledged

that

the

6As the Court's opinion states, "the First Amendment
requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is
..:e:..:;n:...:t:..:i:..:r::...;e:;.;l=-y"---_m::==o-=t-=i:....:vc...::a=-t:..;e:..;d~ by
a purpose to advance religion".
Ante, at 17 (emphasis added).

7.

purpose of this statute was "to return voluntary prayer"
See ante, at 18 n.

to the public schools.
JUSTICE

with

statement,
not

at 11
as

purpose

of

statutes.

in

made

J.,

the

§16-1-20 .1

the

if

sufficient

(O'CONNOR,

noted

including

that

particularly

necessarily

post,
But,

O'CONNOR

to

sequence and

following
establish

enactment,
purpose.

in the

opinion,

manifested

in

I agree

legislator's

single

concurring

Court's
is

a

43.

is
See

judgment).

the

religious

other

evidence,

history of the three Alabama

See ante, at 19.

·; I

also

consider

District Court nor
purpose
of

important

that

neither

the

the Court of Appeals found a secular

~

~

In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement

§16-1-20.1

pending

a

hearing

on

the

District Court said that the statute did

merits),

the

"not reflect a

8.

clearly secular purpose."
72 7 ,

732

( S. D.

Jaffree v.

Ala • 19 8 2) •

Instead,

James,

544 F. Supp.

the District Court

found that the enactment of the statute was an "effort on
the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious
activity." 7 Id.
Lemon

test

and

The Court of Appeals likewise applied the
found

"a

lack

of

part of the Alabama legislature."
F.2d 1526, 1535
of

7 rn

§16-1-20.1

(CAll 1983).
was

the

secular

purpose on the

Jaffree v. Wallace, 705

It held that the objective

"advancement

of

religion."

Id.

its subsequent decision on the merits, the District
Court held that prayer in the public schools--even if led
by the teacher--did not violate the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.
The District Court recognized
that its decision was inconsistent with Engle v. Vitale,
370 u.s. 421 (1962), and other decisions of this Court.
The District Court nevertheless ruled that its decision
was justified because "th~ United States Supreme Court has
erred."
In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the
judgment of the District Court pending appeal to the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jaffree v. Bd. of
School
Comm'rs,
__u.s.
(1983)
(POWELL,
J.,
in
chambers).

.

.

9.

When

-

~+the courts

below are unable to discern an arguably

'\

valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate
to find one.
Despite the legislative history and the findings
~

L.

of the lower courts,
statute if it had a clear secular purpose.

u.s.

Allen,
attribute

(1983)

unconstitutional

particularly

when

a

See Mueller v.

(the Court is "reluctan[t] to
motives

plausible

to

secular

purpose

discerned from the face of the statute").
record

before

purpose,
religious

and

us,
the

reason

however,

~

State has
1\

for

the

identifies
failed

to

statute's

the

state,
may

be

Nothing in the
a

clear

secular

identify any nonenactrnent. 8

Under

8 Instead,
the
State criticizes
the
Lemon test and
asserts that "the principal problem [with the test] sterns
Footnote continued on next page.

10.

I

l

I

these circumstances, the Court i
statute

fails

the

first

prong

of

the

Lemon

test

and

therefore violates the Establishment Clause.
Although we do not reach the other two prongs of
the

Lemon

test,

I

note

that

straightforward moment-of-silence
"advance[]

or

inhibit[]

from the purpose prong."
Wallace, p.9, et ~

"effect"

the
statute

religion."

is

9 See

of

a

unlikely to
Board

See Brief of Appellant George

of

c.

9 If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of
Lemon, we would be concerned primarily with the effect on
the minds and feelings of immature pupils.
As Justice
O'Connor notes, during "a moment of silence a student who
objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose]
is left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled
to listen to the prayers or thoughts of others." Post, at
7 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Given the
types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned
with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple
"moment of silence" as a time for religious prayer.
There are too many other subjects on the mind of the
typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that some
children, raised in strongly religious families, properly
would use the moment to reflect on the religion of his or
her choice.

11.

Education v.
such

a

Allen,

statute

392

u.s.

"foster

entanglement with religion.'"
at

612-613,

quoting Walz

v.

236,
'an

243

(1968).

excessive

Lemon v.

Nor would
government

Kurtzman,

Tax Commissioner,

supra,

397

u.s.

664, 674 (1970).
I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.
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Court's

§16-1-20.1

opinion

violates

Clause of the First Amendment.

the

and

judgment

Establishment

My concurrence is prompted

CR

.q0..

by Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute state-

~

•
i

sponsored prayer in the public schools by enacting three

~

successive

statutes. 1

I

agree

fully

with

JUSTICE

O'CONNOR's assertion that some moment-of-silence statutes

1 The three statutes are: Ala. Code §16-1-20 (moment of
silent meditation); Ala.
Code §16-1-20.1
(moment of
silence for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code §16-120.2
(teachers authorized to lead students in vocal
prayer).
These statutes were enacted over a span of four
years. ·
There is some question whether §16-1-20 was
repealed by implication.
The Court already has summarily
affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding that §16-1-20.2 is
invalid.
Wallace v. Jaffree,
U.S.
(1984) .
Thus,
our opinions today address only-the validity of §16-120.1. See ante, at 3.

'·.

2.

may

be

constitutional, 2

a

suggestion

set

forth

in

2 JUSTICE

the

O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-ofsilence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as
those providing for vocal prayer:
"A state sponsored moment of silence in the
public schools is different from state sponsored
vocal prayer or Bible reading.
First, a moment
of
silence
is
not
inherently
religious.
Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, need
not be associated with a religious exercise.
Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of
silence need not compromise his or her beliefs.
During a moment of silence, a student who
objects to prayer is left to his or her own
thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the
prayers or thoughts of others. For these simple
reasons, a moment of silence statute does not
stand or fall under the Establishment Clause
according to how the Court regards vocal prayer
or Bible reading.
Scholars and at least one
member
of
this Court
have
recognized
the
distinction and suggested that a moment of
silence
in
public
schools
would
be
constitutional.
See Abington, 374 u.s., at 281
(BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("The observance of a
moment of reverent silence at the opening of
class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of
the devotional activities without jeopardizing
either the religious liberties of any members of
the community or the proper degree of separation
between
the
spheres
of
religion
and
government"); L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law, §14-6, at 829 (1978); P. Freund, "The Legal
Issue," in Religion in the Public Schools 23
(1965); Choper, supra, 47 Minn. L. Rev., at 371;
Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme
Court, 61 Mich L. Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a
general matter, I agree.
It is difficult to
Footnote continued on next page.
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Court's opinion as well.
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Ante, at 20.

separately

to express

to critic ism of
v.

Kurtzman,

discern a serious
from
a
room
schoolchildren."

threat
of

the
403

additional

views

three-pronged

Lemon

u.s.

602

(1972),

to religious liberty
silent,
thoughtful

Post, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment).
3 JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced
in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order to make
them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of
the First Amendment."
Post,
at
2-3
(O'CONNOR,
J.,
concurring).
JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the Lemon
test entirely.
Post, at 23 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
As I state in the text, the three-pronged Lemon test
has been applied consistently in Establishment Clause
cases since it was adopted in 1972.
In a word, it has
been the law.
Respect for stare decisis should require us
to follow Lemon~ ~v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., __u.s. __ ,.~-- ((ll~HS!:>J A ("The stability of judicial
decision, and with it respect for the au thor i ty of this
Court, are not served by the precipitous overruling of
multiple precedents •••• ").
The appellants have not
directly argued
that the
test should be discarded.
Moreover, a majority of the Court today in Grand Rapids
School Dist. v. Ball,
u.s.
(1985), and Aguilar v.
Felton, __u.s. ___
---r.l98:nl, expressly follow Lemon and
apply its test.

4.

identifies standards that have proven useful in analyzing
case

after

case

other courts.

both

in

our

decisions

and

in

those

of

It is the only coherent test a majority of

the Court has ever adopted.

Only once since our decision

in Lemon, supra, have we addressed an Establishment Clause
issue without resort to its three-pronged test.
v. Chambers, 463

u.s.

been

or

overruled

783 (1983) • 4
its

test

See Marsh

Lemon, supra, has not

modified.

Yet,

continued

criticism of it could encourage other courts to feel free
to decide Establishment Clause cases on an ad hoc basis. 5

4 rn Marsh v. Chambers, 463 u.s. 783 (1983), we held that
the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day's
session with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State did
not
violate
the
Establishment Clause of
the
First
Amendment.
Our holding was based upon the historical
acceptance of the practice, that had become "part of the
fabric of our society." Id., at
5 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (1972), was a carefully
considered opinion of the Chief Justice, in which he was
joined by six other Justices.
Lemon's three-pronged test
Footnote continued on next page.
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of Lemon.
Id., at
In Lync~. Don~ley, ___u.s. ___ (1984), we said that
the Court is not "confined to any single test or criterion
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Id., at
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(1983),
was
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the long historical
practice of including religious symbols in the celebration
of Christmas.
Nevertheless,
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without
any
criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to the
facts of that case.
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If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of
Lemon, we would be concerned primarily with the effect on
the minds and feelings of immature pupils.
As Justice
O'Connor notes, during "a moment of silence a student who
objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose]
is left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled
to listen to the prayers or thoughts of others." Post, at
7 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Given the
types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned
with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple
"moment of silence" as a time for religious prayer.
There are too many other subjects on the mind of the
typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that some
children, raised in strongly religious families, properly
would use the moment to reflect on the religion of his or
her choice.

I .
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664, 674

(1970).

I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.
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ISHMAEL JAFFREE ET AL.
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[January-, 1985]

delivered the opinion of the Court.
At an early stage of this litigation, the constitutionality of
three Alabama statutes was questioned: (1) § 16-1-20, enacted in 1978, which authorized a one-minute period of silence
in all public schools "for meditation;" 1 (2) § 16-1-20.1, enacted in 1981, which author~riod of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer;" 2 and (3) § 16-1-20.2, enacted in
JUSTICE STEVENS

1

Alabama Code § 16-1-20 reads as foll!)ws:
"At the commencement of the first class each day in the first through the
sixth grades in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which
each such class is held shall announce that a period of silence, not to exceed
one minute in duration, shall be observed for meditation, and during any
such period silence shall be maintained and no activities engaged in."
V Appellees have abandoned any claim that § 16-1-20 is unconstitutio .
See Brief of Appellees 2.
1
Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 provides:
"At the commencement of"the first class of each day in all grades in all
public schools the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is held
may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration

.'
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1982, which authorized teachers to lead "willing students" in
a prescribed prayer to "Almighty God ... the Creator and
Supreme Judge of the world.'' 3
At the preliminary-injunction stage of this case, the District Court distinguished § 16-1-20 from the other two statutes. It then held that there was "nothing wrong" with
§ 16-1-20, 4 but that § 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 were both
invalid because the sole purpose of both was "an effort on the
part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity."5 After the trial on the merits, the District Court did
not change its interpretation of these two statutes, but held
that they were constitutional because, in its opinion, Alabama has the power to establish a state religion if it chooses
to do so. 8
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's initial interpretation of the purpose of both §§ 16-1-20.1 and
16-1-20.2, and held them both unconstitutional. 7 We have
shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such
period no other activities shall be engaged in."
1
Alabama Code § 16-1-20.2 provides:
"From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educational institution within the State of Alabama, recognizing that the Lord God is
one, at the beginning of any homeroom or any class, may pray, may lead
willing students in prayer, or may lead the willing students in the following
prayer to God:
"Almighty God, You alone are our God. We aclmowledge You as the
Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, Your truth,
and Your peace abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the
counsels of our government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the classrooms of our schools in the name of our Lord. Amen."
•'The court stated that it did not find any potential infirmity in§ 16-1-20
because "it is a statute which prescribes nothing more than a child in school
shall have the right to meditate in silence and there is nothing wrong with a
little meditation and quietness." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732
(SD Ala. 1982).
5
Ibid.
'Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 554 F.
Supp. 1104, 1128 (SD Ala. 1983).
1
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535-1536 (CA111983).

' '
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already affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding with respect
to § 16-1-20.2. 8 Moreover, ap'a~~have not questioned
the holding that§ 16-1-20 is vall .
us, the narrow question -for aeciS~~16-1-20.1, which authorizes a
period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer," is a
law respecting the establishment of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment. 10
I
Appellee Ishmael Jaffree is a resident of Mobile County,
Alabama. On May 28, 1982, he filed a complaint on behalf of
three of his minor children; two of them were second-grade
students and the third was then in kindergarten. The complaint named members of the Mobile County School Board,
various school officials, and the minor plaintiffs' three teachers as defendants. 11 The complaint alleged that the appellees
brought the action "seeking principally a declaratory judgment and an injunction restraining the Defendants and each
of them from maintaining or allowmg the maintenance of regular religious prayer services or other forms of religious
observances in the Mobile County Public Schools in violation
of the First Amendment as made applicable to states by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." 12 The complaint further alleged that two of the children had been subjected to various acts of religious indoctrination ''from the beginning of the school year in September,
1981;" 18 that the defendant teachers had "on a daily basis" led
their classes in saying certain prayers in unison; 14 that the
'Wallace v. Jaffree, 104 S. Ct. 1704 (1984).
• See n. 1, S'IJ:pra..
10
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, of course, has
long ~n held applicable to the States. Everson v. Board of Education,
330 u. s. 1, 15-16 (1947).
11
App. 4-7.
11
I d., at 4.
11
I d., at 7.
U]bi,d.

..
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minor children were exposed to ostracism from their peer
group class members if they did not participate; 16 and that
Ishmael J affree had repeatedly but unsuccessfully requested·
that the devotional services be stopped. The original complaint made no reference to any Alabama statute.
On June 4, 1982, appellees filed an amended complaint
seeking class certification, 18 and on June 30, 1982, they filed
a second amended complaint naming the Governor of Alabama and various State officials as additional defendants. In
that amendment the appellees challenged the constitutionality of three Alabama statutes: §§ 16-1-20, 16-1-20.1, and
16-1-20.2. 17
On August 2, 1982, the District Court held an evidentiary
hearing on appellees' motion for a preliminary injunction.
At that hearing, State Senator Donald G. Holmes testified
that he was the ''prime sponsor" of the bill that was enacted
in 1981 as § 16-1-20.1!8 He explained that the bill was an
"effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools . . . it
is a beginning and a step in the right direction." 11 Apart
from the purpose to return voluntary prayer to public school,
Senator Holmes unequivocally testified that he had ''no other
purpose in mind." 20 A week after the hearing, the District
Court entered a preliminary injunction. 21 The court held
that appellees were likely to prevail on the merits because
the enactment of§§ 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 did not reflect a
clearly secular purpose. 22
11

!d., at 8-9.
App. 17.
1
See nn. 1, 2, and 3, supra.
' !d., at 21.
11
!d., at 47-49.
11
!d., at 50.
• Id., at 52.
11
Jaffree v. Ja'TIUB, 544 F. Supp. 727 (SD Ala. 1982).
•See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). Insofar as
relevant to the issue now before us, the District Court explained:
"The injury to plaintiffs from the possible establishment of a religion by
the State of Alabama contrary to the proscription of the establishment
II

••
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In November 1982, the District Court held a four-day trial
on the merits. The evidence related primarily to the
1981-1982 academic year-the year after the enactment of
§ 16-1-20.1 and prior to the enactment of§ 16-1-20.2. The
District Court found that during that academic year each of
the minor plaintiffs' teachers had led classes in prayer activities, even after being informed of appellees' objections to
these activities. 23
In its lengthy conclusions of law, the District Court reviewed a number of opinions of this Court interpreting the
clause outweighs any indirect harm which may occur to defendants as a result of an injunction. Granting an injunction will merely maintain the status quo existing prior to the enactment of the statute.
"The purpose of Senate BillS [§ 16-1-20.2] as evidenced by its preamble,
is to provide for a prayer that may be given in public schools. Senator
Holmes testified that his purpose in sponsoring § 16-1-20.1 was to return
voluntary prayer to the public schools. He intended to provide children
the opportunity of sharing in their spiritual heritage of Alabama and of this
country. See Alabama Senate Journal 921 (1981). The Fifth Circuit has
explained that 'prayer is a primary religious activity in itself. . . . ' Karen
B. v. Treen, 653 F. 2d S97, 901 (5th Cir. 1981). The state may not employ
a religious means in its public schools. Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 224 [ ... ] (1963). Since these statutes do not
reftect a clearly secular purpose, no consideration of the remaining twoparts of the Lemon test is necessary.
"The enactment of Senate BillS[§ 16-1-20.2] and§ 16-1-2-.1 is an effort
on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity.
Even though these statutes are permissive in form, it is nevertheless state
involvement respecting an establishment of religion. Engle v. Vitale, 370
U. S. 421, 430 (1962). Thus, binding precedent which this Court is under
a duty to follow indicates the substantial likelihood plaintiffs will prevail on
the merits." I d., at 730-732.
• The District Court wrote:
"Defendant Boyd, as early as September 16, 1981, led her class at E. R.
Dickson in singing the following phrase:
"'God is great, God is good,'
"'Let us thank him for our food,
" 'bow our heads we all are fed,
" 'Give us Lord our daily bread.

83-812 & 83-929-0PINION
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Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and then embarked on a fresh examination of the question whether the
First Amendment imposes any barrier to the establishment
of an official religion by the State of Alabama. After reviewing at length what it perceived to be newly discovered historical evidence, the District Court concluded that ''the
establishment clause of the first amendment to the United
States Constitution does not prohibit the state from establishing a religion." 24 In a separate opinion, the District
Court dismissed appellees' challenge to the three Alabama
statutes because of a failure to state any claim for which relief
could be granted. The court's dismissal of this challenge was
"'Amen!'"
"The recitation of this phrase continued on a daily basis throughout the
1981-82 school year."
"Defendant Pixie Alexander has led her class at Craighead in reciting
the following phrase:
"'God is great, God is good,
" 'Let us thank him for our food.' "
"Further, defendant Pixie Alexander had her class recite the following,
which is known as the Lord's Prayer:
"'Our Father, which are in heaven, hallowed be Thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day
our daily bread and forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors. And
lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil for thine is the kingdom
and the power and the glory forever. Amen.'"
"The recitation of these phrases continued on a daily basis throughout the
1981-82 school year.

"Ms. Green admitted that she frequently leads her class in singing the
following song:
"'For health and strength and daily food, we praise Thy name, Oh
Lord.'"
"This activity continued throughout the school year, despite the fact that
Ms. Green had knowledge that plaintifY did not want his child exposed to
the above-mentioned song.'' Jaffree v. Board ofCCYmmisttionera of Mobile
CO'Unty, 554 F. Supp., at 1107-1108.
• I d., at 1128.
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also based on its conclusion that the Establishment Clause
did not bar the States from establishing a religion. 26
The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases; not surprisingly, it reversed. The Court of Appeals noted that this
•Jaffree v. James, 554 F. Supp. 1130, 1132 (SD Ala. 1983). The District Court's opinion was announced on January 14, 1983. On February 2,
1983, JUSTICE POWELL, in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Eleventh
Circuit, entered a stay which in effect prevented the District Court from
dissolving the preliminary injunction that had been entered in August of
1982. JUSTICE POWELL accurately summarized the prior proceedings:
"The situation, quite briefly, is as follows: Beginning in the fall of 1981,
teachers and the minor applicants' schools conducted prayers in their regular classes, including group recitations of the Lord's Prayer. At the time,
an Alabama statute provided for a one-minute period of silence 'for meditation or voluntary prayer' at the commencement of each day's classes in the
public elementary schools. Ala. Code§ 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1982). In 1982,
Alabama enacted a statute permitting public school teachers to lead their
classes in prayer. 1982 Ala. Acts 735.
"Applicants, objecting to prayer in the public schools, filed suit to enjoin
the activities. They later amended their complaint to challenge the applicable state statutes. After a hearing, the District Court granted a preliminary injunction. Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (1982). It recognized that it was bound by the decisions of this Court, id., at 731, and that
under those decisions it was 'obligated to enjoin the enforcement' of the
statutes, id., at 733.
"In its subsequent decision on the merits, however, the District Court
reached a different conclusion. Jaffree v. Board of School Commiaaionera
of Mobile County,- F. Supp.- (1983). It again recognized that the
prayers at issue, given in public school classes and led by teachers, were
violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as that
clause had been construed by this Court. The District Court nevertheless
ruled 'that the United States Supreme Court had erred.' !d., at--. It
therefore dismissed the complaint and dissolved the injunction.
"There can be little doubt that the District Court was correct in finding
that conducting prayers as part of a school program is unconstitutional
under this Court's decisions. In E1U}le v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962), the
Court held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits a State
from authorizing prayer in the public schools. The following Term, in
Murray v. Curlett, decided with School District of Abi1U}ton T01JJ'n8hip v.
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963), the Court explicitly invalidated a school

'
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Court had considered and had rejected the historical arguments that the District Court found persuasive, and that the
District Court had misapplied the doctrine of stare decisis. 28
The Court of Appeals then held that the teachers' religious
activities violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.'n With respect to§ 16-1-20.1 and§ 16-l-20.2,
the Court of Appeals stated that "both statutes advance and
encourage religious activities." 28 The Court of Appeals then
quoted with approval the District Court's finding that § 161-20.1, and§ 16-1-20.2, were efforts ''to encourage religious
activity. Even though these statutes are permissive in
district's rule providing for the reading of the Lord's Prayer as part of a
school's opening exercises, despite the fact that participation in those exercises was voluntary.
"Unless and until this Court reconsiders the foregoing decisions, they
appear to control this case. In my view, the District Court was obligated
to follow them." Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Molnle
County, 103 S. Ct. 842, 842-843 (1983).
• The Court of Appeals wrote:
"The stare decisis doctrine and its exceptions do not apply where a lower
· court is compelled to apply the precedent of a higher court. See 20 Am.
Jur. 2d Courts § 183 (1965).
"Federal district courts and circuit courts are bound to adhere to the controlling decisions of the Supreme Court. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370,
375 (1982) . . . . JUSTICE REHNQUIST emphasized the importance of
precedent when he observed that 'unless we wish anarchy to prevail within
the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by
the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those
courts may think it to be.' Davis, 454 U. S. at 375, 102 S. Ct. at 706. See
Al8o, Thurston Moto-r Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., U. S.
- , 103 S. Ct. 1343, 75 L. Ed. 2d (1983) (the Supreme Court, in a
per curiam decision, recently stated: 'Needless to say, only this Court may
overrule one of its precedents')." Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1532
(CAll 1983).
21
/d., at 1533-1534. This Court has denied a petition for a writ of certiorari that presented the question whether the Establishment Clause prohibited the teachers' religious prayer activities. Board of School Commissioners of Molnle County, Alabama v. Jaffree, U. S. (1984).
• Id., at 1535.
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fonn, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an
establishment of religion." 29 Thus, the Court of Appeals
concluded that both statutes were "specifically the type
which the Supreme Court addressed in Engle [v. Vitale, 370

u. s. 421 (1962)]."

30

A suggestion for rehearing en bane was denied over the
dissent of four judges who expressed the opinion that the full
court should reconsider the panel decision insofar as it held
§ 16-1-20.1 unconstitutional. 31 When this Court noted probable jurisdiction, it limited argument to the question that
those four judges thought worthy of reconsideration. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the other
issues presented by the appeals was affirmed. Wallace v.
Jaffree,- U.S.- (1984).
II
Our unanimous affirmance of the Court of Appeals' judg• Ibid.
• Ibid. After noting that the invalidity of § 16-1-20.2 was aggravated
by "the existence of a government-composed prayer," and that the proponents of the legislation admitted that that section "amounts to the establishment of a state religion," the court added this comment on§ 16-1-20.1:
"The objective of the meditation or prayer statute (Ala. Code § 16-120.1) was also the advancement of religion. This fact was recognized by
the district court at the hearing for preliminary relief where it was established that the intent of the statute was to return prayer to the public
schools. James, 544 F. Supp. at 731. The existence of this fact and the
inclusion of prayer obviously involves the state in religious activities.
Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (MD Tenn. 1982). This demonstrates a lack of secular legislative purpose on the part of the Alabama
Legislature. Additionally, the statute has the primary effect of advancing
religion. We do not imply that simple meditation or silence is barred from
the public schools; we hold that the state cannot participate in the advancement of religious activities through any guise, including teacher-led meditation. It is not the activity itself that concerns us; it is the purpose of the
activity that we shall scrutinize. Thus, the existence of these elements
require that we also hold section 16-1-20.1 in violation of the establishment
clause." Id., at 1535-1536
RJaffree v. Wallace, 718 F. 2d 614 (CA111983) (per curiam).

I

•

83-812 & 83-929-0PINION
10

WALLACE v. JAFFREE

ment concerning § 16-1-20.2 makes it unnecessary to comment at length on the District Court's remarkable conclusion
that the Federal Constitution imposes no obstacle to Alabama's establishment of a state religion. Before analyzing
the precise issue that is presented to us, it is nevertheless appropriate to recall how firmly embedded in our constitutional
jurisprudence is the proposition that the several States have
no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms protected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of
the United States.
As is plain from its text, the First Amendment was
adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the
individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express
himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.31 Until the Fourteenth Amendment was added to
the Constitution, the First Amendment's restraints on the
exercise of federal power simply did not apply to the States. 33
But when the Constitution was amended to prohibit any
State from depriving any person of liberty without due process of law, that Amendment imposed the same substantive
limitations on the States' power to legislate that the First
Amendment had always imposed on the Congress' power.
This Court has confirmed and endorsed this elementary proposition of law time and time again. 34
• The First Amendment provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U. S. Const.,
Arndt. 1.
•see Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans, 44

u.s. 589, 609 (1845).

"See, e. g., Maynard v. Wooley, 430 U. S. 706, 714 (1977) (right to
refuse endorsement of an offensive state motto); Terminello v. Chicago,
337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949) (right to free speech); Board of Education v. Barnett,
319 U. S. 624, 637-638 (1943) (right to refuse to participate in a ceremony
that offends one's conscience); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303

'
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Writing for a unanimous Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940), Justice Roberts explained:
''We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to
the appellants, deprives them of their liberty without
due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has
rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as
Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition oflegislation on the subject of religion has a double
aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by' law
of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form
of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as
the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law.
On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the
chosen form of religion."
Cantwell, of course, is but one case in which the Court has
identified the individual's freedom of conscience as the central liberty that unifies the various clauses in the First
(1940) (right to proselytize one's religious faith); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S.
496, 519 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring) (right to assemble peaceably); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 707 (1931) (right to publish an unpopular
newspaper); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 557, 573 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (right to advocate the cause of communism); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U. S. 652, 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (right to express an unpopular
opinion); cf. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 215, n. 6
(1963), where the Court apP.rovingly quoted Board of Education v. Minor,
23 Ohio St. 211, 253 (1872), which stated:
"The great bulk of human affairs and human interests is left by any free
government to individual enterprise and individual action. Religion is eminently one of these interests, lying outside the true and legitimate province of government."
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Amendment. 36 Enlarging on this theme, THE CHIEF JusTICE recently wrote:
"'We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment
against state action includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. See
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 633-634
(1943); id., at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring). A system
which secures the right to proselytize religious, political,
and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right
to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind.'" I d., at 637.
"'The Court in Barnette, supra, was faced with a state
statute which required public school students to participate in daily public ceremonies by honoring the flag both
with words and traditional salute gestures. In overruling its prior decision in Minersville District v. Gobitis,
310 U. S. 586 (1940), the Court held that 'a ceremony so
touching matters of opinion and political attitude may
[not] be imposed upon the individual by official authority
•For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 164 (1944),
the Court wrote:
"If by this position appellant seeks for freedom of conscience a broader
protection than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted that any of the
great liberties insured by the First Article can be given higher place than
the others. All have preferred position in our basic scheme. Schneider v.
State, 308 U. S. 147; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296. All are interwoven there together. Differences there are, in them and in the modes
appropriate for their exercise. But they have unity in the charter's prime
place because they have unity in their human sources and functionings."
See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 269 (1981) (stating that religious worship and discuasion "are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment").

~.
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under powers committed to any political organization
under our Constituiton.' 319 U. S., at 636. Compelling the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more
serious infringement upon personal liberties than the
passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate,
but the difference is essentially one of degree. Here, as
in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which
forces an individual, as part of his daily life-indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view-to be an
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable. In doing so, the
State 'invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it
is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.' I d., at 642."
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714-715 (1977).
Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from
speaking are complimentary components of a broader concept
of individual freedom of mind, so also the individual's freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to
refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority.
At one time it was thought that this right merely proscribed
the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would
not require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the
atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Mohammedism or Judaism. 311 But when the underlying princi•Thus Joseph Story wrote:
"Probably at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and of the
amendment to it now under consideration [First Amendment], the general
if not the universal sentiment in America was, that christianity ought to
receive encouragement from the state so far as was not incompatible with
the private rights of conscience and the freedom of religious worship. An
attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold
all in utter indift'erence, would have created universal disapprobation, if
not universal indignation." 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States § 1874, at 593 (1861) (footnote omitted).
In the same volume, Story continued:
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ple has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the Court
has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of
conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the
right to select any religious faith or none at all. :rr This conclusion derives support not only from the interest in respecting the individual's freedom of conscience, but also from the
conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the
"The real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, much less to
advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating chris-

tianity; but to e:x:clude all rivalry among christian sects, and to p1'6Vent any
national ecclesiastical establishment which slwuld give to a hierarchy the
e:x:clusive patT01UI{Je of the national gC11Jernment. It thw cut off the meam
of religiouB persecution (the vice and pest of former ages), and of the
subversion of the rights of comcience in matters of religion which had
been trampled upon almost from the days of the Apostles to the present
age •... " Id., at§ 1877, at 594 (emphasis supplied).
"Thus, in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), the
Court stated:
"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another."
Id., at 18 (the First Amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers"); Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 216 (1963) ("this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids
only governmental preference of one religion over another"); id., at 226
("The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a
long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel
of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experience that it is not within the power of the government to invade
that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance
or retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the State is
firmly committed to a position of neutrality"); Torasco v. Watkim, 367
U. S. 488, 495 (1961) ("We repeat and again reaffinn that neither a State
nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess
a belief or disbelief in any religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass laws
or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers,
and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God
as against those religions founded on different beliefs").
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product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful. 38 As
Justice Jackson eloquently stated in Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943):
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, re• In his "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
1785," James Madison wrote, in part:
"1. Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, 'that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.' The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as
these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is
unalienable; because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence
contemplated by their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men:
It is unalienable also; because what is here a right towards men, is a duty
towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator
such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him.
"We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is
abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly
exempt from its cognizance.
"3. Because, it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of citizens, and
one of [the] noblest characteristics of the late Revolution. The freemen of
America did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the
principle. We revere this lesson too much, soon to forget it. Who does
not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular
sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?" The Complete Madison
299-301 (1953)
See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 435 (1961) ("It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers
and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to
those the people choose to look for religious guidance'').
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ligion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein."
Alabama, no less than the Congress, must respect that basic
truth. 38
III
When the Court has been called upon to construe the
breadth of the Establishment Clause, it has examined the
criteria developed over a period of many years. Thus, in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971), we
wrote: .
"Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court
over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned
• As the Barnette opinion explained, it is the teaching of history, rather
than any appraisal of the quality of a State's motive, that supports this
duty to respect basic freed~ms:
"Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many good
as well as by evil men. Nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon but
at other times and places the ends have been racial or territorial security,
support of a dynasty or regime, and particular plans for saving souls. As
the first and moderate methods to obtain unity have failed, those bent on
its accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity. As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more
bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper division of our
people could proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary
to choose what doctrine and whose program public educational officials
shall compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the
Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity,
the Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our
present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon ftnd themselves extenninating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard." 319 U. S.,
at 640-641.
See also E11!Jel v. Vitale, 370 U. S., at 431 ("a union of government and
religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion").
'
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from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 243
(1968); finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.' Walz [v. Tax
Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970)]."

It is the first of these three criteria that is most plainly implicated by this case. As the District Court correctly recognized, no consideration of the second or third criteria is necessary if a statute does not have a clearly secular purpose. 40
At the very least, the First Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion. 41
In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask
''whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion." 42 In this case, the answer to that
question is dispositive. For the record not only provides us
with an unambiguous affirmative answer, but it also reveals
that the enactment of§ 16-1-20.1 was not motivated by any
clearly secular purpose-indeed, the statute had no secular
purpose.
• See trupra, n. 22.
"See Lynch v. Donnelly, U. S. - , (1984); id., at (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id., a t - (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL, BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ., dissenting); Mueller v. Allen, 103
S. Ct. 3062, 3066-3067 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 271
(1982); Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39,40-41 (1980) (per curiam); Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 236 (1977).
•Lynch v. Donnelly,- U . S . - , - (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) ("The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect
prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.
An afftrmative answer to either question should render the challenged
practice invalid'').
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IV
The sponsor of the bill that became § 16-1-20.1, Senator
Donald Holmes, inserted into the legislative record-apparently without dissent-a statement indicating that the legislation was an "effort to return voluntary prayer" to the public
schools.~ Later Senator Holmes confirmed this purpose before the District Court. In response to the question whether
he had any purpose for the legislation other than returning
voluntary prayer to public schools, he stated, "No, I did not
have no other purpose in mind."" The State did not present
evidence of any secular purpose.~
• The statement indicated, in pertinent part:
"Gentlemen, by passage of this bill by the Alabama Legislature our children in this state will have the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of this state and this country. The United States as well as the State
of Alabama was founded by people who believe in God. I believe this effort
to return voluntary prayer to our public schools for its return to us to the
original position of the writers of the Constitution, this local philosophies
and beliefs hundreds of Alabamians have urged my continuous support for
permitting school prayer. Since coming to the Alabama Senate I have
worked hard on this legislation to accomplish the return of voluntary
prayer in our public schools and return to the basic moral fiber." App. 50
(emphasis added).
,. /d., at 52. The District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that
the purpose of§ 16-1-20.1 was "an effort on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp.
727, 732 (SD Ala. 1882); Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CAll
1983). The evidence presented to the District Court elaborated on the
express admission of the Governor of Alabama (then Fob James) that the
enactment of§ 16-1-20.1 was intended to "clarify [the State's] intent to
have prayer as part of the daily classroom activity," compare Second
Amended Complaint 4ft 32(d) (App. 24-25) with Governor's Answer to
§ 32(d) (App. 40); and that the "expressed legislative purpose in enacting
Section 16-1-20.1 (1981) was to 'return voluntary prayer to public
schools,'" compare Second Amended Complaint 4ft4ft 32(b) and (c) (App. 24)
with Governor's Answer to 114ft 32(b) and (c) (App. 40).
• Appellant Governor George C. Wallace now argues that§ 16-1-20.1 "is
best understood as a permissible accommodation of religion" and that
viewed even in terms of the Lemon test, the "statute conforms to accept-
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The unrebutted evidence of legislative intent contained in
the legislative record and in the testimony of the sponsor of
§ 16-1-20.1 is confirmed by a consideration of the relationship
between this statute and the two other measures that were
considered in this case. The District Court found that the
1981 statute and its 1982 sequel had a common, nonsecular
purpose. The wholly religious character of the later enactment is plainly evident from its text. When the differences
between§ 16-1-20.1 and its 1978 predecessor, § 16-1-20, are
examined, it is equally clear that the 1981 statute has the
same wholly religious character.
There are only three textual differences between § 16able constitutional criteria." Brief of Appellant George C. Wallace 5; see
also Brief of Appellants Douglas T. Smith et al., 39 (§ 16-1-20.1 "accommodates the free exercise of the religious beliefs and free exercise of speech
and belief of those affected''), 47. These arguments seem to be based on
the theory that the free exercise of religion of some of the State's citizens
was burdened before the statute was enacted. The United States, appearing as amicus curiae in support of the appellants, candidly aclmowledges that "it is unlikely that a strong Free Exercise claim could be made
that time for personal prayer must be set aside during the school day."
Brief for the United States 10. There is no basis for the suggestion that
§ 16-1-20.1 "is a means for accommodating the religious and meditative
needs of students without in any way diminishing the school's own neutrality or secular atmosphere." !d., at 11. In this case, it is undisputed that
at the time of the enactment of § 16-1-20.1 there was no governmental
practice impeding students from silently praying for one minute at the beginning of each school day; thus, there was no need to "accommodate" or to
exempt individuals from any general governmental requirement because of
the dictates of our cases interpreting the Free Exercise Clause. See,
e. g., Thoma8 v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U. S. 398 (1963); see also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374
U. S. 203, 226 (1963) ("While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits
the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has
never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs''). What was missing in the appellants' eyes at time of the
enactment of§ 16-1-20.1--and therefore what is precisely the aspect that
makes the statute unconstitutional-was the State's endorsement and promotion of religion and a particular religious practice.

t ••

-·
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1-20.1 and § 16-1-20: (1) the earlier statute applies only to
grades one through six, whereas § 16-1-20.1 applies to all
grades; (2) the earlier statute uses the word "shall" whereas
§ 16-1-20.1 uses the word ''may''; (3) the earlier statute refers
only to ''meditation" whereas § 16-1-20.1 refers to "meditation or voluntary prayer." The first difference is of no relevance in this litigation because the ·minor appellees were in
kindergarten or second grade during the 1981-1982 academic
year. The second difference would also have no impact on
this litigation because the mandatory language of§ 16-1-20
continued to apply to grades one through six. 48 Thus, the
only significant textual difference is the addition of the words
"or voluntary prayer."
The legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools \
is, of course, quite different from merely protecting every
student's right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate oment of sile ce during the school day. The 1978
statute alrea y protected that right, containing nothing that
prevented any student from engaging in voluntary prayer
during a silent minute of meditation. 47 Appellants have not
identified any secular purpose that was not fully served by
§ 16-1-20 before the enactment of § 16-1-20.1. Thus, only
two conclusions are consistent with the text of§ 16-1-20.1:
(1) the statute was enacted to convey a message of State endorsement and promotion of prayer; or (2) the statute was enacted for no purpose. No one suggests that the statute was
nothing but a meaningless or irrational act. 48
• See n. 1, supra.
n Indeed, for some persons meditation itself may be a form of prayer.
B. Larson, Larson's Book of Cults 62-65 (1982); C. Whittier, Silent Prayer
and Meditation in World Religions 1-7 (Cong. Research Service).
• If the conclusion that the statute had no purpose were tenable, it
would remain true that no purpose ia not a secular purpose. But such a
conclusion ia inconsistent with the common-sense presumption that statutes are usually enacted to change existing law. Appellants do not even
suggest that the State had no purpose in enacting§ 16-1-20.1.
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We must, therefore, conclude that the Alabama Legislature intended to change existing law 411 and that it was motivated by the same purpose that the Governor's Answer to
the Second Amended Complaint expressly admitted; that the
statement inserted in the legislative history revealed; and
that Senator's Holmes testimony frankly described. The
Legislature enacted § 16-1-20.1 despite the existence of
§ 16-1-20 for the sole purpose of expressing the State's endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the beginning of each school day. The addition of "or voluntary
prayer" indicates that the State intended to characterize
prayer as a favored practice. Such an endorsement is not
consistent with the established principle that the Government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward
religion. 60
The importance of that principle does not permit us to treat
this as an inconsequential case involving nothing more than a
few words of symbolic speech on behalf of the political majority.61 For whenever the State itself speaks on a religious
• United States v. Champlin, 341 U. S. 290, 297 (1951) (a "statute
cannot be divorced from the circumstances existing at the time it was
passed"); id., at 298 (refusing to attribute pointless purpose to Congress in
the absence of facts to the contrary); United States v. N aticrrw,l City Lines,
337 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1949) (rejecting Government's argument that Congress had no desire to change law when enacting legislation).
•See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam);
Committee for Public Educatim& v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 792-793 (1973)
("A proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment
Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward religion''); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 109 (1968); Abington School
District v. Sckem'flP, 374 U. S. 203, 215-222 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U. S. 421, 430 (1961) ("Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students
is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment
Clause"); McCollum v. Board of EducatWn, 333 U.S 203, 211-212 (1948);
Everson v. Board of Educatim&, 330 U. S. 1, 18 (1947).
11
As this Court stated in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430-431 (1962):
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subject, one of the questions that we must ask is ''whether
the Government intends to convey a message of endorsement
or disapproval of religion." 52 The well-supported concurrent
findings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals-that
§ 16-1-20.1 was intended to convey a message of State-approval of prayer activities in the public schools-make it unnecessary, and indeed inappropraite, to evaluate the practical significance of the addition of the words "or voluntary
prayer" to the statute. Keeping in mind, as we must, "both
"The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated
by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those
laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not."
Moroever, this Court has noted that "[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain." Id., at 431. This comment
has special force in the public-school context where attendance is mandatory. Justice Frankfurter aclmowledged this reality in McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 2Z1 (1948~ (concurring opinion):
"That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint, it does
not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to
conscience and outside the school's domain. The law of imitation operates,
and non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children."
See also Abington School Di8trict v. Sclurmpp, 374 U. S. 203, 290 (1963)
(BRENNAN, J., concurring); cf. Marsh v. Chambers,- U. S. - , 3336
(1983) (distinguishing between adults not susceptible to "religious indoctrination" and children subject to ''peer pressure"). Further, this Court has
observed:
"That [Boards of Education] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual,
if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes." Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943).
•Lynch v. Donnelly,- U . S . - , - (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) ("The purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that a government activity have a secular purpose. . . . The proper inquiry under the
prupsoe prong of the Lemon test . . . is whether the government intends to
convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion'').

,.,.
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the fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in
our constitutional scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in
which Establishment Clause values can be eroded," 58 we conclude that§ 16-1-20.1 violates the First Amendment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.
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~early stage of this litigation, the constitutionality of ?t--o
,'t'liree Alabama statutes was questioned: (1) § 16-1-20, en- ~ acted in 1978, which authorized a one-minute period of silence
in all public schools "for meditation;" 1 (2) § 16-1-20.1, enacted in 1981, which authorized a period of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer;" 2 and (3) § 16-1-20.2, enacted in
NS

J?

Alabama Code § 16-1-20 reads as follows:
"At the commencement of the first class each day in the first through the
sixth grades in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which
each such class is held shall announce that a period of silence, not to exceed
one minute in duration, shall be observed for meditation, and during any
such period silence shall be maintained and no activities engaged in."
Appellees have abandoned any claim that § 16-1-20 is unconstitutional.
See Brief of Appellees 2.
1
Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 provides:
"At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all
public schools the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is held
may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration

I
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1982, which authorized teachers to lead "willing students" in
a prescribed prayer to "Almighty God ... the Creator and
Supreme Judge of the world.'' 8
At the preliminary-injunction stage of this case, the District Court distinguished § 16-1-20 from the other two statutes. It then held that there was "nothing wrong" with
§ 16-1-20, 4 but that § 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 were both
invalid because the sole purpose of both was "an effort on the
part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity."~ After the trial on the merits, the District Court did
not change its interpretation of these two statutes, but held
that they were constitutional because, in its opinion, Alabama has the power to establish a state religion if it chooses
to do so. 8
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's initial interpretation of the purpose of both §§ 16-1-20.1 and
16-1-20.2, and held them both unconstitutional. 7 We have
shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such
period no other activities shall be engaged in."
• Alabama Code § 16-1-20.2 provides:
"From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educational institution within the State of Alabama, recognizing that the Lord God is
one, at the beginning of any homeroom or any class, may pray, may lead
willing students in prayer, or may lead the willing students in the following
prayer to God:
"Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as the
Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, Your truth,
and Your peace abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the
counsels of our government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the classrooms of our schools in the name of our Lord. Amen."
•The court stated that it did not find any potential infirmity in§ 16-1-20
because "it is a statute which prescribes nothing more than a child in school
shall have the right to meditate in silence and there is nothing wrong with a
little meditation and quietness." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732
(SD Ala. 1982).
'Ibid.
'Jaffree v. Board of School Commissicmers of Mobile County, 554 F.
Supp. 1104, 1128 (SD Ala. 1983).
1
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535-1536 (CA111983).
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already affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding with respect
to § 16-1-20.2. 8 Moreover, appellees have not questioned
the holding that § 16-1-20 is valid. 9 Thus, the narrow question for decision is whether § 16-1-20.1, which authorizes a
period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer," is a
law respecting the establishment of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment. 10
I
Appellee Ishmael J affree is a resident of Mobile County,
Alabama. On May 28, 1982, he filed a complaint on behalf of
three of his minor children; two of them were second-grade
students and the third was then in kindergarten. The complaint named members of the Mobile County School Board,
various school officials, and the minor plaintiffs' three teachers as defendants. 11 The complaint alleged that the appellees
brought the action "seeking principally a declaratory judgment and an injunction restraining the Defendants and each
of them from maintaining or allowing the maintenance of regular religious prayer services or other forms of religious
observances in the Mobile County Public Schools in violation
of the First Amendment as made applicable to states by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." 12 The complaint further alleged that two of the children had been subjected to various acts of religious indoctrination ''from the beginning of the school year in September,
1981;" 18 that the defendant teachers had "on a daily basis" led
their classes in saying certain prayers in unison; 14 that the
'Wallace v. Jaffree, 104 S. Ct. 1704 (1984).
• See n. 1, mpro.
10
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, of course, has
long been held applicable to the States. Everson v. Board of Education,
330 u. s. 1, 15-16 (1947).
11
App. 4-7.
11
/d., at 4.
11
/d., at 7.
U[bid.
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minor children were exposed to ostracism from their peer
group class members if they did not participate; 15 and that
Ishmael J affree had repeatedly but unsuccessfully requested·
that the devotional services be stopped. The original complaint made no reference to any Alabama statute.
On June 4, 1982, appellees filed an amended complaint
seeking class certification, 18 and on June 30, 1982, they filed
a second amended complaint naming the Governor of Alabama and various State officials as additional defendants. In
that amendment the appellees challenged the constitutionality of three Alabama statutes: §§ 16-1-20, 16-1-20.1, and
16-1-20.2. 17
On August 2, 1982, the District Court held an evidentiary
hearing on appellees' motion for a prelimin
injunction.
At that hearing, State Senator Ilald -G. Holme testified
that he was the ''prime sponsor"
as enacted
in 1981 as § 16-1-20.1. 18 He explained that the bill was an
"effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools . . . it
is a egmning an a
e 1g
ec IOn. " Apart
from the purpose to return voluntary prayer to public school,
Senator Holmes unequivocally testified that he had ''no other
, e · rict
purpose in mind." 20 A wee after e
21
Co~ a preliminary injunction. The court held ] j)
that appellees were likely to prevail on the merits because
C..
the enactment of§§ 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 did not reflect a
clearly secular pur ose. 22
11

I d., at 8-9.

App. 17.
Id., at 21. See nn. 1, 2, and 3, supra.
11
I d., at 47-49.
11
Id., at 50.
• Id., at 52.
DJaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (SD Ala. 1982).
• See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). Insofar as
relevant to the issue now before us, the District Court explained:
"The injury to plaintiffs from the possible establishment of a religion by
the State of Alabama contrary to the proscription of the establishment
II

11
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In November 1982, the District Court held a four-day trial
on the merits. The evi en
e p
·
the
1981-1982'aademic year-the year after the enactment of
§ 16-1-20.1 and.miqr to the enactment of§ 16-1-20.2. The
District Court round that during that academic year each of
the minor plaintiffs' teachers had led classes in prayer actiVities, even
r eing
s o ecti
to
these activities. 23
In its lengthy conclusions of law, the District Court reviewed a number of opinions of this Court interpreting the
clause outweighs any indirect harm which may occur to defendants as a result of an injunction. Granting an injunction will merely maintain the status quo existing prior to the enactment of the statute.
"The purpose of Senate BillS[§ 16-1-20.2] as evidenced by its preamble,
is to provide for a prayer that may be given in public schools. Senator
Holmes testified that his purpose in sponsoring§ 16-1-20.1 was to return
voluntary prayer to the public schools. He intended to provide children
the opportunity of sharing in their spiritual heritage of Alabama and of this
country. See Alabama Senate Journal 921 (19S1). The Fifth Circuit has
explained that 'prayer is a primary religious activity in itself. . . . ' Karen
B. v. Treen, 653 F . 2d S97, 901 (5th Cir. 19S1). The state may not employ
a religious means in its public schools. Abington School District v.
Schmnpp, 374 U. S. 203, 224 [ ... ] (1963). Since these statutes do not
reftect a clearly secular purpose, no consideration of the remaining twoparts of the Lerrum test is necessary.
"The enactment of Senate BillS[§ 16-1-20.2] and§ 16-1-2-.1 is an effort
l on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity.
Even oug these statutes are perrrussive m orm, 1t lS neve e ess s te
involvement respecting an establishment of religion. Engle v. Vitale, 370
U. S. 421, 430 (1962). Thus, binding precedent which this Court is under
a duty to follow indicates the substantial likelihood plaintiffs will prevail on
the merits." I d., at 730-732.
• The District Court wrote:
"Defendant Boyd, as early as September 16, 1981, led her class at E. R.
Dickson in singing the following phrase:
"'God is great, God is good,'
"'Let us thank him for our food,
" 'bow our heads we all are fed,
" 'Give us Lord our daily bread.

.
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Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and then embarked on a fresh examination of the question whether the
First Amendment imposes any barrier to the establishment
of an official religion by the State of Alabama. After reviewing at length what it perceived to be newly discovered historical evidence, the District Court concluded that ''the )
establishment clause of the first amendment to the United
States Constitution does not rohibit the state from estabe opimo , t e istrict
lishing a rel!gion." :u n a sep
Co~sed appellees' challenge to the three Alabama
statutes because of a failure to state any claim for which relief
could be granted. The court's dismissal of this challenge was
"'Amen!'"
"The recitation of this phrase continued on a daily basis throughout the
1981-82 school year."
"Defendant Pixie Alexander has led her class at Craighead in reciting
the following phrase:
"'God is great, God is good,
"'Let us thank him for our food.'"
"Further, defendant Pixie Alexander had her class recite the following,
which is lmown as the Lord's Prayer:
"'Our Father, which are in heaven, hallowed be Thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day
our daily bread and forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors. And
lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil for thine is the kingdom
and the power and the glory forever. Amen.'"
"The recitation of these phrases continued on a daily basis throughout the
1981-82 school year.
"Ms. Green admitted that she frequently leads her class in singing the
following song:
"'For health and strength and daily food, we praise Thy name, Oh
Lord.'"
"This activity continued throughout the school year, despite the fact that
Ms. Green had lmowledge that plaintiff did not want his child exposed to
the above-mentioned song.'' /a/free v. Board ofCommistrionera of Mobile
County, 554 F. Supp., at 1107-1108.
16
ld., at 1128.
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also based on its conclusion that the Establishment Clause
did not bar the States from establishing a religion. 215
The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases; not surprisingly, it reversed. The Court of Appeals noted that this
. /

V
/

•Jaffree v. James, 554 F. Supp. 1130, 1132 (SD Ala. 1983). The District Court's opinion was announced on January 14, 1983. On February 2,
1983, JUSTICE POWELL, in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Eleventh
Circuit, entered a stay which in effect prevented the District Court from
dissolving the preliminary injunction that had been entered in August of
1982. JUSTICE POWELL accurately summarized the prior proceedings:
"The situation, quite briefly, is as follows: Beginning in the fall of 1981,
teachers and the minor applicants' schools conducted prayers in their regular classes, including group recitations of the Lord's Prayer. At the time,
an Alabama statute provided for a one-minute period of silence 'for meditation or voluntary prayer' at the commencement of each day's classes in the
public elementary schools. Ala. Code§ 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1982). In 1982,
Alabama enacted a statute permitting public school teachers to lead their
classes in prayer. 1982 Ala. Acts 735.
"Applicants, objecting to prayer in the public schools, filed suit to enjoin
the activities. They later amended their complaint to challenge the applicable state statutes. After a hearing, the District Court granted a preliminary injunction. Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (1982). It recognized that it was bound by the decisions of this Court, id., at 731, and that
under those decisions it was 'obligated to enjoin the enforcement' of the
statutes, id., at 733.
"In its subsequent decision on the merits, however, the District Court
reached a different conclusion. Jaffree v. Board of School Commissicmers
of Mobile County,- F. Supp.- (1983). It again recognized that the
prayers at issue, given in public school classes and led by teachers, were
violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as that
clause had been ~nstrued by this Court. The District Court nevertheless
ruled 'that the"(J nited States Supreme Court had erred.' I d., at - - . It
therefore dismissed the complaint and dissolved the injunction.
"There can be little doubt that the District Court was correct in finding
that conducting prayers as part of a school program is unconstitutional
undertJiiS Court'S declSibns. In Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962), the
Court held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits a State
from authorizing prayer in the public schools. The following Term, in
Murray v. Curlett, decided with School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963), the Court explicitly invalidated a school
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Court had considered and had rejected the historical arguments that the District Court found persuasive, and that the
District Court had misapplied the doctrine of stare decisis. 211
The Court of Appeals then held that the teachers' religious
activities violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. 27 With respec~to § 16::±:_gQJ and § 16-1-20.2,
the Court of Appeals stateo that "both statutes advance and
enco~!e!!gi~a~vities." 211 Th~en
quote<r wifllapprovar the District Court's finding that § 161-20.1, and § 16-1-20.2, were efforts "to encourage religious _, __,
activity. Even though these statutes are permissive in ~

C..A 11

district's rule providing for the reading of the Lord's Prayer as part of a
school's opening exercises, despite the fact that participation in those exercises was voluntary.
"Unless and until this Court reconsiders the foregoing decisions, they
appear to control this case. In my view, the District Court was obligated
to follow them." Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile
County, 103 S. Ct. 842, 842-843 (1983).
• The Court of Appeals wrote:
"The stare decisis doctrine and its exceptions do not apply where a lower
· court is compelled to apply the precedent of a higher court. See 20 Am.
Jur. 2d Courts § 183 (1965).
"Federal district courts and circuit courts are bound to adhere to the controlling decisions of the Supreme Court. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370,
375 (1982) . . . . JUSTICE REHNQUIST emphasized the importance of
precedent when he observed that 'unless we wish anarchy to prevail within
the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by
the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those
courts may think it to be.' Davis, 454 U. S. at 375, 102 S. Ct. at 706. See
Al8o, Thuraton Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., U. S.
- , 103 S. Ct. 1343, 75 L. Ed. 2d (1983) (the Supreme Court, in a
per curiam decision, recently stated: 'Needless to say, only this Court may
overrule one of its precedents')." Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1532
(CA111983).
rr Id., at 1533-1534. This Court has denied a petition for a writ of certiorari that presented the question whether the Establishment Clause prohibited the teachers' religious prayer activities. Board of School CommisU. S. (1984).
sioners of Mobile County, Alabama v. Jaffree, • /d., at 1535.

(

.
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fonn, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an
establishment of religion." 29 Thus, the Court of Appeals
concluded that both statutes were "specifically the type
which the Supreme Court addressed in Engle [v. Vitale, 370
421 (1962)]." 30
~
A suggestion for rehearing en bane was denied over the
dissent of four judges who expressed the opinion that the full
court should reconsider the panel decision insofar as it held
§ 16-1-20.1 unconstitutional. 31 When this Court noted probabiej\:iFiS(tiction, it limited argument to the question that
those four judges thought worthy of reconsideration. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the other
issues presented by the appeals was affirmed. Wallace v.
Jaffree,- U.S.- (1984).

u. s.

II
Our unanimous affirmance of the Court of Appeals' judg•]bid.
• Ibid. After noting that the invalidity of § 16-1-20.2 was aggravated
by "the existence of a government-composed prayer,'' and that the proponents of the legislation admitted that that section "amounts to the establishment of a state religion,'' the court added this comment on§ 16-1-20.1:
"The objective of the meditation or prayer statute (Ala. Code § 16-120.1) was also the advancement of religion. This fact was recognized by
the district court at the hearing for preliminary relief where it was established that the intent of the statute was to return prayer to the public
schools. James, 544 F. Supp. at 731. The existence of this fact and the
inclusion of prayer obviously involves the state in religious activities.
Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (MD Tenn. 1982). This demonstrates a lack of secular legislative purpose on the part of the Alabama
Legislature. Additionally, the statute has the primary effect of advancing
religion. We do not imply that simple meditation or silence is barred from
the public schools; we hold that the state cannot participate in the advancement of religious activities through any guise, including teacher-led meditation. It is not the activity itself that concerns us; it is the purpose of the
activity that we shall scrutinize. Thus, the existence of these elements
require that we also hold section 16-1-20.1 in violation of the establishment
clause." I d., at 1535-1536
RJaffree v. Wallace, 718 F. 2d 614 (CA111983) (per curiam).

~
It -I- 2-D./
V'L

~r

~-

4/J!....
~
)(,:,, .. 2tJ. "l..

(~
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ment concerning § 16-1-20.2 makes it unnecessary to comment at length on the District Court's remarkable conclusion
that the Federal Constitution imposes no obstacle to Alabama's establishment of a state religion. Before analyzing
the precise issue that is presented to us, it is nevertheless appropriate to recall how finnly embedded in our constitutional
jurisprudence is the proposition that the several States have
no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms protected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of
the United States.
As is plain from its text, the First Amendment was
adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the
individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express
himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.31 Until the Fourteenth Amendment was added to
the Constitution, the First Amendment's restraints on the
exercise of federal power simply did not apply to the States. 33
But when the Constitution was amended to prohibit any
State from depriving any person of liberty without due process of law, that Amendment imposed the same substantive
limitations on the States' power to legislate that the First
Amendment had always imposed on the Congress' power.
This Court has confinned and endorsed this elementary proposition of law time and time again. 34
• The First Amendment provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U. S. Const.,
Arndt. 1.
•see Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of Nw Orleans, 44

u. s. 589, 609 (1845).

"See, e. g., Mayrw:rd v. Wooley, 430 U. S. 705, 714 (1977) (right to
refuse endorsement of an offensive state motto); Terminello v. Chicago,
337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949) (right to free speech); Board of Education v. Barnett,
319 U. S. 624, 637-638 (1943) (right to refuse to participate in a ceremony
that offends one's conscience); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303

.·
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Writing for a unanimous Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940), Justice Roberts explained:
''We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to
the appellants, deprives them of their liberty without
due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has
rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as
Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition oflegislation on the subject of religion has a double
aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by' law
of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form
of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as
the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law.
On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the
chosen form of religion."
Cantwell, of course, is but one case in which the Court has
identified the individual's freedom of conscience as the central liberty that unifies the various clauses in the First
(1940) (right to proselytize one's religious faith); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S.
496, 519 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring) (right to assemble peaceably); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 707 (1931) (right to publish an unpopular
newspaper); Whitney v. Californi4, 274 U. S. 557, 573 (Brandeis, J ., concurring) (right to advocate the cause of communism); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U. S. 652, 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (right to express an unpopular
opinion); cf. Abington School .District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 215, n. 6
(1963), where the Court apJ!rovingly quoted Board of Education v. Minor,
23 Ohio St. 211, 253 (1872), which stated:
"The great bulk of human affairs and human interests is left by any free
government to individual enterprise and individual action. Religion is eminently one of these interests, lying outside the true and legitimate province of government."
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Amendment. 36 Enlarging on this theme, THE CmEF JusTICE recently wrote:
,____
" 'We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment
against state action includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. See
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 633-634
(1943); id., at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring). A system
which secures the right to proselytize religious, political,
and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right
to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind."' I d., at 637.
"'The Court in Barnette, supra, was faced with a state
statute which required public school students to participate in daily public ceremonies by h~g both
with words and traditional salute gestures. In overruling its prior decision in MineT81Jille District v. Gobitis,
310 U. S. 586 (1940), the Court held that 'a ceremony so
touching matters of opinion and political attitude may
[not] be imposed upon the individual by official authority
•For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 164 (1944),
the Court wrote:
"If by this position appellant seeks for freedom of conscience a broader
protection than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted that any of the
great liberties insured by the First Article can be given higher place than
the others. All have preferred position in our basic scheme. Schneider v.
State, 308 U. S. 147; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296. All are interwoven there together. Differences there are, in them and in the modes
appropriate for their exercise. But they have unity in the charter's prime
place because they have unity in their human sources and functionings."
See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 269 (1981) (stating that religious worship and discussion "are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment").
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under powers committed to any political organization
under our Constituiton.' 319 U. S., at 636. Compelling the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more
serious infringement upon personal liberties than the
passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate,
but the difference is essentially one of degree. Here, as
in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which
forces an individual, as part of his daily life-indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view-to be an
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable. In doing so, the
State 'invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it
is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.' I d., at 642."
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714-715 (1977).
~

Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from
speaking are complimentary components of a broader concept
of individual freedom of mind, so also the individual's freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to
refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority.
At one time it was thought that this right merely proscribed
the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would
not require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the
atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Mohammedism or Judaism. 311 But when the underlying princi• Thus Joseph Story wrote:
"Probably at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and of the
amendment to it now under consideration [First Amendment], the general
if not the universal sentiment in America was, that christianity ought to
receive encouragement from the state so far as was not incompatible with
the private rights of conscience and the freedom of religious worship. An
attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold
all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if
not universal indignation." 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States § 1874, at 593 (1851) (footnote omitted).
In the same volume, Story continued:

.·
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ple has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the Court
has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of
conscience protect~ by~e F~endm~he
right to select an re!i ous faith gr. n~e af ii!!; 31 "11ii8Concluston dertves support not o y from the interest in respecting the individual's freedom of conscience, but also from the
conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the
"The real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, much less to
advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating christianity; but to ncluds all rivalry amoTU} christian sects, and to prevent any
na.timtal ecclesiastical establi8hment which should give to a hierarchy the
eulUBive patronage of the national government. It thus cut off the means
of religioua peraecution (the vice and pest of fO'T"TneT ages), and of the
subversion of the rights of conscience in matters of religiqn which had
been trampled upon almost from the days of the Apostles to the present
age•••• " Id., at § 1877, at 594 (emphasis supplied).
"Thus, in Everaon v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15 (1947), the
Court stated:
"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another."
Id., at 18 (the First Amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers"); Abington
School Di8trict v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 216 (1963) ("this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids
only governmental preference of one religion over another"); id., at 226
("The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a
long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel
of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experience that it is not within the power of the government to invade
that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance
or retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the State is
firmly committed to a position of neutrality"); Torasco v. Watkins, 367
U. S. 488, 495 (1961) ("We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State
nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess
a belief or disbelief in any religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass laws
or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers,
and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God
as against those religions founded on different beliefs'').
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product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful. 38 As
Justice Jackson eloquently stated in Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943):
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, re• In his "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
1785," James Madison wrote, in part:
"1. Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, 'that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.' The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as
these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is
unalienable; because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence
contemplated by their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men:
It is unalienable also; because what is here a right towards men, is a duty
towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator
such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him.
"We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is
abridged by the iilstitution of Civil .Society, and that Religion is wholly
exempt from its cognizance.
"3. Because, it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of citizens, and
one of [the] noblest characteristics of the late Revolution. The freemen of
America did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the
principle. We revere this lesson too much, soon to forget it. Who does
not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular
sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?" The Complete Madison
299-301 (1953)
See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 435 (1961) ("It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers
and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to
those the people choose to look for religious guidance").
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ligion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein."

/

Alabama, no less than the Congress, must respect that basic
truth. 38
III
When the Court has been called upon to construe the
breadth of the Establishment Clause, it has examined the
criteria developed over a period of many years. Thus, in
L~ v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (~971), we
wrote: .
"Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court
over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned
• As the Barnette opinion explained, it is the teaching of history, rather
than any appraisal of the quality of a State's motive, that supports this

duty to respect basic freedoms:
"Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in . support of some end
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many good
as well as by evil men. Nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon but
at other times and places the ends have been racial or territorial security,
support of a dynasty or regime, and particular plans for saving souls. As
the first and moderate methods to obtain unity have failed, those bent on
its accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity. As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more
bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper division of our
people could proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary
to choose what doctrine and whose program public educational officials
shall compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the
Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity,
the Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our
present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive eliminati9n of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard." 319 U. S.,
at 640-641.
See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S., at 431 ("a union of government and
religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion").

83-812 & 83-~PINION
WALLACE v. JAFFRE:D

17

from our cases. First, th~tute must have a secular
legislativefeurpose; secon/i;-1~ principal or rimary effect
"=" e one
· eit er-advanc
or inhibits religio Board 9/:Epucation v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 243
(1968); finall~e statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.' Walz [v. Tax
Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970)]."
It is the first of these three criteria that is most plainly implicated by this~trict Court correctly recognized, no consideration
e seco d or third criteria is necessary if a statute does not have a clear! secular urpose. 40
At thevery east, the irst Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirelJ' motivated py a purpose to advance rel!gion 41
••
,___
In applying thelp\11-; ;se ~' it is appropriate to ask
"whether government's actual pur se is to endorse or diss case, the answer o that
approve of religion." 42 n
question is dispositive. For the record not only provides us
with an unambiguous affirmative answer, but it also reveals
that the enactment of§ 16-1-20.1 was not motivated by any
cl~ indeed, the s~cular
purpose.
-------.::>
~

• See B'UP"'J', n. 22.
"See Lynch v. Donnelly,- U . S . - , - (1984); id., a t (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id., a t - (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL, BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ., dissenting); Mueller v. Allen, 103
S. Ct. 3062, 3066-3067 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 271
(1982); Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam); Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 236 (1977).
• Lynch v. Donnelly, U. S. - , (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) ("The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect
prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.
An affirmative
wer to either question should render the challenged
practice mv 'd .

c •

~
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• The statement indicated, in pertinent part:
"Gentlemen, by passage of this bill by the Alabama Legislature our children in this state will have the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of this state and this country. The United States as well as the State
of Alabama was founded by people who believe in God. I believe this effort
to return voluntary prayer to our public schools for its return to us to the
original position of the writers of the Constitution, this local philosophies
and beliefs hundreds of Alabamians have urged my continuous support for
permitting school prayer. Since coming to the Alabama Senate I have
worked hard on this legislation to accompZish the return of voluntary
prayer in our public schools and return to the basic moral fiber." App. 50
(emphasis added) .
.. I d., at 52. The District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that
the purpose of§ 16-1-20.1 was "an effort on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp.
727, 732 (SD Ala. 1882); Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CAll
1983). The evidence presented to the District Court elaborated on. the
express admission of the Governor of Alabama (then Fob James) that the
enactment of§ 16-1-20.1 was intended to "clarify [the State's] intent to
have prayer as part of the daily classroom activity," compare Second
Amended Complaint , 32(d) (App. 24-25) with Governor's Answer to
§ 32(d) (App. 40); and that the "expressed legislative purpose in enacting
Section 16-1-20.1 (1981) was . to 'return voluntary prayer to public
schools,'" compare Second Amended Complaint ,, 32(b) and (c) (App. 24)
with Governor's Answer to n 32(b) and (c) (App. 40).
• Appellant Governor George C. Wallace now argues that§ 16-1-20.1 "is
best understood as a permissible accommodation of religion" and that
viewed even in terms of the Lemon test, the "statute conforms to accept-

~
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The unrebutted evidence of legislative intent contained in
the legislative record and in the testimony of the sponsor of
§ 16-1-20.1 is confirmed by a consideration of the relationship
between this statute and the two other measures that were
considered in this case. The District Court found that the
1981 st~d its 1982 sequel had a common, nonsecular
purpose. The wholly religious haracter of the later enact"Em the diffeTe"nces
ment i
·
yfdt
o its x
between§ 16-1-20.1 and its 1978 predecessor, § 16-1-20, are
examined, it is equally clear that the 1981 statute has the
same wholly religious character.
There are only three textual differences between § 16able constitutional criteria." Brief of Appellant George C. Wallace 5; see
also Brief of Appellants Douglas T. Smith et al., 39 (§ 16-1-20.1 "accommodates the free exercise of the religious beliefs and free exercise of speech
and belief of those affected"), 47. These arguments seem to he based on
the theor:y that the free exercise of religion of some of the State's citizens
~ened before the statute was eDacted.
The United States, appearing as amicus curiae in support of the appellants, candidly acknowledges that "it is unlikely that a strong Free Exercise claim could be made
that time for personal prayer must be set aside during the school day."
Brief for the United States 10. There is no basis for the suggestion that
§ 16-1-20.1 "is a means for accommodating the religious and meditative
needs of students without in any way diminishing the school's own neutrality or secular atmosphere." !d., at 11. In this case, it is undisputed that
at the time of the enactment of§ 16-1-20.1 there was no governmental
practice impeding students from silently praying for one minute at the beginning of each school day; thus, there was no need to "accommodate" or to
exempt individuals from any general governmental requirement because of
the dictates of our cases interpreting the Free Exercise Clause. See,
e. g., Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U. S. 398 (1963); see also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374
U. S. 203, 226 (1963) ("While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits
the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has
never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs''). What was missing in the appellants' eyes at time of the
enactment of§ 16-1-20.1--and therefore what is precisely the aspect that
makes the statute unconstitutional-was the State's endorsement and promotion of religion and a particular religious practice.
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1-20.1 and § 16-1-20: (1) the earlier statute applies only to
grades one through six, whereas § 16-1-20.1 applies to all
grades; (2) the earlier statute uses the word "shall" whereas
§ 16-1-20.1 uses the word "may"; (3) the earlier statute refers
only to ''meditation" whereas § 16-1-20.1 refers to "meditation or voluntary prayer." The first difference is of no relevance in this litigation because the ·minor appellees were in
kindergarten or second grade during the 1981-1982 academic
year. The second difference would also have no impact on
this litigation because the mandatory language of§ 16-1-20
continued to apply to grades one through six. 46 Thus, the
only significant textual difference is the addition of the words
"or voluntary prayer."
The legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools
is, of course, quite different from merely protectin everJ
( student's ri ht to· en ge in volun
ra er during an jlPpropriate moment ofs1 ence durin the school day. The 1978
statu e eady protecte that right, contaming nothing that
prevented any student from engaging in voluntary prayer
during a silent minute of meditation. 47 Appellants have not
identified any secular purpose that was not fully served by
§ 16-1-20 before the enactment of§ 16-1-20.1. Thus, only
two conclusions are consistent with the text of§ 16-1-20.1:
(1) the statute was ~nacted to convey a message of State endorsement and promotion of prayer; or (2) the statute was enacted for no purpose. No one suggests that the statute was
nothing but a meaningless or irrational act. 46
• See n. 1, supra.
#I Indeed, for some persons meditation itself may be a form of prayer.
B. Larson, Larson's Book of Cults 62-65 (1982); C. Whittier, Silent Prayer
. and Meditation in World Religions 1-7 (Cong. Research Service).
• If the conclusion that the statute had no purpose were tenable, it
would remain true that no purpose is not a secular purpose. But such a
conclusion is inconsistent with the common-sense presumption that statutes are usually enacted to change existing law. Appellants do not even
suggest that the State had no purpose in enacting§ 16-1-20.1.

I~
\
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We must, therefore, conclude that the Alabama Legislature intended to change existing law 48 and that it was motivated by the same purpose that the Governor's Answer to
the Second Amended Complaint expressly admitted; that the
statement inserted in the legislative history revealed; and
that Senator's Holmes testimony frankly described. The
Legislature enacted § 16-1-20.1 despite the existence of
§ 16-1-20 for the sole purpose of expressing the State's endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the beginning of each school day. The addition of "or voluntary
prayer" indicates that the State intended to characterize
prayer as a favored practice. Such an endorsement is not
consistent with the established principle that the Government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward
religion. 50
The importance of that principle does not permit us to treat
this as an inconsequential case involving nothing more than a
few words of symbolic speech on behalf of the political majority.61 For whenever the State itself speaks on a religious
• United States v. Champlin, 341 U. S. 290, 297 (1951) (a "statute
cannot be divorced from the circumstances existing at the time it was
passed"); id., at 298 (refusing to attribute pointless purpose to Congress in
the absence of facts to the contrary); United States v. Natitmal City Lines,
337 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1949) (rejecting Government's argument that Congress had no desire to change law when enacting legislation).
•See, e. g., Stone v. (}raham, 449 U. S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam);
Ccwnmitteefor Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 792-793 (1973)
("A proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment
Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward religion''); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 109 (1968); Abington School
District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 215-222 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U. S. 421, 430 (1961) ("Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students
is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment
Clause"); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S 203, 211-212 (1948);
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 18 (1947).
11
As this Court stated in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430-431 (1962):

.:
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subject, one of the questions that we must ask is ''whether
the Government intends to convey a message of endorsement
or disapproval of religion." 52 The well-supported concurrent
findings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals-that
§ 16-1-20.1 was intended to convey a message of State-approval of prayer activities in the public schools-make it unnecessary, and indeed inappropraite, to evaluate the practical significance of the addition of the words "or voluntary
prayer" to the statute. Keeping in mind, as we must, "both
"The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated
by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those
laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not."
Moroever, this Court has noted that "[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain." Id., at 431. This comment
has special force in the public-school context where attendance is mandatory. Justice Frankfurter acknowledged this reality in McCollum v.
Board of EducatUm., 333 U. S. 203, 227 (1948) (concurring opinion):
"That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint, it does
not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to
conscience and outside the school's domain. The law of imitation operates,
and non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children."
See also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 290 (1963)
(BRENNAN, J., concurring); cf. Marsh. v. Chambers,- U.S.-, 3336
(1983) (distinguishing between adults not susceptible to "religious indoctrination" and children subject to "peer pressure"). Further, this Court has
observed:
"That [Boards of Education] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual,
if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes." Board
of EducatUm. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943).
•Lynch. v. Donnelly,-- U . S . - , - (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) ("The purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that a government activity have a secular purpose. . . . The proper inquiry under the
prupsoe prong of the Lemon test ... is whether the government intends to
convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion").

I
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the fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in
our constitutional scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in
which Establishment Clause values can be eroded," 58 we conclude that§ 16-1-20.1 violates the First Amendment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affinned.

It is so ordered.

•[d., a t - .

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor

~.ll,,ll

From:

Justice Stevens

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _

M_A_¥_9_
Recirculated: _ _ _
3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 83-812

AND

83-929

v.
ISHMAEL JAFFREE

ET AL.

DOUGLAS T. SMITH, ET AL., APPELLANTS
83-929
v.
ISHMAEL JAFFREE ET AL.

[May-, 1985]

delivered the opinion of the Court.
At an early stage of this litigation, the constitutionality of
three Alabama statutes was questioned: (1) § 16-1-20, enacted in 1978, which authorized a one-minute period of silence
in all public schools "for meditation"; 1 (2) § 16-1-20.1, enacted in 1981, which authorized a period of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer"; 2 and (3) § 16-1-20.2, enacted in
JUSTICE STEVENS

' Alabama Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) reads as follows:
"At the commencement of the first class each day in the first through the
sixth grades in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which
each such class is held shall announce that a period of silence, not to exceed
one minute in duration, shall be observed for meditation, and during any
such period silence shall be maintained and no activities engaged in."
Appellees have abandoned any claim that § 16-1-20 is unconstitutional.
See Brief for Appellees 2.
2
Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) provides:
"At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all
public schools the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is held
may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration

1_9_85
__
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1982, which authorized teachers to lead "willing students" in
a prescribed prayer to "Almighty God
the Creator and
Supreme Judge of the world." 3
At the preliminary-injunction stage of this case, the District Court distinguished § 16-1-20 from the other two statutes. It then held that there was "nothing wrong" with
§ 16-1-20, 4 but that § 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 were both
invalid because the sole purpose of both was "an effort on the
part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity."5 After the trial on the merits, the District Court did
not change its interpretation of these two statutes, but held
that they were constitutional because, in its opinion, Alabama has the power to establish a state religion if it chooses
to do so. 6
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's initial interpretation of the purpose of both §§ 16-1-20.1 and
16-1-20.2, and held them both unconstitutional. 7 We have
o

o

•

shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such
period no other activities shall be engaged in."
8
Alabama Code § 16-1-2002 (Supp. 1984) provides:
"From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educational institution within the state of Alabama, recognizing that the Lord God is one,
at the beginning of any homeroom or any class, may pray, may lead willing
students in prayer, or may lead the willing students in the following prayer
to God:
"Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as the
Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, Your truth,
and Your peace abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the
counsels of our government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the classrooms of our schools in the name of our Lord. Amen."
4
The court stated that it did not find any potential infirmity in § 16-1-20
because "it is a statute which prescribes nothing more than a child in school
shall have the right to meditate in silence and there is nothing wrong with a
little meditation and quietness." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732
(SD Ala. 1982).
5
Ibid.
8
Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 554 F.
Supp. 1104, 1128 (SD Ala. 1983).
7
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d 1526, 1535-1536 (CA111983).
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already affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding with respect
to § 16-1-20.2. 8 Moreover, appellees have not questioned
the holding that § 16-1-20 is valid. 9 Thus, the narrow question for decision is whether § 16-1-20.1, which authorizes a
period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer," is a
law respecting the establishment of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment. 10
I
Appellee Ishmael Jaffree is a resident of Mobile County,
Alabama. On May 28, 1982, he filed a complaint on behalf of
three of his minor children; two of them were second-grade
students and the third was then in kindergarten. The complaint named members of the Mobile County School Board,
various school officials, and the minor plaintiffs' three teachers as defendants. 11 The complaint alleged that the appellees
brought the action "seeking principally a declaratory judgment and an injunction restraining the Defendants and each
of them from maintaining or allowing the maintenance of regular religious prayer services or other forms of religious observances in the Mobile County Public Schools in violation of
the First Amendment as made applicable to states by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." 12 The complaint further alleged that two of the children had been subjected to various acts of religious indoctrination "from the beginning of the school year in September,
1981"; 13 that the defendant teachers had "on a daily basis" led
their classes in saying certain prayers in unison; 14 that the
Wallace v. Jaffree , 466 u. s. (1984).
See n. 1, supra.
10
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, of course, has
long been held applicable to the States. Everson v. Board of Education,
330 u. s. 1, 15-16 (1947).
11
App. 4-7.
12
I d., at 4.
18
I d., at 7.
" Ibid.
8
9
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minor children were exposed to ostracism from their peer
group class members if they did not participate; 16 and that
Ishmael J affree had repeatedly but unsuccessfully requested
that the devotional services be stopped. The original complaint made no reference to any Alabama statute.
On June 4, 1982, appellees filed an amended complaint
seeking class certification, 16 and on June 30, 1982, they filed
a second amended complaint naming the Governor of Alabama and various State officials as additional defendants. In
that amendment the appellees challenged the constitutionality of three Alabama statutes: §§ 16-1-20, 16-1-20.1, and
16-1-20.2. 17
On August 2, 1982, the District Court held an evidentiary
hearing on appellees' motion for a preliminary injunction.
At that hearing, State Senator Donald G. Holmes testified
that he was the "prime sponsor" of the bill that was enacted
in 1981 as § 16-1-20.1. 18 He explained that the bill was an
"effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools ... it
is a beginning and a step in the right direction." 19 Apart
from the purpose to return voluntary prayer to public school,
Senator Holmes unequivocally testified that he had "no other
purpose in mind." 20 A week after the hearing, the District
Court entered a preliminary injunction. 21 The court held
that appellees were likely to prevail on the merits because
the enactment of§§ 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 did not reflect a
clearly secular purpose. 22
/d., at 8-9.
/d., at 17.
17
/d., at 21. See nn. 1, 2, and 3, supra.
18
/d., at 47-49.
19
/d., at 50.
20
/d., at 52.
21
Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (SD Ala. 1982).

16
18

22
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). Insofar as
relevant to the issue now before us, the District Court explained:
"The injury to plaintiffs from the possible establishment of a religion by
the State of Alabama contrary to the proscription of the establishment
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In November 1982, the District Court held a four-day trial
on the merits. The evidence related primarily to the
1981-1982 academic year-the year after the enactment of
§ 16-1-20.1 and prior to the enactment of § 16-1-20.2. The
District Court found that during that academic year each of
the minor plaintiffs' teachers had led classes in prayer activities, even after being informed of appellees' objections to
these activities. 23
In its lengthy conclusions of law, the District Court reviewed a number of opinions of this Court interpreting the
clause outweighs any indirect harm which may occur to defendants as a result of an injunction. Granting an injunction will merely maintain the
status quo existing prior to the enactment of the statutes.
"The purpose of Senate Bill8 [§ 16-1-20.2] as evidenced by its preamble,
is to provide for a prayer that may be given in public schools. Senator
Holmes testified that his purpose in sponsoring§ 16-1-20.1 was to return
voluntary prayer to the public schools. He intended to provide children
the opportunity of sharing in their spiritual heritage of Alabama and of this
country. See Alabama Senate Journal 921 (1981). The Fifth Circuit has
explained that 'prayer is a primary religious activity in itself. . . .' Karen
B. v. Treen, 653 F. 2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1981). The state may not employ
a religious means in its public schools. Abington School District v.
Schempp, [374 U. S. 203, 224] (1963). Since these statutes do not reflect a
clearly secular purpose, no consideration of the remaining two-parts of the
Lemon test is necessary.
"The enactment of Senate Bill 8 [§ 16-1-20.2] and § 16-1-20-.1 is an effort on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity.
Even though these statutes are permissive in form, it is nevertheless state
involvement respecting an establishment of religion. Engle v. Vitale, [370
U. S. 421, 430] (1962). Thus, binding precedent which this Court is under
a duty to follow indicates the substantial likelihood plaintiffs will prevail on
the merits." 544 F. Supp., at 730-732.
28
The District Court wrote:
"Defendant Boyd, as early as September 16, 1981, led her class at E. R.
Dickson in singing the following phrase:
"'God is great, God is good,'
" 'Let us thank him for our food,
"'bow our heads we all are fed,
" 'Give us Lord our daily bread.
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Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and then embarked gn a fresh examination of the question whether the
First Amendment imposes any barrier to the establishment
of an official religion by the State of Alabama. After reviewing at length what it perceived to be newly discovered historical evidence, the District Court concluded that "the
establishment clause of the first amendment to the United
States Constitution does not prohibit the state from establishing a religion." 24 In a separate opinion, the District
Court dismissed appellees' challenge to the three Alabama
statutes because of a failure to state any claim for which relief
could be granted. The court's dismissal of this challenge was
"'Amen!'
"The recitation of this phrase continued on a daily basis throughout the
1981-82 school year.
"Defendant Pixie Alexander has led her class at Craighead in reciting
the following phrase:
"'God is great, God is good,
"'Let us thank him for our food.'
"Further, defendant Pixie Alexander had her class recite the following,
which is known as the Lord's Prayer:
"'Our Father, which are in heaven, hallowed be Thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day
our daily bread and forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors. And
lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil for thine is the kingdom
and the power and the glory forever. Amen.'
"The recitation of these phrases continued on a daily basis throughout the
1981-82 school year.
"Ms. Green admitted that she frequently leads her class in singing the
following song:
"'For health and strength and daily food, we praise Thy name, Oh Lord.'
"This activity continued throughout the school year, despite the fact that ·
Ms. Green had knowledge that plaintiff did not want his child exposed to
the above-mentioned song.'' Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of
Mobile County, 554 F. Supp., at 1107-1108.
?A I d., at 1128.
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also based on its conclusion that the Establishment Clause
did not bar the States from establishing a religion. 25
The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases; not surprisingly, it reversed. The Court of Appeals noted that this
26
Jaffree v. James, 554 F. Supp. 1130, 1132 (SD Ala. 1983). The District Court's opinion was announced on January 14, 1983. On February
11, 1983, JusTICE POWELL, in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit, entered a stay which in effect prevented the District Court
from dissolving the preliminary injunction that had been entered in August
1982. JusTICE POWELL accurately summarized the prior proceedings:
"The situation, quite briefly, is as follows: Beginning in the fall of 1981,
teachers in the minor applicants' schools conducted prayers in their regular
classes, including group recitations of the Lord's Prayer. At the time, an
Alabama statute provided for a one-minute period of silence 'for meditation
or voluntary prayer' at the commencement of each day's classes in the public elementary schools. Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1982). In 1982,
Alabama enacted a statute permitting public school teachers to lead their
classes in prayer. 1982 Ala. Acts 735.
"Applicants, objecting to prayer in the public schools, filed suit to enjoin
the activities. They later amended their complaint to challenge the applicable state statutes. After a hearing, the District Court granted a preliminary injunction. Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (1982). It recognized that it was bound by the decisions of this Court, id., at 731, and that
under those decisions it was 'obligated to enjoin the enforcement' of the
statutes, id., at 733.
"In its subsequent decision on the merits, however, the District Court
reached a different conclusion. Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners
of Mobile County, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (1983). It again recognized that the
prayers at issue, given in public school classes and led by teachers, were
violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as that
Clause had been construed by this Court. The District Court nevertheless ruled 'that the United States Supreme Court has erred.' I d., at 1128.
It therefore dismissed the complaint and dissolved the injunction.
"There can be little doubt that the District Court was correct in finding
that conducting prayers as part of a school program is unconstitutional
under this Court's decisions. In Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962), the
Court held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits a State
from authorizing prayer in the public schools. The following Term, in
Murray v. Curlett, decided with Abington School District v. Schempp, 374
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Court had considered and had rejected the historical arguments that the District Court found persuasive, and that the
District Court had misapplied the doctrine of stare decisis. 26
The Court of Appeals then held that the teachers' religious
activities violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. 27 With respect to§ 16-1-20.1 and§ 16-1-20.2,
the Court of Appeals stated that "both statutes advance and
encourage religious activities." 28 The Court of Appeals then
quoted with approval the District Court's finding that § 161-20.1, and § 16-1-20.2, were efforts "'to encourage a religious activity. Even though these statutes are permissive in
U. S. 203 (1963), the Court explicitly invalidated a school district's rule
providing for the reading of the Lord's Prayer as part of a school's opening
exercises, despite the fact that participation in those exercises was
voluntary.
"Unless and until this Court reconsiders the foregoing decisions, they
appear to control this case. In my view, the District Court was obligated
to follow them." Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile
County, 459 U. S. 1314, 1314-1316 (1983).
211
The Court of Appeals wrote:
"The stare decisis doctrine and its exceptions do not apply where a lower
court is compelled to apply the precedent of a higher court. See 20 Am.
Jur. 2d Courts § 183 (1965).
·
"Federal district courts and circuit courts are bound to adhere to the controlling decisions of the Supreme Court. Hutto v. Davis, [454 U. S. 370,
375] (1982) . . . . Justice Rehnquist emphasized the importance of
precedent when he observed that 'unless we wish anarchy to prevail within
the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by
the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those
courts may think it to be.' Davis, [454 U. S. at 375]. See Also, Thurston
Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., [460 U. S. 533, 535] (1983) (the
Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, recently stated: 'Needless to say,
only this Court may overrule one of its precedents')." Jaffree v. Wallace,
705 F. 2d, at 1532.
Z7 ld., at 1533-1534.
This Court has denied a petition for a writ of
certiorari that presented the question whether the Establishment Clause
prohibited the teachers' religious prayer activities. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, Alabama v. Jaffree, 466 U. S. - - (1984).
28
705 F. 2d, at 1535.

-
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fonn, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an
establishment of religion."' 29 Thus, the Court of Appeals
concluded that both statutes were "specifically the type
which the Supreme Court addressed in Engle [v. Vitale, 370

u. s. 421 (1962)]."

30

A suggestion for rehearing en bane was denied over the
dissent of four judges who expressed the opinion that the full
court should reconsider the panel decision insofar as it held
§ 16-1-20.1 unconstitutional. 31 When this Court noted probable jurisdiction, it limited argument to the question that
those four judges thought worthy of reconsideration. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the other
issues presented by the appeals was affinned. Wallace v.
Jaffree, 466 U.S.- (1984).
II
Our unanimous affirmance of the Court of Appeals' judg211

Ibid.
Ibid. After noting that the invalidity of § 16-1-20.2 was aggravated
by "the existence of a government composed prayer,'' and that the proponents of the legislation admitted that that section "amounts to the establishment of a state religion,'' the court added this comment on§ 16-1-20.1:
"The objective of the meditation or prayer statute (Ala. Code § 16-120.1) was also the advancement of religion. This fact was recognized by
the district court at the hearing for preliminary relief where it was established that the intent of the statute was to return prayer to the public
schools. James, 544 F. Supp. at 731. The existence of this fact and the
inclusion of prayer obviously involves the state in religious activities.
Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (MD Tenn. 1982). This demonstrates a lack of secular legislative purpose on the part of the Alabama
Legislature. Additionally, the statute has the primary effect of advancing
religion. We do not imply that simple meditation or silence is barred from
the public schools; we hold that the state cannot participate in the advancement of religious activities through any guise, including teacher-led meditation. It is not the activity itself that concerns us; it is the purpose of the
activity that we shall scrutinize. Thus, the existence of these elements
require that we also hold section 16-1-20.1 in violation of the establishment
clause." Id., at 1535-1536.
31
Jaffree v. Wallace, 713 F. 2d 614 (CA111983) (per curiam).
30
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ment concerning § 16-1-20.2 makes it unnecessary to comment at length on the District Court's remarkable conclusion
that the Federal Constitution imposes no obstacle to Alabama's establishment of a state religion. Before analyzing
the precise issue that is presented to us, it is nevertheless appropriate to recall how firmly embedded in our constitutional
jurisprudence is the proposition that the several States have
no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms protected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of
the United States.
As is plain from its text, the First Amendment was
adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the
individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express
himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.32 Until the Fourteenth Amendment was added to
the Constitution, the First Amendment's restraints on the
exercise of federal power simply did not apply to the States. 33
But when the Constitution was amended to prohibit any
State from depriving any person of liberty without due process of law, that Amendment imposed the same substantive
limitations on the States' power to legislate that the First
Amendment had always imposed on the Congress' power.
This Court has confirmed and endorsed this elementary proposition of law time and time again. 34
The First Amendment provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
88
See Permoli v. Municipality No.1 of the City of New Orleans, 3 How.
589, 609 (1845).
34
See, e. g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (right to
refuse endorsement of an offensive state motto); Terminiello v. Chicago,
' 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949) (right to free speech); Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637-638 (1943) (right to refuse to participate in a
ceremony that offends one's conscience); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U. S. 296, 303 (1940) (right to proselytize one's religious faith); Hague v.
112
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Writing for a unanimous Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940), Justice Roberts explained:
".. . We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to the appellants, deprives them of their liberty
without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First
Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has
rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as
Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double
aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law
of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form
of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as
the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law.
On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the
chosen form of religion."
Cantwell, of course, is but one case in which the Court has
identified the individual's freedom of conscience as the central liberty that unifies the various clauses in the First
CIO , 307 U. S. 496, 519 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.) (right to assemble
peaceably); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 707 (1931)
(right to publish an unpopular newspaper); Whitney v. California, 274
U. S. 357, 373 (Brandeis, J. , concurring) (right to advocate the cause of
communism); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (right to express an unpopular opinion); cf. Abington School
District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 215, n. 7 (1963), where the Court approvingly quoted Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 253 (1872),
which stated:
"The great bulk of human affairs and human interests is left by any free
government to individual enterprise and individual action. Religion is
eminently one of these interests, lying outside the true and legitimate
province of government."
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Amendment. 35 Enlarging on this theme, THE CHIEF
TICE recently wrote:

Jus-

"We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment
against state action includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. See
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 633-634
(1943); id., at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring). A system
which secures the right to proselytize religious, political,
and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right
to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind.' I d., at 637.
"The Court in Barnette, supra, was faced with a state
statute which required public school students to participate in daily public ceremonies by honoring the flag both
with words and traditional salute gestures. In overruling its prior decision in Minersville District v. Gobitis,
310 U. S. 586 (1940), the Court held that 'a ceremony so
touching matters of opinion and political attitude may
[not] be imposed upon the individual by official authority
For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 164 (1944),
the Court wrote:
"If by this position appellant seeks for freedom of conscience a broader
protection than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted that any of the
great liberties insured by the First Article can be given higher place than
the others. All have preferred position in our basic scheme. Schneider v.
State, 308 U. S. 147; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296. All are interwoven there together. Differences there are, in them and in the modes
appropriate for their exercise. But they have unity in the charter's prime
place because they have unity in their human sources and functionings."
See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 269 (1981) (stating that religious worship and discussion "are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment").
86
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under powers committed to any political organization
under our Constitution.' 319 U. S., at 636. Compelling the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more
serious infringement upon personal liberties than the
passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate,
but the difference is essentially one of degree. Here, as
in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which
forces an individual, as part of his daily life-indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view-to be an
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable. In doing so, the
State 'invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it
is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.' I d., at 642."
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714-715 (1977).
Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from
speaking are complimentary components of a broader concept
of individual freedom of mind, so also the individual's freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to
refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority.
At one time it was thought that this right merely proscribed
the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would
not require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the
atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Mohammedism or Judaism. 36 But when the underlying princiThus Joseph Story wrote:
"Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of the
amendment to it, now under consideration [First Amendment], the general, if not the universal sentiment in America was, that christianity ought
to receive encouragement from the state, so far as was not incompatible
with the private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious worship.
An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to
hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation,
if not universal indignation." 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1874, p. 593 (1851) (footnote omitted).
In the same volume, Story continued:
31
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ple has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the Court
has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of
conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the
right to select any religious faith or none at all. 37 This conclusion derives support not only from the interest in respecting the individual's freedom of conscience, but also from the
conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the
"The real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, much less to
advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating christianity; lYut to exclude all rivalry among christian sects, and to prevent any
national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to a hierarchy the
exclusive patronage of the national government. It thus cut off the means
of religious persecution, (the vice and pest of former ages,) and of the
subversion of the rights of conscience in matters of religion, which had
been trampled upon almost from the days of the Apostles to the present
age .... " ld., § 1877, at 594 (emphasis supplied).
37
Thus, in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S., at 15, the Court
stated:
"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another."
ld., at 18 (the First Amendment ''requires the state to be a neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers"); Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 216 ("this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another"); id., at 226 ("The place
of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel of the
individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experience that it is not within the power of the government to invade that
citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or
retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly
committed to a position of neutrality"); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488,
495 (1961) ("We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose
requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither
can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against
those religions founded on different beliefs").
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product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful, 38 and
from recognition of the fact that the political interest in forestalling intolerance extends beyond intolerance among Christian sects-or even intolerance among "religions"-to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever and the uncertain. 39 As
88

In his "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
1785," James Madison wrote, in part:
"1. Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, 'that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the [Manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and] conviction, not by force or
violence.' The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction
and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it
as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is
unalienable; because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence
contemplated by their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men:
It is unalienable also; because what is here a right towards men, is a duty
towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator
such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him ....
We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is
abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly
exempt from its cognizance.
"3. Because, it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of citizens, and
one of [the] noblest characteristics of the late Revolution. The freemen of
America did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the
principle. We revere this lesson too much, soon to forget it. Who does
not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular
sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?" The Complete Madison
299-301 (S. Padover ed. 1953).
See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 435 (1962) ("It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers
and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to
those the people choose to look for religious guidance").
• As the Barnette opinion explained, it is the teaching of history, rather
than any appraisal of the quality of a State's motive, that supports this
duty to respect basic freedoms:
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Justice Jackson eloquently stated in Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943):
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein."
The State of Alabama, no less than the Congress of the
United States, must respect that basic truth.

III
When the Court has been called upon to construe the
breadth of the Establishment Clause, it has examined the
criteria developed over a period of many years. Thus, in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971), we
wrote:
"Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many good
as well as by evil men. Nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon but
at other times and places the ends have been racial or territorial security,
support of a dynasty or regime, and particular plans for saving souls. As
first and moderate methods to attain unity have failed, those bent on its
accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity. As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper division of our people
could proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary to
choose what doctrine and whose program public educational officials shall
compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such attempts to
compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive
to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition,
as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to
Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian
enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters.
Compulsory unification of opinion
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard." 319 U. S., at 640-641.
See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S., at 431 ("a union of government and
religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion").
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"Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court
over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned
from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 243
(1968); finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.' Walz [v. Tax
Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970)]."
It is the first of these three criteria that is most plainly implicated by this case. As the District Court correctly recognized, no consideration of the second or third criteria is necessary if a statute does not have a clearly secular purpose. 40
For even though a statute that is motivated in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion, see, e. g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 296-303
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring), the First Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion. 41
In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask
"whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion." 42 In this case, the answer to that
40

See supra, n. 22.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. - , (1984); id., at (O'CONNOR, J. , concurring); id., a t - (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL, BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ., dissenting); Mueller v. Allen, 463
U. S. 388, - - - (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S., at 271; Stone
v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam); Wolman v. Walter,
433 u. s. 229, 236 (1977).
42
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S., at (O'CONNOR, J., concurring)
("The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks
whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under
review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either question should render the challenged practice
invalid").
<~See
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question is dispositive. For the record not only provides us
with an unambiguous affirmative answer, but it also reveals
that the enactment of § 16-1-20.1 was not motivated by any
clearly secular purpose-indeed, the statute had no secular
purpose.
IV
The sponsor of the bill that became § 16-1-20.1, Senator
Donald Holmes, inserted into the legislative record-apparently without dissent-a statement indicating that the legislation was an "effort to return voluntary prayer" to the public
schools. 43 Later Senator Holmes confirmed this purpose before the District Court. In response to the question whether
he had any purpose for the legislation other than returning
voluntary prayer to public schools, he stated, "No, I did not
have no other purpose in mind." 44 The State did not present
The statement indicated, in pertinent part:
"Gentlemen, by passage of this bill by the Alabama Legislature our children in this state will have the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of this state and this country. The United States as well as the State
of Alabama was founded by people who believe in God. I believe this effort
to return voluntary prayer to our public schools for its return to us to the
original position of the writers of the Constitution, this local philosophies
and beliefs hundreds of Alabamians have urged my continuous support for
permitting school prayer. Since coming to the Alabama Senate I have
worked hard on this legislation to accomplish the return of voluntary
prayer in our public schools and return to the basic moral fiber." App. 50
(emphasis added).
"!d., at 52. The District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that
the purpose of§ 16-1-20.1 was "an effort on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp.,
at 732; Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F. 2d, at 1535. The evidence presented to
the District Court elaborated on t~e express admission of the Governor of
Alabama (then Fob James) that the enactment of§ 16-1-20.1 was intended
to "clarify [the State's] intent to have prayer as part of the daily classroom
activity," compare Second Amended Complaint ~ 32(d) (App. 24-25) with
Governor's Answer to § 32(d) (App. 40); and that the "expressed legislative
purpose in enacting Section 16-1-20.1 (1981) was to 'return voluntary
prayer to public schools,"' compare Second Amended Complaint ~~ 32(b)
and (c) (App. 24) with Governor's Answer to ~~ 32(b) and (c) (App. 40).
48
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evidence of any secular purpose. 45
The unrebutted evidence of legislative intent contained in
the legislative record and in the testimony of the sponsor of
§ 16-1-20.1 is confirmed by a consideration of the relationship
between this statute and the two other measures that were
considered in this case. The District Court found that the
1981 statute and its 1982 sequel had a common, nonsecular
purpose. The wholly religious character of the later enactment is plainly evident from its text. When the differences
Appellant Governor George C. Wallace now argues that§ 16-1-20.1 "is
best understood as a permissible accommodation of religion" and that
viewed even in terms of the Lemon test, the "statute conforms to acceptable constitutional criteria." Brief for Appellant Wallace 5; see also
Brief for Appellants Smith et al. 39 (§ 16-1-20.1 "accommodates the free
exercise of the religious beliefs and free exercise of speech and belief of
those affected"), id., at 47. These arguments seem to be based on the
theory that the free exercise of religion of some of the State's citizens was
burdened before the statute was enacted. The United States, appearing
as amicus curiae in support of the appellants, candidly acknowledges that
''it is unlikely that in most contexts a strong Free Exercise claim could be
made that time for personal prayer must be set aside during the school
day." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10. There is no basis for
the suggestion that § 16-1-20.1 ''is a means for accommodating the religious and meditative needs of students without in any way diminishing the
school's own neutrality or secular atmosphere." !d., at 11. In this case,
it is undisputed that at the time of the enactment of§ 16-1-20.1 there was
no governmental practice impeding students from silently praying for one
minute at the beginning of each school day; thus, there was no need to "accommodate" or to exempt individuals from any general governmental requirement because of the dictates of our cases interpreting the Free Exercise Clause. See, e. g., Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana Employment
Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398
(1963); see also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 226
(''While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action
to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a
majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs").
What was missing in the appellants' eyes at time of the enactment of
§ 16-1-20.1-and therefore what is precisely the aspect that makes the
statute unconstitutional-was the State's endorsement and promotion of
religion and a particular religious practice.
46
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between § 16-1-20.1 and its 1978 predecessor, § 16-1-20, are
examined, it is equally clear that the 1981 statute has the
same wholly religious character.
There are only three textual differences between § 161-20.1 and § 16-1-20: (1) the earlier statute applies only to
grades one through six, whereas § 16-1-20.1 applies to all
grades; (2) the earlier statute uses the word "shall" whereas
§ 16-1-20.1 uses the word "may''; (3) the earlier statute refers
only to "meditation" whereas § 16-1-20.1 refers to "meditation or voluntary prayer." The first difference is of no relevance in this litigation because the minor appellees were in
kindergarten or second grade during the 1981-1982 academic
year. The second difference would also have no impact on
this litigation because the mandatory language of § 16-1-20
continued to apply to grades one through six. 46 Thus, the
only significant textual difference is the addition of the words
"or voluntary prayer."
The legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools
is, of course, quite different from merely protecting every
student's right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the school day. The 1978
statute already protected that right, containing nothing that
prevented any student from engaging in voluntary prayer
during a silent minute of meditation. 47 Appellants have not
identified any secular purpose that was not fully served by
§ 16-1-20 before the enactment of§ 16-1-20.1. Thus, only
two conclusions are consistent with the text of § 16-1-20.1:
(1) the statute was enacted to convey a message of State endorsement and promotion of prayer; or (2) the statute was
enacted for no purpose. No one suggests that the statute
was nothing but a meaningless or irrational act. 46
See n. 1, supra.
Indeed, for some persons meditation itself may be a form of prayer.
B. Larson, Larson's Book of Cults 62-65 (1982); C. Whittier, Silent Prayer
and Meditation in World Religions 1-7 (Cong. Research Service 1982).
48
If the conclusion that the statute had no purpose were tenable, it
would remain true that no purpose is not a secular purpose. But such a
441
'

7
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We must, therefore, conclude that the Alabama Legislature intended to change existing law 49 and that it was motivated by the same purpose that the Governor's Answer to
the Second Amended Complaint expressly admitted; that the
statement inserted in the legislative history revealed; and
that Senator's Holmes testimony frankly described. The
Legislature enacted § 16-1-20.1 despite the existence of
§ 16-1-20 for the sole purpose of expressing the State's
endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the beginning of each school day. The addition of "or voluntary
prayer" indicates that the State intended to characterize
prayer as a favored practice. Such an endorsement is not
consistent with the established principle that the Government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward
religion. 50
The importance of that principle does not permit us to treat
this as an inconsequential case involving nothing more than a
few words of symbolic speech on behalf of the political majorconclusion is inconsistent with the common-sense presumption that statutes are usually enacted to change existing law. Appellants do not even
suggest that the State had no purpose in enacting§ 16-1-20.1.
48
United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U. S. 290, 297 (1951) (a
"statute cannot be divorced from the circumstances existing at the time it
was passed"); id., at 298 (refusing to attribute pointless purpose to Congress in the absence of facts to the contrary); United States v. National
City Lines, Inc., 337 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1949) (rejecting Government's argument that Congress had no desire to change law when enacting legislation).
50
See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S., at 42 (per curiam); Committee
for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 792-793 (1973) ("A proper
respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels
the State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward religion"); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 109 (1968); Abington School District v. Schempp,
374 U. S., at 215-222; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S., at 430 ("Neither the fact
that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from
the limitations of the Establishment Clause"); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S 203, 211-212 (1948); Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U. S., at 18.

'

'

83-812 & 83-929-0PINION
WALLACE v. JAFFREE

22

ity. 51 For whenever the State itself speaks on a religious
subject, one of the questions that we must ask is "whether
the Government intends to convey a message of endorsement
or disapproval of religion." 52 The well-supported concurrent
findings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals-that
§ 16-1-20.1 was intended to convey a message of State-approval of prayer activities in the public schools-make it unnecessary, and indeed inappropriate, to evaluate the practiAs this Court stated in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S., at 430:
"The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated
by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those
laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not."
Moroever, this Court has noted that "[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain." I d., at 431. This comment
has special force in the public-school context where attendance is mandatory. Justice Frankfurter acknowledged this reality in McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 227 (1948) (concurring opinion):
"That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint, it does
not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to
conscience and outside the school's domain. The law of imitation operates,
and non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children."
See also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 290 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 792 (1983)
(distinguishing between adults not susceptible to "religious indoctrination"
and children subject to "peer pressure"). Further, this Court has
observed:
"That [Boards of Education] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual,
if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes." Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S., at 637.
52
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S., a t - - (O'CONNOR, J., concurring)
("The purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that a government activity
have a secular purpose. . . . The proper inquiry under the purpose prong
of Lemon ... is whether the government intends to convey a message of
endorsement or disapproval of religion").
51
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cal significance of the addition of the words "or voluntary
prayer" to the statute. Keeping in mind, as we must, "both
the fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in
our constitutional scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in
which Establishment Clause values can be eroded," 53 we conclude that § 16-1-20.1 violates the First Amendment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

MJd., a t - .

